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EDITOR'S NOTE
In this issue of the Water Law Review, the authors present insightful
articles advocating for better means of preserving both water quality
and quantity. Our lead article, The California Supreme Court Reviews the

Mojave River Adjudication, offers an excellent preview of what may lie
ahead for California groundwater management. Mr. Eric Garner and
Mr. Steven Anderson provide a thorough review of California groundwater law, and analyze the state of that law in the context of new law
that may unfold as the California Supreme Court considers the serious
concerns of Mojave River Basin appropriators.
Ms. Tara Cavanaugh addresses the failure of state and federal law
to adequately protect groundwater quality in her article regarding
groundwater contamination. Ms. Cavanaugh begins with a critical
analysis of current federal regulation, then provides an instructive review of the steps taken by states and the judiciary to help remedy the
void left by federal environmental laws.
Mr. Randall Cherry presents an innovative water quality control
strategy in his article discussing effluent trading. He uses the mining
industry as a case study for his analysis and suggests that, although it
has some potential drawbacks, effluent trading may provide viable pollution control incentives acceptable to industry, regulators, and public
interests.
This issue's commentary by Mr. Richard Morrison reminds us that
we are accountable for the results of our professional activities. Mr.
Morrison discusses the perceived inapplicability of ethics to issues involving the environment and natural resources, and admonishes that
an attitude change is needed if we are to preserve a high quality of life.
Mr. Morrison challenges us to apply the same ethical standards when
dealing with natural resources and the environment as we apply to
other legal matters.
Beginning with this issue, we are pleased to present a new Conference Report section. The Conference Reports summarize recent
seminars, workshops, and professional conferences addressing topical
water related issues. The topic of this issue's report, instream flows, is
one of paramount concern to municipalities, Native American tribes,
industry, and private citizens. We anticipate that these reports will
provide our readers with a unique resource for future reflection and
research of current issues.
These articles all demonstrate that water law is continuing to
evolve. This issue is dedicated to a great water lawyer who heavily influenced today's water law landscape - Mr. Glenn Saunders. In tribute
to Mr. Saunders' contributions, we have reprinted his autobiography,
Reflections on Sixty Years of Water Law Practice. We hope you will find it

an insightful and enjoyable presentation of water law's rich history.
Debra Eiland
Editor-in-Chief

GLENN SAUNDERS
1904-1990

IN TRIBUTE
The Water Law Review respectfully dedicates its Fall 1998 issue to
Glenn Saunders, a legend among Colorado water lawyers. Born in Des
Moines, Iowa in 1904, his family soon moved to Denver where he attended high school and college. He first entered the water business in
the summer of 1918 when, at age 14, he watched the float gauges at a
Denver Union Water Company pump station. He graduated from the
University of Denver in 1926, and received his law degree from the
University of Michigan in 1929.
Mr. Saunders worked for the Denver Board of Water Commissioners from 1929 to 1969. He became Denver Water's general counsel in
1931, and was placed in charge of all water rights development in
1937. During this period he played key roles in the development of
Denver's transmountain water from the Blue, Fraser, and Williams
Fork basins. His first major water rights case was Denver v. Sheriff in
which the Colorado Supreme Court first addressed issues relating to
transmoutain diversions for municipal use.
Mr. Saunders also played a key role in the passage of the 1952
McCarran Amendment, which granted states the right to join the federal government as a defendant in state court basin wide river adjudications. He was chief counsel on 49 Colorado Supreme Court water
rights decisions in addition to numerous federal cases. This included
the 1955 Blue River Decree, which defined various water rights to the
Blue River with respect to Denver's construction of Dillon Reservoir
and the Roberts Tunnel, and remains under federal jurisdiction.
In 1969, Mr. Saunders left the Water Board to form the firm of
Saunders Snyder Ross & Dickson, where he continued to represent
Denver's water interests until his death in 1990.
In honor of Mr. Saunders valuable contributions to the field of water law, the Review has reprinted his autobiographical history of the
Denver Water Department in this issue.

IN APPRECIATION
The Waler Law Review Editorial Board and Staff wish to extend our
sincere thanks to Ms. Rebecca Welborn and Ms. Vicki Spencer for
their exceptional contribution to the journal's success.
Ms. Welborn served as Production and Assistant Editor in 19971998. She contributed tirelessly to ensuring production of the highest
quality publication, and has served as an invaluable mentor. Ms. Welborn continues to selflessly give her time for the journal's advancement. Her contributions will benefit the Review far into the future.
Ms. Spencer served as Editor-in-Chief in 1997-1998, and was instrumental in developing the solid infrastructure within which we operate today. Among other things, she spent many hours orchestrating
fund-raising, establishing relationships with university administration,
and building the journal's positive reputation.
Vicki and Rebecca, we truly appreciate your efforts and extend our
best wishes for your future success.

EDITORIAL ERROR
Due to a gross oversight by the Editorial Board, Ms. Maureen
McInerney's name was inadvertantly left off the list of Staff Members in
our Summer 1998 issue. Ms. Mclnerney is a valued member of our
staff, and this error must not be construed as a negative statement regarding her contribution to the Review. The Editorial Board extends
our sincere apology to Ms. MclInerney for this omission.
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REFLECTIONS ON SIXTY YEARS OF
WATER LAW PRACTICE*
GLENN SAUNDERS::

I have had a long history in the water business-longer than I ever
expected it to be from my first encounter in 1918. During World War
I, the Denver Union Water Company was short on responsible help. I
was a responsible boy, and a neighbor of the Water Company's Chief
Engineer. His chauffeur lived just behind us, so I had the opportunity
to drive in the Water Company's Stevens-Duryea open car to various
points in the Denver Union Water Company system. Consequently, in
the summer of 1918, 1 was hired to watch the float gauges on the clear
water basins at the Capitol Hill Pump Station in Denver. The pump
station supplied water to everyone east of the South Platte River.
These gauges had to be watched closely. There were many
wood-stave conduits in the Denver Union Water Company system. If
one of these gauges fell rapidly, it meant that a conduit had broken. If
a conduit broke, it needed to be known immediately because they provided Denver's principal supply of filtered water. At that time there
was no telemetric enunciator to locate the break, so it was important
that the gauges were watched constantly. When they fell, a notification
was immediately sent to Denver Union Water Company's central office. I worked there until November 1, 1918, when the city and county
of Denver took over the water plant from the Denver Union Water
Company after a long series of plant evaluation hearings in the United
States District Court.
During this time, I became familiar with the arguments as to
whether Denver, a municipal corporation, should own the Denver UnPreviously published in the Natural Resources Law Center Occasional Paper
Series, 1989. Reprinted with permission from the Natural Resources Law Center, Uni-

versity of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, CO.
Mr. Saunders served as General Counsel at the Denver Water Board from 1931

to 1969.

Upon leaving Denver Water, he formed the firm Saunders Snyder Ross &

Dickson, where he continued to represent Denver Water until his death in 1990. For
more information on Mr. Saunders' life, see In Tribute at the beginning of this issue.
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ion Water Company, a private enterprise. My father was a right-wing
conservative and did not believe the government should do anything
other than run a police department. Our next-door neighbor, Ben
Sweet, was a member of the first Board of Water Commissioners and a
proponent of public ownership. I had the benefit of backyard, overthe-fence arguments about the merits of public ownership versus the
merits of private enterprise.
I returned to Denver from law school in 1929 at the commencement of the Great Depression. I had absolutely no regard for the
criminal law practice in which my father was busily engaged, so I went
to my old friend, then Mayor Ben Stapleton. As a widower, he helped
raise me and inculcated in me some of his own very high ideals.
Stapleton had three basic community objectives: (1) to develop an
adequate water supply derived from the tributaries of the Colorado
River; (2) to construct a major ground transportation vehicular system;
and (3) to build a major airport. Stapleton initiated the Valley Highway (now 1-25) through a design created by engineers Crocker and
Ryan. He also secured what is now known as Stapleton International
Airport. He had his friend, Brown Cannon, who ran Windsor Farm
Dairy, quietly acquire the airport land at dry-grazing land farm prices.
Stapleton told me the Denver Water Department had a brilliant attorney named Malcolm Lindsey who was special counsel for water matters. The then existing city charter made it the duty of the City Attorney to render all legal service required by the Board of Water
Commissioners. Stapleton pointed out that the City Attorney had so
many irons in the fire that it was necessary to have a special water
counsel. He wanted me to benefit from the tutelage of Malcolm
Lindsey and to devote a major part of my energies to help create a water supply for Denver. Stapleton said the city did not pay enough
money for a man to make a decent living, so if I went to work for the
Water Board, I should maintain the right to have a private practice.
He gave me this advice even though he expected me to devote most of
my attention to creating a water supply for Denver.
I went to work for the Water Board and found its legal affairs, except for the protection of its water rights, in shambles, because Charles
H. Haines, a very competent assistant city attorney who was assigned to
the Water Department, was overloaded with other city work. He welcomed me with open arms, bounced into my office, and tossed a request for an eminent domain proceeding on my desk. He said, 'You
will find out all about eminent domain in the 6300's of the 1921 Compiled Laws." Since I was not yet licensed to practice law, he said, 'Just
sign my name to things and call me on the phone if you think you
need any advice." I immediately found myself in the midst of a number of lawsuits. The Lock Joint Pipe Company had six miles of pipe
strewn out on public highways and no right-of-way to place the pipe.
There was no negotiation team to acquire the necessary property
rights, so I became the negotiation team, the lawyer, and the financial
adviser.
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Fortunately, the Water Board had an exceedingly competent manager named Hiriam Hiltz, who was a business executive for Henry M.
Porter. Porter endowed what is now the Porter Hospital. He left the
hospital to run the Water Department after integrating the Porter gift
shop into the hospital's business. With his help and my youthful energy, we soon had the Water Board's legal affairs in pretty good shape.
I began learning water law from Mr. Lindsey. Lindsey and I made
an excellent combination. He never went to law school, but he studied
law while working as a court reporter in Trinidad. He had a grassroots education. A very quiet man, he did not like the vigor of a headto-head contest. The adversarial process is what I enjoyed most about
practicing law. Consequently, I learned water law from him, and he sat
as a spectator while I conducted litigation. I had nothing to unlearn
about Colorado water law because the subject was not taught at the
University of Michigan, where I attended law school. This enabled me
to learn water law from people who were practicing it: people such as
Watt McKendrie of Pueblo, Bill Kelly of Greeley, and Frank Delaney of
Glenwood Springs. Many other fine water lawyers who were either a
part of our team or our adversaries followed these people.
At that time, members of the Board of Water Commissioners were
the type of people that could be found on the directorate of any important utility corporation, such as the public service company, the
telephone company, or the tramway. These men, except for A. P.
Gumlick, had their own businesses to tend to and expected Water
Board employees to take a leadership role in developing the water system. Gumlick, the President of the Water Board, and his wife were financially able to devote their energies to public service. I worked very
closely with Mr. Gumlick, the manager, the engineering division, and
the accounting division in planning the development of an adequate
water supply. Denver was already a major city. Centrally located, it
looked like it would probably always be a hub in the North American
continent with a permanence found in places like Rome and London.
I was always impressed with the fact that we were building a water system that would be utilized for centuries and that every move we made
would be magnified either for better or for worse. This impressed
upon me the necessity of doing the job right the first time so that it
would not have to be corrected at great expense in the future.
In the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's, when Denver was most vigorously
developing its water supply system, the attitude of the public, the legislature, and the judiciary was generally the same as it had been since
the middle of the 19th Century: do everything you can to develop a
civilized community in this near desert country by developing our water resources for beneficial use. During the 1980's this attitude was severely diluted by a current generation which now enjoys the comfort of
a more civilized environment. The good life in Colorado, with its skiing and other recreational advantages, exists because of the careful
management of our limited water resources. Many people, often referred to as "environmentalists," have the attitude that water should be
preserved by leaving it in the streams for the fish and the fishermen,
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and that reservoir construction should be eliminated. These people
do not realize that the population of the United States is constantly increasing. Denver's population and subsequent water needs will continue to increase for many years to come. The current political trend
is to prevent further development of water supplies and to limit development by public agencies, rather than to allow the private entrepreneur to invest his money and talent in order to meet the new needs of
our growing community. This is a big change in the water law scene.
The seventeen western states are generally semi-arid. All have
adopted what is known as the appropriation doctrine with respect to
the use of streams. To encourage the development of water for beneficial use and to create a civilized community out of relatively barren
public domain, early miners, farmers, and other settlers were encouraged to expend their energy (and what little money they had) to divert
water from the natural streams and then apply it to beneficial uses,
such as growing crops, manufacturing, and supplying towns and cities.
The appropriation doctrine was created by custom. This new law was
fortified later by constitutional provisions, state and federal statutes,
and court decisions. The new law gave a priority right, over later developers, to whoever was willing to spend the time and money necessary to put water to beneficial use. Thus, in times of shortage, a priority right assured the settler priority against others, some perhaps
located farther upstream than the early settler, from taking the water
which the early settler had applied to beneficial use. This system, used
throughout the western United States, has been successful in turning
what was a barren wilderness into a productive and civilized portion of
the nation.
In permit states, where a water right cannot be created except by
permission from the government, the permit specifies the amount of
time allowed for completion of the physical structures needed to put
the water to beneficial use. The government official issuing the permit
determines what he considers to be an appropriate time within which
to complete the project. Provisions for extending that time are made
by statute. The standard for determining how much time is necessary
to complete a project is unclear. From a practical standpoint, the
courts consider the determination made by the issuing official to be
correct unless it is clearly arbitrary or unreasonable. The courts have
repeatedly recognized that a water right is created by the concurrence
of intent to appropriate water and manifestation of that intent. Property rights have been protected by conditional decrees because the
courts have respected the protection of individual property rights
against forfeiture to the government.
Of all the western states, Colorado has the simplest water system.
In every other appropriation state, whoever wants to develop water
must get permission from a government employee, usually the State
Engineer, before he can proceed. Until permission is granted, the
user does not have a date of appropriation. In Colorado, all the appropriator has to do is form intent to appropriate water and make that
intent known to anyone who might be affected by it. Historically, no

Issue 1

REFLECTIONS ON SIXTY YEARS OF WATER LAWPRACTICE

5

political influence or governmental authority has been allowed to interfere with the growth of the state. As a result, Colorado has surpassed where it would have been had the people been restricted by
government bureaucracy.
In Colorado, a property right to divert water and apply it to beneficial use is created at the moment intent and the manifestation of that
intent to the general public occurs. Originally, this property right
could be protected only by the uncertainty of a quiet title suit in court.
But one of the first acts of the legislature after Colorado became a
state was to provide a statewide system of adjudicating water rights so
that the extent of any appropriator's right would be determined in an
open, public court proceeding. Enforcement of these rights, as fixed
by the courts, has been administered by the office of the State Engineer.
The priority date of a water right is what gives it value. Often,
many years pass before water appropriated by concurrence of intent
and manifestation of intent can actually be put to beneficial use to
complete the water right. The justification for large expenditures of
money and the expectation of making good on early priority dates has
grown out of the Colorado water law concept called conditional water
rights. From the earliest days, statutes and court decisions provided
that no water may be diverted, regardless of the date of decree, except
for water applied to a beneficial use. Water may not be lawfully
wasted. When a user is finished with his water, he must return any excess to the nearest watercourse for use by others. As a result, when water is diverted from the Colorado River to the Platte River, the Platte
River user may make a succession of uses before he returns that water
to the Platte River for use by others. Denver has taken advantage of
this situation by appropriating its Colorado River water for complete
utilization to the extent it can maintain dominion over such water.
Under procedures carefully established to create Denver's Colorado
River water rights, place of use and amount of storage measurements
were carefully made and followed.
Under these practices, when Denver diverts Colorado River water
for storage in any of its reservoirs, it tracks how much water is stored at
any particular time. Theoretically, water is drawn out of storage in the
same order in which it was stored, although water from different years
is mixed in the same vessel. Since the mere storage of water does not
constitute a beneficial use, this practice became important. Until
stored water is actually used, a decree for that water remains conditional: Denver would have to go to court every four years to show it was
1. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-301(1) (1998). This provision states: "The state engineer shall be responsible for the administration and distribution of the waters of the
state, and in each division such administration and distribution shall be accomplished
through the offices of the division engineer as specified in this article."
2. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(6) (1998). Section six defines conditional water rights. It states: "'Conditional water right' means a right to perfect a water right
with a certain priority upon the completion with reasonable diligence of the appropriation upon which such water right is to be based."
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continuing to maintain its diligence toward the application of the appropriated water to a beneficial use. Denver maintains records to
show that the water first in storage is the first water out for use. Ideally, Denver will never completely drain all of its reservoirs. However,
in September 1934, the drought situation was so bad that, just before a
major flood occurred, Denver only had a four-day supply of water in
storage. Coupled with the fact that there was almost no water in the
streams for direct diversion, Denver was near catastrophe.
Under the first-in first-out theory, Denver expects to maintain substantial storage at all times to avoid being without water to fight fires or
sustain life. Under the first-in first-out theory, a reservoir can be given
an absolute decree once its full capacity has been used even though it
has not been completely drained and put to beneficial use. By providing for complete treatment of Denver's sewage returns, provisions can
be made so that no transmountain water will be wasted. Only water
that Denver cannot successfully use and reuse will ultimately be returned to the Platte River.
To serve all the city's residents, Denver's decreed rights require
successive use of diverted water through complete rehabilitation of
once used water. While the idea of recycled water may offend the sensibilities of some people, it must be remembered that everybody on the
Mississippi River uses recycled water. New Orleans is regarded as having one of the safest and best water systems in the United States because it has learned to treat Mississippi mud and turn it into beautiful,
potable water. The people downstream from Denver should not be
concerned about using recycled water.
It took Denver many years from the initiation date of its transmountain water rights to construct the facilities necessary to carry the
water to the Denver area. When these water rights were presented to
the courts for adjudication, the time-honored procedure of conditional water rights, by then protected by statute, was used. The courts
recognized the property right to appropriate water as the date intent
was formed and exhibited to the public. A court's decree is conditioned on intent followed diligently by construction of the necessary
structures, and then by actual application of the water to the intended
beneficial use. These conditional decrees recognized the validity of
the water right but conditioned their final validity on perfection of the
water right. The perfection process required application of the water
to beneficial use with due diligence, construction of the facilities, and
actual use of the water. From the earliest days, Colorado residents
have benefited from this procedure, and Denver's situation is simply
illustrative of the value of this conditional decree system.
During the early period of development, the Denver Water Board
employed a man named George M. Bull as its investigative engineer to
develop needed new water resources. On July 4, 1921, he took a party
into the field to make the survey upon which Denver's transmountain
water rights were basically founded. Denver secured a date for its
transmountain diversions for the Fraser and the Williams Fork Rivers
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on July 4, 1921, which it protected against calls on the river from the
lower basin states (principally California and Arizona) by virtue of provisions it secured in the Upper Colorado River Compact.
Denver tried to relate its Blue River priority date to the Fraser and
Williams Fork River projects in order to secure a 1921 priority date.
This attempt failed at the hands of the Colorado Supreme Court.3 Instead, the project received a 1946 priority date and has since been constructed and put into operation. The Blue River Project facilities became more effective due to a 1956 plan in which the Roberts Tunnel
Collection System facilities would bring water to the Dillon Reservoir,
then into the Two Forks Reservoir, and then to the Denver area. The
water rights which were established as a result of Bull's surveys and the
adjudications that followed enabled Denver to supply five million people with water.
A.P. Gumlick devoted most of his time to his job as President of the
Denver Board of Water Commissioners. A very frugal man from an
economic standpoint, Gumlick felt that the people of Denver should
not finance the Blue River project but instead that the project should
be financed by areas outside the city through a United States Bureau
of Reclamation project. To this end, the South Platte Water Users Association was formed with William W. Gaunt, a Brighton attorney, as its
president. This association consisted of Colorado Springs, Douglas
County, Arapahoe County, Adams County, and Jefferson County.
Representatives of these entities met at the high school in Englewood
with E. B. Debler, who was in charge of creating water projects for the
United States Bureau of Reclamation, in an endeavor to create a project now typified by the Colorado-Big Thompson project. The purpose
of this meeting was to develop the Blue River resource without the use
of Denver funds and to supply additional water to all the entities involved. Colorado Springs later joined Aurora in creating water supplies from tributaries of the Colorado River. The effort to turn the
Blue River project into a reclamation project instead of a Denver project failed at the hands of the Colorado Supreme Court, 4 and the idea
was abandoned.
Denver has been innovative in developing Colorado water law in a
number of respects. Denver believed that using water from a natural
stream for exchanges satisfied the criteria for a beneficial use for
which a priority right could be secured. Consequently, before others
began the practice, Denver secured a priority right to use natural
stream waters for exchanges to insure the proper operation of its systems. Recognizing the fungibility of the waters of natural streams,

3. City & County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d
992 (Colo. 1954). The court refused to grant a 1921 priority date because: (1) Denver
had not made a survey on the ground in the Blue River Basin as it had in the Williams
Fork Basins; (2) Denver had changed its manner of diversion; and (3) Denver failed to
demonstrate continuous effort between 1921 and 1946, the date when the final reservoir plan was approved. Id. at 1000-1001.
4. Id. at 1000.
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statutes since the nineteenth century have authorized the use of these
waters as a vehicle for trading water by placing it in a stream at one
place and removing a like amount at another. With the increasing
demand for use of natural stream water for exchanging flows, it became apparent several decades ago that conflicting demands would
mean that not all desired exchanges could be made. However, since
Denver secured the first decree granting a priority right to use water
for exchange purposes, decrees for this purpose have become quite
common.
Although one expects the United States government to try to help
all of its citizens, some federal agencies have perennially opposed Denver's development of a water supply. Government witnesses testified,
many years ago, that the waters which were appropriated from the
tributaries of the Colorado River were not needed by the people of
Denver. Figures were brought together, particularly by Randy Riter of
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, to show that Denver's population
growth would not be what the Denver Water Department projected.
The Water Department's predictions have been entirely corroborated
by actual events over the last fifty years (1935-1985).
It is not surprising that Denver's estimate of future water needs has
proved accurate. The principal bases for these estimates were
long-range projections by business interests in the community. These
business entities invested and risked their money based on their predictions of the size of the population that would eventually have to be
served with water. The Water Department made its own projections, as
did the gas and electric utility, the telephone utility, and voluntary
commerce and industrial organizations. The 1988 estimates of growth
were challenged by environmental groups opposed to changing the
natural environment. Their aim was to conserve Colorado's rivers.
The beneficiaries of this civilization forget that the loss of natural river
flows has made it possible to live in a civilized environment. Our
highly developed urban, agricultural, and industrial civilization was
created by taking water from natural streams. Often overlooked is the
fact that the eastern slope rivers, such as the Platte and the Arkansas,
supported a very limited irrigation community until reservoirs were
built to store spring floods for use later in the summer.
An example of the great benefit that storage conservation provides
is the South Platte River. By building reservoirs in the mountains,
Denver made it possible to have a year-around supply of water. Much
of that water is used to create a beautiful environment full of trees,
shrubs, flowers and lawns, which now characterize the city that was
once a near desert. These projects, as well as the Aurora project which
brought outside water and storage water into the Platte River, have
created a continuous flow of water in the South Platte River. In the
early days, the South Platte went dry in August or September, so no
suitable nesting habitat could be found for migrating birds along the
Platte in Colorado or Nebraska. There simply was not any water. Bird
habitat was injured by the spring floods which tended to channelize
temporarily and then disappear. After a hundred years of urban and
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irrigation development, the Platte River is now a haven, not only for
people but also for various fish and waterfowl. Every new project for
which there is a water supply such as the Two Forks Reservoir, tends to
increase this natural bounty.
A different phase in the development of the Denver water system
relates to the Williams Fork project. During the Depression of the
1930's, governmental agencies worked to find ways to put the economy
back in motion. Cities, states, and the federal government all promoted public projects. One way to do this was through the Public
Works Administration, under which the United States would pay a
percentage of local public project costs. Although the Denver Charter
required the entire cost of the Denver water system operation to be
paid from rates charged to consumers, nothing in the charter prevented Denver from accepting gifts. Denver's Williams Fork project
provided for a tunnel from the Williams Fork River, a tributary of the
Colorado River, into Clear Creek, a tributary of the South Platte River.
During this period, Denver began having problems treating its
sewage effluent. One potential solution was to use high quality water
to dilute sewage as it entered the South Platte River. There was an
abandoned canal, called the White Cap, which ran from Clear Creek
to a point on the Platte River, where its outfall would mingle with various raw sewage outfalls in Denver before the polluted water would be
used by others. While the waters of the Williams Fork had been appropriated for all municipal purposes, building a canal system and a
tunnel under Jones Pass from the Williams Fork River to Clear Creek
was still in the survey and design stage.
Denver had the good fortune of having its outstanding engineer,
George Bull, selected by the United States government to approve
various public works projects for the region which included Colorado.
Denver Water Board personnel presented a plan to him for immediate
completion of the Williams Fork system and a plan to meet the dilution water requirements of the State Health Department. It did not
take long to convince Mr. Bull-he was already familiar with the program as he had originally designed the outlines and assisted in the
preparation of the appropriation filings.
During construction of the project, the standards for sewage
treatment were raised considerably so that mere dilution was no longer
adequate. The question of whether sewage dilution was a beneficial
use of water did not receive ajudicial determination. But, the system
was put into operation in order to bring water from western Colorado
to the Platte River basin for customary beneficial uses. Instead of using
the White Cap Canal, it was economically feasible to drive the Vasquez
Tunnel from Clear Creek into the Moffat Tunnel system, thus combining the waters of the Williams Fork River with those of the Fraser River
for use in the Denver water system. Because these steps were purely
mechanical and did not change the ultimate purpose of the appropriated water, no court proceedings were required for their consummation.
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To accommodate Denver's need to recycle its sanitary sewage to
meet acceptable standards, it became necessary to move the place of
Denver's sewage effluent return from a point above a major ditch to a
point below that ditch. If the change was made, the ditch would not
have received the same volume of return flow. The ditch company
contested Denver's right to make this change. The Colorado Supreme
Court held that Denver, as the appropriator of the water that went
through the sanitary sewers, was not obligated to continue its practice
of returning such water to a natural watercourse at the same place.'
I conceived of another developed water concept in Pikes Peak Golf
Club, Inc. v. Kuiper. In that case, Roy Pring transformed an area underlain by impervious shale where most of the water was consumed by
plant life. Only occasionally would water spill into Fountain Creek, a
tributary of the Arkansas River. By draining the swampy area and husbanding the water very carefully, a golf course was created and, for the
first time, substantial amounts of water spilled into Fountain Creek.
The State Engineer claimed this water for appropriators on Fountain
Creek and ordered the golf course to cease its operations and effectively deliver the two hundred forty acre-feet that had formerly been
consumed by plant life and evaporation to water users on Fountain
Creek. The Supreme Court held in my favor. Historically, the two
hundred forty acre-feet of water were not tributary waters and were,
therefore, not subject to administration by the State Engineer under
the priority system.' As a result, the golf course was allowed to use the
salvaged water.
At this point, a distinction must be made between developed water
and salvaged water. Developed water is water that was never part of a
natural watercourse, or it is tributary ground water which is really part
of a surface stream. Salvaged water is water that was part of a natural
stream or might become part of a natural stream but for changes
brought about by the act of man. The leading case regarding salvaged
water, Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District v. Shelton Farms,
Inc.,8 is a decision written by Justice Edward C. Day, noted for his practical horse sense approach to solving legal problems. It is well known
that salt cedars in the bed of the Arkansas River, much like cotton5. Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal Dist. No. 1 v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 499 P.2d 1190, 1193-94 (Colo. 1972). The court stated that changes of points
of return of waste water are not governed by the same rules as changes of points of diversion. Id. at 1193. The court also stated it is conceivable that there may be instances
in which a change of point of return may be enjoined, but the present case was not
one of those instances. Id.
6. Pikes Peak Golf Club, Inc. v. Kuiper, 455 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1969).
7. Id. at 884-85. The court stated that the authority of water officials to administer
water is limited to that which has become a part of, or is tributary to, a natural stream.
The court defined a natural stream to consist of surface waters, the underftow which
supports these surface waters, and tributary water. Where a person, by his own efforts
has increased the flow of water in a natural stream, he is entitled to the use of the water to the extent of the increase.
8. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529
P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1975).
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wood trees, evaporate large amounts of water from the stream in which
they are located. In Shelton Farms, landowners removed salt cedars
from their lands and claimed a right to the excess water in the stream
as a result of the removal. This was clearly not a new or developed
source of water and any attempt to define it or administer it without
injuring senior appropriators would have been next to impossible.
The Supreme Court rejected the idea that salvaged water was free from
the call of the river.9
Recently, Red Giffen, a retired Forest Service employee, wrote a
letter to the editor of a Denver newspaper pointing out that in heavily
forested areas very little precipitation, whether rain or snow, ever
reaches the ground so that it flows into streams. He pointed out that
careful timber cutting could result in more water reaching the flowing
streams. Such cutting would leave stands of timber adjacent to clearcut areas where small, newly grown trees would not prohibit precipitation from reaching the ground. Such a procedure, over wide areas,
could produce substantially more water in natural streams. The letter
did not note the cost of this type of timber operation or of replanting.
Those costs would have to be weighed against the cost of cloud seeding
in areas tributary to natural streams where heavy timber cover would
not prevent precipitation from reaching the streams. The need for
such procedures seems to be far in the future, when the population of
the United States increases to the point that water supplies become a
desperate necessity.
On the basis of distinguishing between "speculation" and "appropriation," the Supreme Court recently indicated that unless an appropriator knew where he was going to put the water, had a market for it,
and could demonstrate he had the water, he could not make an appropriation.' Within 60 days of this decision, the Colorado legislature
passed definitive legislation to provide guidelines reaffirming the conditional decree statutes." In an earlier case, an appropriator from the
tributaries of the Fraser River simply said he wanted to use the water in
eastern Colorado, where he knew there was need for a supply. A decree for this appropriation was affirmed. 2 Under this earlier philoso-

9. Id. at 1327.
10. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d
566 (Colo. 1979). The court stated:
Our constitution guarantees a right to appropriate, not a right to
speculate. The right to appropriate is for Use [sic], not merely for
profit. As we read our constitution and statutes, they give no one
the right to preempt the development potential of water for the anticipated future use of Others [sic] not in privity of contract, or in
any agency relationship, with the developer regarding that use. To
recognize conditional decrees grounded on no interest beyond a
desire to obtain water for sale would as a practical matter discourage
those who have need and use for the water from developing it.
Id. at 568.
11. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) (1998); COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92103(3) (a) (1998).
12. Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Dev. Co., 106 P.2d 363, 368 (Colo. 1940).
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phy, the High Line Canal, which was one hundred fifty miles in length,
was built by English capital to serve land which had not yet been patented and where the settlers had not yet arrived to use the water. Appropriation was confirmed only after the settlers arrived, patented the
land, and put the water to beneficial use."3
As has been correctly stated by the Colorado Supreme Court on
several occasions, water developers, whether public or private, cannot
afford to make great expenditures of money in the development of a
water resource without the assurance of a decree that entitles them to
the water they propose to put to beneficial use. It has always been recognized that such a decree, for its final effectiveness, would be dependent on completion of the appropriation with due diligence. To
assure that the proposed appropriator was not merely speculating, it
was required that he make a showing every four years, in the case of a
project taking many years to develop, that he was diligently pursuing
his appropriation. The four year requirement of a showing of due
diligence was expected to weed out the speculators who might simply
attempt to tie up the water supply of a stream in the hope of someday
finding a way to make use of it. In Vidler, the Colorado Supreme Court
seemed to change its Taussig philosophy. However, the legislature
passed a definitive statute shortly after the decision in Vidler furnished
the criteria on which future decisions of developers and courts must be
based. This assumes, of course, that the legislature had the authority
to pass the statute under the Colorado Constitution and that the Colorado Supreme Court is bound to follow laws as passed by the legislature regardless of personal views.
Rather than further examining Vidler, we therefore looked to the
new statute. Passed in 1986, the first thing to note is that the statute
ratified the granting of conditional decrees. In title 37, article 92, section 103(3) (a) of the Colorado Code, we find the words "but no appropriation of water, either absolute or conditional, shall be held to
occur when the proposed appropriation is based upon the speculative
sale or transfer of the appropriative rights to persons not parties to the
proposed appropriation ...04 Reference to "either absolute or conditional" is a clear ratification of the long-standing practice that decrees for uncompleted appropriations are to be conditioned upon actual appropriation of the water put to beneficial use. The language
continues, giving the courts criteria, not for due diligence, but only for
what is considered to be a speculative appropriation.
13.
14.

Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irrigating Co., 17 P. 487 (1888).
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1998).

15. Id. The statute defines speculation as a situation where "[tihe purported appropriator of record does not have either a legally vested interest or a reasonable expectation of procuring such interest in the lands or facilities to be served by such appropriation, unless such appropriator is a governmental agency or an agent in fact for
the persons proposed to be benefited by such appropriation." It also provides as
speculative a situation where "[t]
he purported appropriator of record does not have a
specific plan and intent to divert, store, or otherwise capture, possess, and control a

specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses."
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The first criterion for what is to be considered speculative occurs
when the purported appropriator has neither a legally vested interest
nor a reasonable expectation of procuring such an interest in the
lands or facilities to be served by such appropriation. This is true unless the appropriator is a governmental agency or an agent-in-fact for
the persons proposed to be benefited by the appropriation. '6 This
language grants a special preference to a governmental agency or one
who is an agent-in-fact for the persons proposed to be benefited by the
appropriation. Section 6 of article XVI of the Colorado Constitution
militates against any special preference with the words "[tihe right to
of any natural stream to beneficial
divert the unappropriated waters
7
uses shall never be denied.'
Next, it must be noted that, in the Wheeler case, the High Line Canal could not have secured its date of appropriation. Not only did the
builders lack a vested interest in the lands to be served, but the settlers
had not even arrived. On the other hand, the next alternative may
save the situation. The alternative provides that the purported appropriator of record must have a specific plan and intent to divert, store
or otherwise capture, possess, or control a specific quantity of water for
specific beneficial uses. 8 This language almost brings us back to Taussig, but not quite. In Taussig, the appropriator had a general plan to
carry water from tributaries of the Fraser River and the Colorado River
watershed to somewhere in the South Platte River watershed. 9 There
was already a sufficient shortage of water so that it was a practical certainty that someone would make beneficial use of the water once it arrived in the Platte River watershed. A change in the statute required a
specific plan which would necessarily require a fairly close definition,
not only of the source of water, but particularly as to the place and
character of its use. The facts in the Wheeler case should meet this criterion.
While it has always been well-established that the Colorado Constitution authorizes appropriation for use and not for speculation, there
was no legislative definition of speculation until 1979 with the adoption of title 37, article 92, section 103(3) (a) (I) of the Colorado Code.
The language of the statute is somewhat uncertain in that it says "no
appropriation of water... shall be held to occur when the proposed
appropriation is based upon the speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative rights... 20 This language did not specifically eliminate
appropriation by an individual who was personally speculating as to
how he might apply the water to beneficial use, but did eliminate the
individual's speculation with respect to selling or transfering the water.
Such a concept may have little practical relationship to present-day
conditions because appropriations today are made on a relatively large
16. Id.
17. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (II) (1998).
19. Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Dev. Co., 106 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1940).
20. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1998).
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scale.
In 1979, the legislature added a new concept with these words:
No claim for a conditional water right may be recognized or
a decree therefor granted except to the extent that it is estab
lished that the waters can be and will be diverted, stored, or
otherwise captured, possessed, and controlled and will be
beneficially used and that the project can and will
2 be com'
pleted with diligence and within a reasonable time.
This language requires an appropriator to have the gift of prophecy. The word "established," if literally applied, would make further
appropriations impossible. When it comes to actual application of this
word, the judiciary will probably relate the word "established" to the
concept of burden of proof. This means that if the evidence makes it
reasonable to assume that there would probably be water available,
and the "specific plan" referred to in title 37, article 92, section
103(3) (a) (II) of the Colorado Code 22 appears by competent evidence
to be supported, a decree can be granted.
The National Reclamation Association ("NRA") was a voluntary
group that represented all of the reclamation states, that is, those
states that relied on the appropriation of water as the basis of their social fabric. The Denver Board of Water Commissioners, which had all
the powers of the city to manage and operate its waterworks system
and plant, strongly supported the NRA. Because of this, and as an attorney for the Board, I held a long tenure on the NRA's Resolutions
Committee. One of the most active NRA programs was integrating
United States' claims for water into the water rights systems of each of
the reclamation states.
Working under the auspices of the NRA, I prepared what was
known as the Barrett Bill, named for the Wyoming representative who
introduced the bill. The bill simply provided that the United States
could only acquire water in a state pursuant to the laws of that state.
This comports with the Reclamation Act, which provides that the
United States, with respect to its reclamation projects, must acquire
water under state law.'
The concept gradually filtered through to
Congress. In 1952, Senator McCarran of Nevada attached the substance of the matter to another bill as an amendment. 4 When Senator

21. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(9) (b) (1998).
22. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (II).

23. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1994). The provision provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to effect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory
relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water
used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the

Secretary of the Interior... shall proceed in conformity with such
laws ....

24. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
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McCarran brought the matter to the point that there was going to be a
hearing and recommendation to the Senate, I received a telephone
call from Judge Sturrock from Texas. He was active in the NRA. He
said it was time for me to get to Washington and support the association's viewpoint.
In these hearings, my adversary was Bill Veeder, a Colorado lawyer
who practiced law in Colorado Springs, but left to work for the United
States Department ofJustice. Veeder started the Santa Margaritacases
in California (which nearly caused a revolution). 5 He was a very dedicated public servant and truly believed that the United States should
supersede the powers of all individual states. He believed in a dominant federal government and made the case on behalf of the federal
agencies before the Senate Committee. He said the United States had
so many water rights that it would take several years to prepare the
cases for adjudication. Thirty-five years later, the Department of Justice is making the same plea in cases for adjudication of water rights
and is asking for postponement because they have not had time to find
out what they need or want.
The necessity for integrating U.S. water claims into the state administration system was emphasized by the Colorado Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Stone wrote:
Water rights cannot in fact be adjudicated as to part of the
claimants only. They are relative both as to time and
amount. None is certain unless all are determined. If the
contention of Government immunity be true, then all the
many water adjudication proceedings in Colorado and elsewhere in which the rights of the United States have been
submitted by its officers and have been adjudicated by the
court have resulted in decrees void as to the United States
and therefore uncertain as to the rights of all other parties.
If this contention be true, the landowner who is so fortunate
as to have the use of other taxpayers' money through the
Reclamation Bureau in building his reservoir or ditch is exempt from our statutory proceedings for adjudication of his
water rights, and the arm of the state is paralyzed in this vital
function, at least until such time as the officers of the Federal
Government see fit in their superior wisdom to bring action
in the Federal Court.26

25. See California v. United States, 235 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1956). The case concerned an action, brought by the United States, against three thousand defendants to
quiet title to water rights claimed to be appurtenant to lands acquired in 1941-1943
and used for various purposes of the Army and Navy. Id. at 652. The history of this
litigation appears in United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 101 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.
Cal. 1951); United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. Cal. 1952);
United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 109 F. Supp. 28 (S.D. Cal. 1952); United

States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 110 F. Supp. 767 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
26. City & County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d
992, 1011-12 (Colo. 1954).
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The McCarran Amendment allowed parties to join the United
adjudication of rights to the
States as defendants in any suit ',27
"for the
i
use of water from a river system or "for the administration of such
rights.""8 It provided that when the United States was a party to any
such suit, the United States should be deemed to have waived any right
to plead that state laws were inapplicable.2 It also prohibited the
United States from pleading that it is not amendable by reason of its
sovereignty," and that the United States should be subject to the
'judgments, orders and decrees of the court having jurisdiction."' "
The effectiveness of the McCarran Amendment was attacked by the
United States. Ken Balcomb, a Glenwood Springs attorney who represented the Colorado River Water Users, took on the Department of
Justice so effectively that the United States Supreme Court held that
the McCarran Amendment meant just what it said: that an adjudication of water rights could be of any substantial segment of a water system and did not have to cover an entire water system, as the United
States insisted. It was an obviously correct decision, and had it gone
pursuant to the contentions of the United States Department of justice, there would have been no tribunal to hear adjudications of the
Colorado River waters that run through seven states.
After passage of the McCarran Amendment, a quiet title suit in a
Salt Lake City federal court was turned back by the federal judge to the
local courts. However, Judge Knous of Montrose, the judge in the
United States District Court in Denver, retained jurisdiction in the
federal court of a quiet title suit by the U.S. Department ofJustice in
an effort to evade the effect of the McCarran Amendment. This would
have been appealed by Denver except that Denver finally worked out a
settlement regarding Denver's Blue River diversions to the United
States Green Mountain Reservoir on the Blue River. The result is now
known as the Blue River Decree. 2 I was living in an oxygen tent at that
time because of asthma. The actual negotiations were carried on by
Harold Roberts, who was assisted by John Dickson. I appeared from
time to time under heavy medication, emerging from my oxygen tent
for a few hours. When it appeared that a negotiated settlement could
not be reached, I contacted Ramsey Clark, a top legal person in the
Department of Justice in Washington, and we worked out the sticking
point by phone so that a negotiated decree was reached.
In spite of the plain language of the McCarran Amendment-that
the United States could not plead that state laws are inapplicable in

27. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1994).
28. Id.; see also Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976).
29. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See generally United States v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 608 F.2d
422, 426-29 (10th Cir. 1979) (interpreting the Blue River Decree).
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the adjudication of water rights,33 the Colorado Supreme Court, relying on U.S. Superior Court decisions growing out of the protection of4
rights.1
Indian rights, held that the United States has certain reserved
This case has sometimes been referred to as Denver . A similar case
which arose in a different 3water division but covering the same issues
I.5
became known as Denver

Denver I is a leading case resolving the relationship between the
United States government and the people of Colorado with respect to
water. It reflects efforts, commenced more than ten years earlier, to
define the position of the United States. United States officers and
employees had taken the general position that the United States was
above and beyond any authority of the individual sovereign states and
did not have to comply in any respect with state water law. However,
jurisdiction over the United States has been obtained in every water division in the state.
The extent of United States water rights was pushed in Water Divisions No. 1 and No. 5. In Water Division No. 1, in Denver II, the trial
judge, Donald A. Carpenter, entered a declaratory judgment on the
basis of the pleadings. 36 Judge Carpenter had been steeped in water
law from the time he assisted his father, Delph Carpenter, in putting
together the Colorado River Compact. Judge Carpenter held that federal reserved water rights did not exist in Colorado; that Colorado laws
were applicable to the United States; and that by accepting Colorado
into the union, a state whose constitution provided that all of the waters of the state belonged to the state itself, the United States had recognized that the water of the reclamation states belonged to the people of those states.37 It was also noted that the property of the United
States could only be disposed of by an act of Congress, and, with the
statutes just mentioned, there had been a disposal by Congress of the
Court refused to upwaters of the reclamation states. The Supreme
3
hold the trial court's decision in Denver lI.

In Denver I, the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged that:
39
"[t]he doctrine of federal reserved water rights is judicially created.
There has never been an act of Congress creating reserved rights. The
Colorado Supreme Court subsequently stated:
Based upon a recognition of Congress' underlying power, the
United States Supreme Court has constructed a body of law,

derived by judicial implication from congressional actions,

33. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a).
34.

United States v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 17-20 (Colo. 1982) [here-

inafter Denver 1].
35. City & County of Denver v. United States, 656 P.2d 36 (Colo. 1982) (hereinafter Denver I1).
36. See id. at 38.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 39.
39. Denver I, 656 P.2d at 17.
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holding that: "Congress, in giving the President the power to
reserve portions of the federal domain for specific federal
purposes, impliedly authorized him to reserve 'appurtenant
water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purposes of the reservation.' 40
Despite Colorado's peculiar constitutional provision that all waters
of Colorado belong to the people of Colorado,4 ' the Colorado Supreme Court felt obliged to follow the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. It held that the United States does have reserved
rights in unappropriated waters available at the time of a land reservation because without such rights, the purpose of the land reservation
would be wholly defeated. Since then, in a matter concerning the oil
shale claims of the United States, the Colorado Supreme Court has
held that the United States can amend an original application; however, the priority date is set on the date of the amendment, not the
date of the original application. It must also be republished as if it
were a new application, thus upholding Colorado's antedation law.43
The first major water rights case in which I was involved was City &
County of Denver v. Sheriff44 The case involved Denver's appropriation
of water for carriage through the pioneer bore of the Moffat Tunnel
from the headwaters of the Fraser River in western Colorado into the
Platte River Basin in eastern Colorado. At that time it was as if Colorado were actually two states: Colorado I, where the capitol was located, east of the Continental Divide, and Colorado II, west of the
Continental Divide. The judges, lawyers, legislators, and local officials
in Colorado II had their own water law for western Colorado. It
seemed as if they had never heard of the Colorado Constitution. Consistent with the theory that the constitution was foreign to those in
Colorado II, the trial judge, Charles C. Herrick, held that Denver
could not transport any water out of the Colorado River Basin until it
had exhausted its water resources in the Platte River Basin. 5
As meticulous, accurate, and faithful to the letter of the law as
Malcolm Lindsey was, he was utterly shocked by this ruling, which was
made from the bench at about 10:30 a.m. one morning. Afterwards,
the judge announced that the court would reconvene at one o'clock to
hear motions. It was a fine day, so A. P. Gumlick and I thought about
what had to be done in court after lunch and decided to enjoy the day.
Lindsey went off by himself in a high state of disbelief to prepare a mo-

40. Id.
41. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. The provision provides: "The water of every natural

stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared
to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of
the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided."
42. Denver 1, 656 P.2d at 19-20.
43. United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1986).
44. City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1939).
45. See generally id.
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tion for a new trial. When we got back to court at one o'clock, Lindsey
was so upset that after two sentences he turned the matter over to me.
I thereupon dictated the basis for the decree I thought we ought to
have. This basis subsequently became the decision of the Colorado
Supreme Court, which affirmed the constitutional provisions regarding designated uses of the waters of natural streams.46 The court instructed the lower court that the constitution covered the entire state
of Colorado-Colorado II as well as Colorado I.
It should be noted that my views of western Colorado judges extended to their beliefs about transmountain diversions rather than to
their general competency or integrity. The same Judge Herrick, while
sitting in a trial in Brighton, Colorado that required the use of Italian
interpreters, rather violently pounced on a dishonest interpreter who
was giving me trouble even though I was the attorney who was involved
in the Sheriff case. The interpreter did not realize that Judge Herrick
had been raised in the coal mine country of western Colorado and
spoke Italian as fluently as he did English. The very much surprised
interpreter correctly formulated questions and answers after Judge
Herrick vigorously corrected him from the bench.
Because of my law practice outside the Board of Water Commissioner's business, I have also been involved in the application of the
constitutional provision that no special commission created by the legislature may take control of any municipal assets. The Colorado Supreme Court, itself a state agency, has not favored this limitation on
the powers of state agencies and has found ways to limit it, particularly
in the electric field. Under the constitutional provision, a municipally-owned water system may not have its rates or practices governed
by the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, a special commission
created by the legislature." The provision
was followed in a matter in48
volving the Denver Water Department.
Water law has developed to the point where it is more than a question of putting water to beneficial use. It has become the law of water
quality and the character of return flows. It is no longer enough to
have a water supply. When a developer plans to create more housing,
more manufacturing, or more office facilities, water for these enterprises must be disposed of without impairing the quality of the waters
into which the return flows are inserted. Consequently, the field of
water law has become a field of environmental law, in which the legal
adviser must contemplate not only securing a supply but also disposing
of that supply in a safe and economical manner.

46. Id. at 840-45.
47. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 35. The provision provides: "The general assembly shall
not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power
to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property, or
effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal
function whatever."
48. City of Englewood v. City & County of Denver, 229 P.2d 667, 671-73 (Colo.
1951).
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Colorado water law is a complete deviation from the old English
common law, which required natural streams to flow undiminished in
quantity. Necessity in this arid region created a new common law that
encouraged the removal of water from streams to meet the needs of a
civilized society. But the law continues to follow the part of the old
English common law that required natural streams to be left unimpaired in quality. In what is known as the Chain O'Mines case, 0 placer
miners in Clear Creek Canyon polluted a stream so that the downstream farms receiving this water were filtering out the mill tailings by
applying it to their fields. In a field of corn which was a quarter mile
in length along the distribution system, the first corn would be a foot
high while the corn at the end of the row would be five or six feet tall.
In a suit to enjoin the miners, District Judge Charles C. Sackmann in
the Denver District Court held that a reasonable amount of discharge
had to be permitted because both the miners and the agriculturists
had to be accommodated." The Colorado Supreme Court reversed
the lower court in the Chain O'Mines case, stating that the miners had
no right to pollute the stream to a quality below that of the natural watercourse.5 ' This was particularly important because it affected the waters of Clear Creek. This early legal pronouncement is emphasized
more and more today.
Decrees giving a fight to divert water for beneficial use referred entirely to volumes of water and not at all to the quality of that water.
This matter came up when the Pueblo Reservoir, constructed in the
stream bed of the Arkansas River, changed the quality of the river.
The Bessemer Ditch, which had always been sealed by the natural
sediment in the Arkansas River, became porous and leaky when the
reservoir provided clear water rather than the heavily sedimented water nature had provided. The court was strongly divided over this case.
The original majority held that an appropriator had the right to the
natural quality of a stream without man-made modifications of that
quality. On rehearing, Justice Don Kelly changed his position and accepted what originally had been the minority view-that only water is
subject to appropriation, and therefore, the appropriator has no right
to the quality of water in the stream as it was in its natural state.53
What the final majority opinion overlooked was the fact that the
Colorado Constitution does not merely state that pure water is subject
to appropriation, but states the "water of every natural stream" is subject to appropriation." This certainly does not refer to distilled water
or pure water. In the dissenting opinion, which originally was the majority opinion byJustice William Erickson, appears the sentence: "I sin-

49. Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 44 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1934).

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1027-28.
A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 589 P.2d 57 (Colo. 1978).
Id. at 61-62.
54. COLO. CONsT. art. XVI, § 5.
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55
cerely hope that this Court will reconsider this issue in future years.'
These issues are part of a developing law to which the legislature must
give consideration if it expects the Colorado Supreme Court to avoid
becoming a legislative body to fill a vacuum not filled by the legislature.
The gist of A-B Cattle is that the change in stream content was
man-made because clean water was delivered from the Pueblo Reservoir, just as in Chain O' Mines. Nobody today questions that it is unlawful to dump man-made toxic material into a natural stream. The final
decision in A-B Cattle overlooked the fact that the change in water
quality complained of was man-made. The recent New Mexico case of
EnsenadaLand & Water Ass'n v. Sleeper' involved a transfer of a decreed
right which worked a man-made change in the quality of stream flow.
The court relied on A-B Cattle and allowed the change, again overlooking the fact that the change in water quality was man-made.57
A change in the philosophy of what constitutes a beneficial use has
occurred since 1860. As the United States has developed, Colorado
has become a national asset, not only as an educational and technical
center, but also as a recreational, ranching and agricultural center.
Some of Colorado's best value is found in its high mountains, its forests, and in its streams. A very early statute permitted the floating of
logs on our streams. With modern transportation, this statute can be
repealed as unnecessary. On the other hand, river rafting and kayaking have become major sports and a major economic benefit to Colorado. The diversion of water out of the streams has the effect of diminishing their flow and impairing this kind of use. Long ago when,
such a use was not even considered. It certainly would not have been
thought of as a beneficial use. Beneficial use must necessarily mean
utility for the needs of mankind. Mankind today wants river rafting,
and consequently the maintenance of streams for this use has become
a beneficial use which was not in existence at the time Colorado water
law was first envisioned. However, Colorado law does not adequately
address this problem: it attempts to give the state of Colorado the sole
right to appropriate water for this beneficial use, even though the constitution clearly says that the right to appropriate water for beneficial
use shall never be denied to anyone.58

55.
56.
57.
58.

A-B Cattle, 589 P.2d at 62.
Ensenada Land & Water Ass'n v. Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 792.
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. The provision provides:
The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream
to beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation
shall give the better right as between those using the water for the
same purpose; but when the waters of any natural stream are not
sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the same,
those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those using the
water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the same for manufacturing purposes.
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Water diversion is totally unnecessary for the preservation of Colorado's forests except for the low value Blue Spruce, which must have its
feet wet. Other evergreens obtain all their water nourishment from
their needles. However, forests can provide substantial storage where
the trees are open, so that they act as a windbreak to drop blowing
snow into open space where it can reach natural watercourses. Under
a law passed by the United States Congress, the national forests are to
be maintained for the purpose of providing a continuous supply of water and timber.59 These two objectives are consistent. Timber cutting
provides open space for precipitation to fall. It also improves the flow
of air so that snow and rain will get to the earth, where both timber
and water are supplied. This is why there should be no wilderness areas where there are forests because they are unproductive and inaccessible for recreation to about 98% of the American public. Cutting
trees to create ski slopes provides open space where snow can fall and
also provides economic benefit to the state. Ski areas require a domestic water supply, which means that a substantial amount of
high-altitude water must to be retained to sustain the ski industry.
Waters from Colorado's natural watercourses flow out of the state
and into other states. Broadly speaking, legal rights to the waters of
interstate streams are treated the same way as waters moving from one
fully sovereign state to another. In Europe, water moves in international streams from one nation to another. Each of these nations is
sovereign. The same thing is true of the states of the United States except to the extent that the states have given up a portion of their sovereignty to the Union. The basic law of interstate streams in the
United States is the same as the law of international streams between
fully sovereign nations. There are many refinements, but basically,
each sovereign has the right to an equitable apportionment of the waters of an interstate stream. The equity is based on preservation of the
existing civilization. This requires consideration of matters such as
maintenance of commerce and water quality. International law protecting commerce is strongly influenced by the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution, as recently illustrated in Sporhase v. Nebraska,60 a matter not directly within the experience of the writer.
Well within the immediate experience of the writer, however, is the
Colorado River Compact and the Upper Colorado River Compact.
The operation of the terms of the Colorado River Compact should be
of great concern to the Upper Basin states. The Lower Basin states of
the Colorado River Drainage Basin endeavor to create a perception
that, aside from the Mexican commitment, the states of the Upper Basin must supply them with 7.5 million acre-feet of water from the Colorado River at Lee's Ferry each year, regardless of any deficiency in
59. 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1994). The provision states that "[n]o national forest shall be
established, except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the
purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States .
60. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1981).
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runoff. If there is less than 15 million acre-feet of water available at
Lee's Ferry in any year, the entire shortage must be borne by the Upper Basin. The time is approaching when this concept should be rectified.
Article III (a) of the compact apportions 7.5 million acre-feet of water to the Upper Basin and 7.5 million acre-feet to the Lower Basin.
When the compact was entered into, it was thought that there were
substantially more than 15 million acre-feet available for diversion. Article 111(b) therefore provided for the Lower Basin to increase its beneficial consumptive use by 1 million acre-feet per year. In addition,
paragraph (c) provided water for the Republic of Mexico in the event
of a surplus above the 16 million acre-feet provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b). Subparagraph (c) also provided that if there was
not a sufficient surplus to meet the Mexican obligation, the burden of
any such deficiency would be borne equally by the Upper and Lower
Basins, again emphasizing an equal division of responsibility. Subparagraph (f) provided for a further equitable apportionment, any
time after October 1, 1963, if the 16 million acre-feet had been totally
consumed. Since 1963, the river has never reached 15 million
acre-feet, and consequently, all thought of a further apportionment
has been abandoned. In order to avoid the injury which might occur
as the result of a particularly dry year or dry period, article 111(d) attempted to implement equal division of water between the Upper and
Lower Basins by providing a ten-year running average of 75 million
acre-feet, rather than requiring 7.5 million acre-feet each and every
year.
Article 111(c) does not provide a mechanism to address the additional apportionment provided for in article 111(b) in the event of a
shortage, but it clearly makes the additional apportionment of article
111(b) water a burden to be borne equally by the Upper and Lower Basins. Careful consideration should be given to the proposition that article III(b) apportionment was not intended to interfere with the basic
apportionment of the 15 million acre-feet, but was only supposed to be
effective if there was a surplus over that amount. Those in the Upper
Basin who are responsible for implementation of the Colorado River
Compact and the Upper Colorado River Compact need to keep in
mind that article 111(a) and (b) are apportionments of water. Article
III(d) is not an apportionment, but simply a device to implement the
apportionment. When the Lower Basin seeks to use article III(d) as a
guarantee of 7.5 million acre-feet of water annually, it must bear in
mind that there is an evident intent in the compact to divide the water
equally between the Upper and Lower Basins. Article III(d) is simply
an ill-conceived manner of dividing the water equally based on a mutual mistake of fact.
The State Engineer's office is well aware of the fact that of the
twenty-six years of recorded flow at Lee's Ferry prior to the negotiation
of the compact, the last twenty-four years far exceeded 150 million
acre-feet per decade of water available for division. The fact is that the
division was made on recorded flows which were the highest in the en-
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tire history of the Colorado River and have not been met since the
making of the compact. The facts were sufficiently obscure at the time
of the compact negotiations so that the states believed there would be
a substantial amount of water available for further division among
them in the future. To that end, they provided a date for future diversion. The date has long since passed, and there is no surplus. As a
matter of fact, there is a deficiency of water when full utilization of allotment is made by each state.
In addition to physically recorded flows, we now have access to tree
ring records which confirm the fact that the compact was made on a
mistaken set of facts. For instance, the flows used as the basis for division of water among the Colorado River Basin states were the highest
since the year 1500. In addition, we are now aware of five drought periods which have occurred in the course of history that lasted more
than thirty years each. It is now also certain that the flows at Lee's
Ferry are much less than the 15 million acre-feet of water needed between the Upper and Lower Basins. In fact, the river may become so
deficient that unless there is equal division between the Upper and
Lower Basins, in which the Upper Basin is held to a 75 million
acre-foot delivery at Lee's Ferry for each successive ten-year period,
there will be a substantial reduction in water for the Upper Basin
states.
As a matter of equity and justice, the Lower Basin is entitled to
know now, before it spends more money on further water development, that it does not have an assured supply of 75 million acre-feet
every ten successive years. The time has come for the Upper Basin
states to join together in litigation in order to reform the Colorado
River Compact, which is a contract and a treaty among the states. Reformation of a contract can be made to conform to the true facts because the contract was made upon the basis of a mutual mistake of
fact. The reformation should be on the basis of securing an equal division between the Upper and the Lower Basins which would simply require a change of the number to meet the now proven situation.
There is no reason to try to renegotiate the entire Colorado River
Compact. It has been in operation for more than 60 years. It is the
basis for judicial decisions, the Upper Basin Compact, and federal legislation. These all rely on the equal division of water between the Upper and Lower Basins of the Colorado River. The principles of the
compact are sound: an equal division of water between the Upper and
the Lower Basins. The compact should simply be reformed to reflect
its intent in light of the now known availability of water.
From a tacit standpoint, Colorado should not undertake a reformation effort alone. This should be a unanimous effort by all of the
Upper Basin states. Colorado has historically been the leader, not only
in creating water law but also in creating relations with other states.
This is true, due not only to the capability of its people, but because
water flows out of Colorado into other states with practically no water
flowing into Colorado. This creates a necessity for Colorado to protect
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its interests either by judicial decision or compact involving downstream states. Although the principles stated above were delineated by
a group of Coloradans a number of years ago, it turned out that the
political climate was adverse for Colorado to exercise leadership at that
point.

THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT REVIEWS
THE
MOJAVE RIVER ADJUDICATION
ERIC

L. GARNER AND STEVEN M. ANDERSON:

Introduction .................................................................................
I.
California Groundwater Law ................................................
A . Com m on Law ..........................................................
B. State Groundwater Control ....................................
C. Local Government Management ...........................
II.
The M ojave Basin ................................................................
A. The Trial Court Decision ......................................
B. The Appellate Court's Decision .............................
III. California Water Law Doctrines ............................................
A. Development of the Reasonable Use Doctrine .........
B. Physical Solutions ...................................................
C. Equitable Apportionment ......................................
IV. Issues Facing the California Supreme Court .........................
V.
Conclusion ..........................................................................

26
27
27
32
33
35
35
39
42
42
49
51
56
59

INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court's decision to review the Mojave Basin adjudication brings with it hope that the court will deliver some
much needed clarity to, and guidance on, certain aspects of California
water law. The appellate court decision in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency' applied principles of strict priority based predominantly on
traditional notions of the relationship among different types of water
rights. As this article will demonstrate, the California Supreme Court
has virtually never used a rigid scheme of prioritization when resolving
water rights disputes. Indeed, with the wide range of options available

Mr. Garner and Mr. Anderson practice at the Southern California law firm Best
Best & Krieger. BBK specializes in water, environmental, natural resources, and endangered species law. The firm represents numerous public agencies, including the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, the California State Water Contractors, and other local water agencies, as well as private clients. One of BBK's senior
partners is currently serving as a special master for the United States Supreme Court in
a water rights dispute between two states. Firm water law attorneys have also authored
the definitive book on California water issues, California Water, written numerous articles on Western water law issues, and conducted trials and pursued appeals before all
levels of California state and federal courts.
1. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 64 Cal. App. 4th
737 (1998), petitionfor review granted, 961 P.2d 398, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. 1998).
For the convenience of California practitioners, the editors have included parallel citations for California cases cited in this article.
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to resolve the Mojave problem, the only surprise might be if the supreme court chooses to apply principles of strict priority.
Section I of this article provides an overview of California groundwater law. Section II discusses the background and setting of the Mojave case and the appellate court's opinion. Section III discusses the
development of several water law doctrines that have played a role in
previous California Supreme Court decisions and that will probably influence the high court's decision in this case. Section IV lays out some
of the issues now facing the California Supreme Court, including the
role of equitable apportionment and physical solutions in groundwater
adjudications, the scope of the reasonable use doctrine, the concept of
certainty, and the modern relevance of traditional notions of vested
water rights.
I.

CALIFORNIA GROUNDWATER LAW

A. Common Law
California and Texas are the only western states without some form
California groundwater is
of statewide groundwater regulation.
chiefly governed by common law doctrines and the State Constitution.
Although the State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB" or
"State Board") has broad authority to control surface water appropriations, the State Board does not regulate percolating groundwater.3
Consequently, groundwater disputes have frequently been resolved in
court.
California law recognizes three types of groundwater: defined underground streams, the underflow of surface streams, and percolating
waters. 4 The law of surface water rights governs diversions from defined underground streams and from the underflow of surface
streams. 5 All underground waters not fitting into these two categories,
including waters in underground basins and waters that have escaped
from streams, are considered percolating waters. There is a presumption that groundwater is percolating.7
2. See generally Eric Behrens & Mathew G. Dore, Rights of Landowners to Percolating
Groundwaterin Texas, 32 S.TEX. L. REv. 185, 192 (1991); Karen H. Norris, The Stagnation of Texas Ground Water Law: A Political v. Environmental Stalemate, 22 ST. MARY's L.J.
493, 507-09 (1990); David Todd, Common Resources, Private Rights and Liabilities: A Case
Study on Texas Groundwater Law, 32 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 233, 249, 257-59 (1992); TEX.
WATER CODEANN. § 52.002 (West Supp. 1994).
3. See CAL. WATER CODE § 175 (West 1997). See generally id., §§ 1250-1845 (outlining SWRCB's duties regarding surface water appropriation).
4. Arroyo Ditch & Water Co. v. Baldwin, 100 P. 874, 875, 155 Cal. 280, 284 (1909);
CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1997).

5. Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 81 P.2d 533, 561, 563-64, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 556,
560-62 (1938); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 495-96, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 375-76
(1935); City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 597-98, 124 Cal. 597, 630, 632
(1899); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200-1201 (West 1997).
6. Vineland Irr. Dist. v. Azusa Irr. Co., 58 P. 1057, 1059, 126 Cal. 486, 494 (1899);
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200, 2500 (West 1997).

7.

Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924-
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The doctrines of correlative rights and reasonable use restrict the
use of percolating groundwater. In Katz v. Walkinshaw, the California
Supreme Court rejected the English doctrine of absolute ownership
for the more equitable correlative approach. The doctrine of correlative rights affords all overlying landowners equal rights to available water.9 Each overlying owner is entitled to take all water that it can beneficially use on its overlying land, so long as there is sufficient water in
the basin to meet all needs.'0 Because overlying owners hold mutual
and reciprocal rights, in times of groundwater scarcity each user is limited to a proportionate, ecuitable share of the total amount available
based on reasonable need.
Groundwater reasonably and beneficially utilized on property overlying the groundwater basin from which it is pumped is traditionally
use.
considered paramount to an appropriative non-overlying
Groundwater exported from an overlying area for out of basin use is
considered an appropriation because it does not return to the basin
for further use.' Only surplus groundwater is available for appropriation.
The California Supreme Court's landmark 1949 decision in City of
Pasadena v. City of Alhambra added a new principle to the correlative
rights doctrine. 4 There, most of the substantial pumpers in the Raymond Basin, both overlying and appropriative, were joined in a lawsuit
to determine rights to a groundwater basin that had been declining for
twenty-two of the previous twenty-four years. 5 Plaintiff City of Pasathat pumping should be limited to the safe yield of the
dena claimed
6
basin.

The Pasadenacourt agreed to limit pumping to the safe yield of the
basin and articulated the doctrine of "mutual prescription" to determine which pumpers should curtail their total extractions to ensure
the basin's long-term health. 7 The court held that all parties who had
appropriated water from the basin after the overdraft began, and before the complaint was filed, acquired prescriptive rights against all
25, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1001 (1975).
8. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 141 Cal. 116 (1903).

9. Id. at 771, 141 Cal. at 133.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12.

Corona Foothill Lemon Co. v. Lillibridge, 66 P.2d 443, 444, 8 Cal. 2d 522, 525

(1937).
13. Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918,

924, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1000 n.6, 1001 (1975).
14. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 33 Cal. 2d 908 (1949).
15. Id. at 22-23, 26, 33 Cal. 2d at 916, 922.

16. Id.
17. Id. at 27, 29-30, 33 Cal. 2d at 924, 926-28.
18. A prescriptive water right is a permanent right to use water acquired when the
essential elements for adverse use are present for the required period of time described by the applicable statute of limitations. 1 HAROLD E. ROGERS & ALAN H.
NicHoLs, WATER FOR CALIFORNIA - PLANNING LAw & PRAcrIcE FINANCE, §§ 228-229, at
328-35 (1967).
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other overlying owners and prior appropriators. 9 The court essentially
rejected the notion that water should always be allocated strictly on the
basis of priority and "in time" appropriation. The court modified the
strict application of the priority of overlying rights over appropriative
rights that it had articulated twelve years earlier in Corona Foothill
Lemon Co.2 According to the court, strict application of the rule of
priority would result in an unequal sharing of the burden of curtailing
overdraft, because pumping by later appropriators would be eliminated while no restrictions would be placed on pumping by earlier appropriators." The parties entered into a stipulated judgment which
based their water rights on the amount of water continuously used
over the five-year period preceding the commencement of the litigation. 23 Ultimately, the court limited Raymond Basin groundwater extractions to the amount of the safe yield, with a proportionate reduction in all parties' usage. 24
The Pasadena court's action effectively halted the decline of
groundwater levels in the basin. Increased return flows resulting from
the growing use of imported Colorado River water raised the safe yield
of the basin enough to allow the court to increase the parties' "decreed
pumping rights" in 1955.3

Despite its successful application in the Raymond Basin, the California Supreme Court subsequently noted that the concept of mutual
prescription actually encourages unnecessary groundwater pumping
and creates "a race to the pumphouse" mentality, since in order to es-

tablish a right overlying well owners and landowners must extract
groundwater. Consequently, mutual prescription encourages an individual to pump as much water as possible.
Several other Southern California groundwater basin adjudications
followed in the 20wake of the Raymond
Basin decision. Adjudications
of
.29
30
the West Basin, Central Basin and Main San Gabriel Basin were all
resolved with physical solutions. In each case, the court continues to
supervise a permanent watermaster who has authority to fund and operate programs to control groundwater extractions and to prevent
.

19. City of Pasadena,207 P.2d at 28-30, 33 Cal. 2d at 926-28.
20. Id. at 32, 33 Cal. 2d at 932-33.
21. Corona Foothill Lemon Co. v. Lillibridge, 66 P.2d 443, 8 Cal. 2d 522 (1937).
22. City of Pasadena,207 P.2d at 32, 33 Cal. 2d at 932-33.
23. Id. at 33, 33 Cal. 2d at 933.
24. Id. at 26, 33 Cal. 2d at 922.
25. James H. Krieger & Harvey 0. Banks, Ground Water Basin Management, 50 CAL.
L. REv. 56, 60-62 (1962).
26. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1299, 14 Cal. 3d
199, 267 (1975).
27. ANNE J. SCHNEIDER, GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA - GovERNOR'S
COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS 19-22 (1977).
28. See WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS: GOVERNING GROUNDWATER IN
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 97-126 (1992).

29. Id. at 127-58.
30. Id. at 159-88.
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overdrafts by replenishment with imported water.3 ' The expense and
time involved in adjudicating groundwater basins, as well as the uncertainty of results, has meant in practical terms that only twelve California groundwater basins have been fully adjudicated.
In its next major groundwater decision, City of Los Angeles v. City of
3 the California Supreme Court significantly curtailed the
San Fernando,"
mutual prescription doctrine. In 1955, the City of Los Angeles
brought suit against the cities of San Fernando, Glendale, Burbank,
and other groundwater pumpers to declare that Los Angeles had a
prior and superior right to all groundwater in the upper Los Angeles
River area." Los Angeles also sought to enjoin the cities• • and
other
35
pumpers from extracting groundwater without its permission.
In a long decision that reviewed and commented on numerous
types of water rights, the court declined to follow the theory of mutual
prescription. Instead, the court concluded that California Civil Code
section 1007 prevents the prescription of groundwater rights owned by
a public agency or a public utility, 6 and that prescription against persons other than a public entity' cannot occur without actual notice of
who is prescripting the water. Thus, the court held that in a groundwater basin with multiple pumpers, continuous pumping by an overlying user or an appropriator does not create a paramount right to the
full quantity of water extracted, nor does continuous pumping cause
other pumpers in the basin to lose their rihts.3 In San Fernando,the
court held that Civil Code section 10073 precludes prescription of
groundwater rights owned by public utilities and public agencies, 0 but
also implied that prescription may be limited by overlying owners' con-

31. Schneider, supra note 27, at 22-25.
32. The adjudicated basins are as follows:
Northern California: Siskivou County - Scott River Stream System, Scott River Valley
(as part of a general adjudication pursuant to CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2500-2503 (West
1997)).
Southern California: Kern County: Tehechapi Basin. Kern and San Bernardino
Couie : Cummings Basin. Los Angeles County: Central Basin, West Basin, Upper
Los Angeles River area, Raymond Basin, Main San Gabriel Basin. San Bernardino
_C.on: Warren Valley Basin, Cucamonga Basin, San Bernardino Basin area (partially

in Riverside County). Riverside County: Chino Basin.

33. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1258, 14 Cal. 3d
199, 206-07 (1975).
34. Id. at 1258-59, 14 Cal. 3d at 207.
35. Id. at 1259, 14 Cal. 3d at 207.
36. Id. at 1305, 1307, 14 Cal. 3d at 274, 277.
37. Id. at 1311, 14 Cal. 3d at 282.
38. Id. at 1311-14, 14 Cal. 3d at 283-86.
39. San Fernando, 537 P.2d at 1301, 14 Cal. 3d at 270 (1975) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE
§1007 (West 1997)). California Civil Code section 1007 provides in pertinent part:
"[N]o possession by any person, firm or corporation no matter how long continued of
any land, water, water right, easement, or other property whatsoever dedicated to a
public use by a public utility, or dedicated to or owned by the state or any public entity, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right against the owner thereof." CAL.
CIV. CODE §1007 (West 1997).
40. San Fernando,537 P.2d at 1304-05, 14 Cal. 3d at 274.
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tinued exercise of their rights by pumping water." The self-help doctrine was later clarified to mean: "[O]verlying users retain priority but
lose amounts not pumped.
To resolve the problem in the upper Los Angeles River basin, the
court imposed a proportionate reduction in the quantities of water
available to each party to bring the total annual extractions from the
basin within the safe sustainable yield 3
The primary reason the San Fernandocourt rejected the doctrine of
mutual prescription was that its facts dramatically differed from City of
Pasadena. In San Fernando, each of the Defendants was pumping
41. Id. at 1319 n.101, 14 Cal. 3d at 293 n.101. "Even though cities cannot Lose (sic)
their water rights by prescription, their Acquisition (sic)of prescriptive ground water
rights is subject to the limitations stemming from the lawful owner's self-help set forth
in City of Pasadena.. " id. (italics added). This "self-help" doctrine, which seems to
afford overlying owners a measure of protection against potential prescriptors, was first
articulated in Pasadena. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 33 Cal. 2d
908 (Cal. 1949). There, appropriators and overlying users alike had been taking nonsurplus groundwater from the basin for over 20 years. This mutual pumping eventually led to an overdraft and a lawsuit to determine relative water rights. Id. at 32, 33
Cal. 2d at 931-32. As the appropriators had continuously and adversely pumped
groundwater for a period well exceeding the statutory five years, and had met all the
other statutory requirements, their extraction would seem to prevail over the overlying
owners. However, the court held that the running of the statutory period was effectively interrupted by the self-help, i.e., the ongoing pumping, of the overlying owners.
Id.
The original [overlying] owners by their own acts, although not by
judicial assistance, thus retained or acquired a right to continue to
take some water in the future. The wrongdoers [municipalities et
al.]
also acquired prescriptive rights to continue to take water, but
their rights were limited to the extent that the original owners retained or acquired rights by their pumping. Id.
42. Hi-Desert County Water Dist. v. Blue Skies Country Club, Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d
909, 915, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1723, 1732 (1994). Blue Skies Country Club owned a golf
course overlying a groundwater basin. Id. at 911, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1727. The Country Club had been extracting water from the basin since 1956. Due to perpetual overdraft, Hi-Desert County Water District filed a complaint against the Country Club and
other overlying water users to determine the parties' water rights. The trial court's
1977judgement in that case allocated 585 acre-feet per year to the golf course. Id. at
912, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1726. However, in May 1991, a final summary report issued in
conjunction with the case indicated that Blue Skies would have to pay a "replenishment assessment of '$1009 per acre foot for each acre-foot of extracted groundwater
beyond the safe yield allocation,' rather than beyond the adjudicated allotment." Id. at
913, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1729. Thereafter, in November 1991, the trial court approved
the final summary report. The defendant then moved for an order to amend the safe
yield declaration and the judgement. Id. at 914, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1730. The defendant Country Club appealed from the judgement.
On appeal the defendants claimed that the trial court's post-judgement order
improperly gave all parties equal priority. The Blue Skies court noted that, under San
Fernando, overlying users in an overdraft basin either retain their original overlying
rights or obtain new rights by prescription, so long as they continue to pump. Stated
another way, overlying owners retain their water rights by using them. Id. at 915, 23
Cal. App. 4th at 1731-32. Thus, the trial court erred in holding that the parties' water
rights were all prescriptive and equal in priority and thus constituted an improper redefinition of the parties' rights. Id. at 916, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1732-33.
43. San Fernando, 537 P.2d at 1315, 14 Cal. 3d at 293. The case also re-established
that parties importing water have a right to the return flow from it. Id. at 1291-97, 14
Cal. 3d at 255-64.
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groundwater before the basin went into overdraft. The court determined that the purpose served by the mutual prescription doctrine in
City of Pasadena, avoiding the complete elimination of later appropriative uses, was not necessary to achieve a safe yield in the Los Angeles
River Basin."
In the quarter century since the San Fernando decision, it has been
theorized that the case's most important and long-lasting impact may
be in one footnote among the one hundred six page opinion. In
footnote 61 , the court quoted extensively from a United States Supreme Court case, Nebraska v. Wyoming," which was decided on the basis of the "equitable apportionment" doctrine. The footnote states that
mechanical application of mutual prescription does not always result
in the most equitable apportionment of water based on each party's
need.4 7 Instead, courts should examine whether mutual prescription
or some other physical solution best satisfies equitable factors such as
those considered in Nebraska, including physical and climatic conditions,48 consumptive use in different areas, and the extent of established
uses.
This language from the San Fernandodecision, as well as the case's
application of Civil Code section 1007, indicate that the supreme court
does not believe strict priority should be applied to determine water
rights in overdrafted groundwater basins in California, especially
where the overdraft is caused in part by public entities extracting
groundwater for public use."
B. State Groundwater Control
Despite the complex nature of the common law of groundwater
regulation, the State Board's jurisdiction over groundwater has been
kept extremely limited, particularly in comparison to its broad powers
to manage surface water. There are very few provisions in the Water
Code that can be utilized to control use of percolating groundwater. °
Water Code section 4999 et seq. requires after-the-fact reporting of all
groundwater pumped in certain counties (Riverside, San Bernardino,
Los Angeles and Ventura Counties), but gives no authority to the State
Board to limit pumping or assess penalties for overdrafting. Other

44.

Id. at 1298-99, 14 Cal. 3d at 266-67.

45. Id. at 1298 n.61, 14 Cal. 3d at 265 n.61.
46. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
47. San Fernando,537 P.2d at 1298 n.61, 14 Cal. 3d at 265 n.61.
48. Id. at 1298, 14 Cal. 3d at 165; Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 925, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 1001 (1975).
49. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 751-52, 174 Cal. App. 3d 74,
90-91 (1985); Tehachapi-Cummings, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 923-25, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 1000-02.

50. In 1979, comprehensive legislation that would have adopted the groundwater
management recommendations of the Commission to Review California Water Rights
Law created by Governor Edmond Brown (Cal. Exec. Order No. B-26-77 (May 11,

1977)) was introduced, but the measure subsequently died in committee as a result of
opposing ideas regarding groundwater management. Michael P. Mallery, Groundwater:
A Callfor a ComprehensiveManagement Program, 14 PAC. LJ. 1279, 1299 (1983).
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state statutes related to groundwater are also limited."
In contrast, the State Board's authority over surface water is virtually plenary. No surface water may be appropriated without a permit
from the State Board." In its consideration and issuance of a permit,
the State Board is specifically authorized to consider the protection of
beneficial uses, including fish and wildlife resources.53 The California
Supreme Court has upheld the State Board's broad powers, finding
that, except where vested rights will be negatively impacted, all surface
54
water appropriations are subject to the Water Code's provisions.
C. Local Government Management
Local public entities provide some groundwater management in
California. Some water users and local governments prefer that a
groundwater basin management structure be created by legislation to
help assure predictable groundwater extraction regulations and to
permit groundwater exportation. 5
Counties also typically have
groundwater well permit requirements and assign the county health
and environmental protection department jurisdiction over domestic
well supply and quality issues.56
However, effective local controls over groundwater have been rare.
In 1992, in an attempt to encourage more local control of groundwater, the California Legislature adopted Assembly Bill 3030,"7 which
grants local entities the authority to create groundwater management
plans for groundwater basins. 8 A groundwater management plan may
51. E.g., Water Code sections 1005.1 - 1005.4 protect groundwater pumpers from
the loss of rights in periods of non-use when they have alternative supplies available.
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1005.1-1005.4 (West 1997). Water Code sections 13550 and
13050 prohibit the use of groundwater for certain purposes, such as golf course irrigation, if reclaimed water is readily available and reasonably priced. Id. § 13550. Reclaimed water or recycled water is water that has been treated for waste and is, therefore, suitable for beneficial use. Id. § 13050. However, the State Board must conduct a
hearing and receive testimony before making such a determination, a process that can
take several years. Id. § 13550(a). Water Code section 1242 requires the issuance of a
permit to store water in a groundwater basin. Id. § 1242.
52. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1225, 1250-1350 (West 1997).
53. Id. §§ 1243-1243.5.
54. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 865, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 309 (1980).
55. Perhaps the earliest example of significant local control of groundwater via
state statute occurred in Orange County. Orange County began experiencing serious
groundwater overdraft in the 1920's, and in 1935 the Orange County Water District
was formed as a result of special legislation. BLOMQUIST, supra note 28, at 247-49. The
acts granted the District authority to purchase and spread supplemental water with
funding from a pump tax and ad valorem real property tax. Krieger & Banks, supra
note 25, at 62. The program has proved to be very effective in reducing the critical
overdraft in the basin. BLOMQUIST, supra note 28, at 269; Krieger & Banks, supra note
25, at 62.
56. For example, the County of San Bernardino has extensive well construction
and operation requirements. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CODE §§ 33.0630-33.0645.
57. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750-10750.10 (West 1997).
58. Id. § 10753(a). AB 3030 authorizes local water agencies to adopt a groundwater
management plan subject to a hearing process and majority protest by landowners. Id.
§§ 10753.2-10753.9. Any local water agency whose service area includes a groundwater
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include components to control saline water intrusion, regulate migration of contaminated groundwater, mitigate conditions of overdraft,
and replenish groundwater extracted by water producers. 9 However,
AB 3030 does not authorize local water agencies to make binding determinations of the water rights of any person or entity, nor in most
cases to limit or suspend groundwater extractions.' °
Another type of local groundwater control is exercised through
Water Replenishment Districts-special districts formed to replenish
groundwater supplies within district boundaries.6 ' The purpose of
these districts is to take any actions necessary to: (1) replenish district
groundwater, including buying, selling and exchanging water; (2) protect or prevent interference with groundwater quality or groundwater
rights; or (3) take any action necessary to put groundwater to beneficial use.62 A district may also take action to prevent contaminants from
entering its groundwater supplies, and to remove contaminants from
groundwater.
Counties also control groundwater through ordinances enacted in
response to local problems. For example, Inyo County adopted an ordinance in 1980 to address groundwater exports from the Owens Valley by the City of Los Angeles. The ordinance establishes a comprehensive system of groundwater management, with the goal of
protecting Inyo County's environment and economy by maintaining
groundwater levels at a depth which is capable of supporting natural
resources." Several counties have enacted ordinances to prevent the
export of groundwater from their respective areas. 65
A potential problem with these ordinances is that counties and
other local entities may not have the authority under their police powers to regulate groundwater, particularly groundwater extractions.6
Additionally, local ordinances are subordinate to state laws that regulate groundwater and are considered pre-empted if expressly or implicitly in conflict with general state law. In 1933, however, the California Supreme Court upheld a county ordinance preventing
groundwater extractions for a wasteful, unreasonable or non-beneficial
basin or portion of a groundwater basin that is not otherwise managed or adjudicated
may adopt or implement a groundwater management plan. Id. § 10753(b).
59. Id. § 10753.7.
60. Id. § 10753.8(b)-(c). Groundwater extractions can be limited or suspended

pursuant to a management plan only if the local water agency has determined that
groundwater replenishment programs or other alternative sources of water supply
have proved insufficient or infeasible to lessen the demand for groundwater. Id.
61. CAL. WATER CODE § 60000 (West 1997).
62. Id. §§ 60220-60223.
63. Id. §§ 60224-60225.
64. Antonio Rossmann & Michael J. Steel, Forgingthe New Water Law: Public Regulation of "Proprietay"GroundwaterRights, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 903 (1982).
65. Russell Kletzing, Imported Groundwater Banking: The Kern Water Bank-A Case

Study, 19 PAC. L.J. 1225, 1261-62 (1988).
66.

See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 17 Cal. 3d 129 (1976) (city's

police power is limited to affecting only those areas within its jurisdiction).
67. CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 7; see Rossmann, supra note 64, at 936-43.
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purpose.68 The court found the ordinance was a valid exercise of the
county's police power and groundwater regulation was not solely the
responsibility of the state legislature.69
More recently, the third district court of appeal upheld a Tehama
County ordinance requiring a permit to pump groundwater for use on
nonoverlying land. 70 The court held that the ordinance was not preempted by codified water policy indicating the state's paramount interest in and authority over water, by state law limiting export of water
from certain protected areas, or by water code provisions authorizing
local water agencies to adopt and enforce groundwater management
plans.7
II. THE MOJAVE BASIN
A. The Trial Court Decision
The Mojave River system is located in an arid, desert area southwest of Death Valley, California. It is more than 90 miles in length and
encompasses a groundwater basin of approximately 3,600 square
miles. The basin consists of one large watershed with five distinct
subareas.
The water system has surface and subsurface flows as well as substantial associated percolating groundwater. The surface and groundwater constitute an interconnected water supply. Surface flows serve to
replenish the groundwater basin and the groundwater basin sometimes feeds the river. Surface flows disappear into the basin, but geologic constrictions force the water back to the surface in some places."
The region receives less than 4 inches of rainfall annually. Recharge
of basin aquifers ordinarily occurs only after major storms.
Basin overdraft" began in the 1950's and greatly increased in the
1980's. Attempts to address the overdraft problem in the 1960's and
early 1970's were unsuccessful. 7 By the early 1990's, overdraft exceeded 90,000 acre-feet annually and may well have been much
68. ExparteMaas, 27 P.2d 373, 219 Cal. 422 (1933).
69. Id. at 424-25. See Alameda County Water Dist. v. Niles Sand & Gravel Co., 112
Cal. Rptr. 846, 37 Cal. App. 3d 924 (1974) (validating a county water district's underground water storage program).
70. Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr, 2d 886, 889, 31 Cal. App. 4th 166,
171 (1994).
71. Id. at 891,893-95, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 175, 178-81.
72. Respondents' Brief at 1-6, City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr.
2d 477, 64 Cal. App. 4th 737 (1998) (No. E017881).
73. Groundwater overdraft is "the condition of a groundwater basin in which the
amount of water withdrawn by pumping exceeds the amount of water that recharges
the basin [i.e., the safe yield] over a period of years during which supply conditions
approximate average." 1 CAUFORNIA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA WATER
PLAN UPDATE, BULLETIN 160-93, at 386 (1994).
"Overdraft commences whenever extractions increase, or the withdrawable maximum decreases, or both, to the point
where the surplus ends." City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250,
1307, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 277 (1975).
74. Respondents' Brief at 5, Mojave (No. E017881).
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higher. The overdraft grew with population and economic expansion
in desert communities served by the basin. In essence, the local economy was built on overdraft and basin groundwater reserves. By 1990,
rapid urban growth was causing a shift in water use away from agricultural to municipal uses. By that time, more than 230,000 acre-feet was
annually utilized as follows: approximately 60% agriculture, 31% municipal, and 9% fish hatchery, aquaculture, and lake use.
In May 1990, the City of Barstow and the Southern California Water Company ("SCWC") filed a complaint claiming that groundwater
extraction by the City of Adelanto, the Mojave Water Agency ("MWA")
and other "upstream" producers on the Mojave River system (collectively "municipal purveyors" or "stipulating parties") adversely impacted Barstow's groundwater supply." Plaintiffs requested that the
municipal purveyors be ordered to provide an average annual flow of
30,000 acre-feet in the Mojave River Channel near Barstow." Plaintiffs
also sought to compel MWA to import State Water Project water.77
In July 1991, MWA filed an amended cross-complaint which joined
all water producers within the Mojave River watershed, except for certain small producers.7" MWA sought a judicial declaration that water
supply available in the basin was insufficient to meet demand and also
requested a declaration of the water rights of in-basin water producers. Originally, more than 3,000 parties were named. s° Eventually,
parties pumping less than 10 acre-feet of water annually were dismissed from the action 8 and approximately 450 parties remained.
In October 1991, the trial court ordered a litigation standstill so
that the parties 812
could try to negotiate a "physical solution" to the overdraft problem.
By September 1993, a large majority of basin water
producers remaining in the action had agreed to a negotiated physical
solution to the overdraft problem. More than 95% of the producers
named in the action either stipulated to the proposed physical solution judgment or did not oppose it. Measured from a water production standpoint, parties aggregating 89% of the basin's water production agreed to the solution, while parties representing 93% of the
municipal use and 85% of the agricultural use supported or did not
oppose the stipulated judgment.
The decreed purpose of the physical solution was to: (1) develop
75. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 64 Cal. App. 4th
737 (1998). MWA and other named water purveyors supply water to communities in
the area including Hemet, Victorville, and Apple Valley.
76. Respondents' Brief at 6-7, Mojave (No. E017881).
77. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 744.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. City of Barstow v. City of Adelanto, Riverside County Superior Court Case No.

208568 (Trial CourtJudgmentJan. 10, 1996).
81.
82.
83.

Respondents' Brief at 7, Mojave, (No. E017881).
Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 744-45.
Id. at 483, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 745; Respondents' Brief at 7, Mojave (No.

E017881).
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means to conserve local water; (2) guarantee that downstream water
producers would not be adversely affected by production upstream;
and (3) raise money to purchase supplemental water supplies. The
drafters of the physical solution envisioned a system not aimed at balancing water production with natural supply, but rather a "solution
that generates the money necessary to acquire water ... through transfer or through import ....
[I]n the long term the amount of water
supply needed for the area will be made available as opposed to reducing back to some arbitrary amount of water supply."8'4
In anticipation of the physical solution, the parties investigated the
production levels of nearly 6800 basin wells. From that study, a "base
annual right" equivalent to the highest amount of water taken by each
individual producer during the five-year period from 1986-1990 was
determined. Significantly, this base annual production right was calculated without affording priority based on the type of use or water
right.8 5
The stipulating parties agreed to share the burden of groundwater
shortage proportionately by reducing their individual production by
20%. A "ramp down" procedure allowed the parties to decrease their
pumping by 5% annually over the first five years following court approval of the physical solution. Thereafter, unless an adjustment was
made based on local hydrologic circumstances, parties could pump
80% of their base annual right without accruing a replenishment assessment obligation. In other words, the stipulating parties did not allege any water rights priorities in favor of the physical solution. Thus,
there was no reliance on inter se priorities. Producers exceeding their
base annual rights, i.e., their fair share of the subarea free production
allowance, agreed to pay a "replenishment water assessment. '' 16 The
court-appointed watermaster was required to use these assessments to
purchase imported water to replace excess subarea production. The
physical solution did not place restrictions on the quantity of water a
producer could pump. Rather, pumpers exceeding specific pumping
levels were simply assessed fees based on the amount of overproduc18
tion.
The judgment divided the Mojave River Basin into five geologic
subareas, with certain subareas required to provide a specific, historical quantity of water to the adjoining downstream subarea.89 This water supply obligation of the upstream subarea is known as "make-up
water." A make-up water assessment could be imposed if downstream
supply obligations were not satisfied. In other words, the watermaster
would impose such assessments to meet any subarea's deficiency in
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Mojave at 484-85, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 745.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

90. Id.
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providing water to the adjoining downstream subarea. 9
The physical solution also provided for transferable "free production allowance rights" among the parties, subject to specified consumptive-use limitations. Thus, the parties had the right to transfer
water off their property. For example, an agricultural user could
transfer its free production allowance to an urban user.
At the stipulating parties' request, the trial court approved the
physical solution by way of interlocutory judgment on September 23,
1993, and bound the signatories to follow

it. 92

However, the matter

proceeded to trial to determine the rights of several parties not stipulating to the physical solution. The nonstipulating parties fell primarily into two groups: an association of individual dairy farmers owning
overlying lands in the basin (collectively "Cardozo Group" or "Cardozo
Appellants") and the Jess Ranch Water Company.
After a bench trial, the court determined that inter alia:
1. Imposition of the physical solution on the nonstipulating parties
was necessary to implement the mandate of Article X, Section 2 of the
California Constitution;
2. Continued basin pumping not in conformance with the dictates
of the physical solution would itself constitute an unreasonable use or
method of water use;
3. The physical solution was a fair and equitable basis for satisfaction of all water rights in the Mojave Basin area, was in furtherance of
the mandate of the State Constitution and the water policy of the State
of California, and took into account applicable public trust interests;
4. The physical solution was fair and equitable to the Cardozo
Group and the solution could be imposed upon them because "the
constitutional mandate of reasonable and beneficial use dictates an
equitable apportionment of rights when a water basin is in overdraft."
5. Continuing jurisdiction over the judgment and the parties was
necessary in case any party exercised its right to modify, amend or amplify any practical features of the physical solution based on changed
circumstances or new information.
Following the trial court's judgment, the Cardozo Group and the
Jess Ranch Water Company filed an appeal. 9 The Cardozo Group al91. Id. Separate administrative assessments on each acre-foot of production were
levied to fund watermaster administrative activities and to maintain riparian habitat
and environmental values. Respondents' Brief at 13-14, Mojave (No. E017881).
92. Respondents' Brief at 8, Mojave (No. E017881); see also Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. at
482-83, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 745.
93. City of Barstow v. City of Adelanto, Riverside County Superior Court Case No.
208568, at 6, 24-25, 41 (Trial CourtJudgmentJan. 10, 1996).
94. This article does not examine any of the claims on appeal of the Jess Ranch
Water Company. Among other allegations, the Jess Ranch Water Company contended
that the trial court erred by assuming that the proposed physical solution was valid and
by compellingJess Ranch to prove the validity of its water rights. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 483, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 749. Jess Ranch also contended that the trial court improperly failed to take into account Jess Ranch's established water rights. Id. Jess
Ranch further argued that the proposed physical solution was inequitable because it
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leged that the trial court disregarded their preexisting, paramount riparian and overlying rights and that the trial court's judgment should
be revised to recognize and protect these outstanding water rights.95
Respondents MWA, Barstow, SCWC, et al., (i.e., the parties stipulating to the physical solution) defended the trial court's action arguing,
among other points, that Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution required the equitable apportionment of water in overdrafted
groundwater basins.
B. The Appellate Court's Decision
Taking the position that water rights priorities are absolute and
cannot be modified or
S96curtailed in any way to accommodate a physical
solution, the Mojave court overturned the trial court's judgment. The
tenor of the court's opinion is captured in its determination that "the
trial court could not overlook well settled principles of water law to establish its own system of groundwater allocation."97
The first part of the court's opinion is devoted to equitable apportionment. That section examines Article X, Section 2 of the California
Constitution, the California Supreme Court's decisions in Pasadena v.
Alhambra and Los Angeles v. San Fernando, and more recent appellate
decisions interpreting and implementing those two cases. The second
portion of the opinion presents the court's analysis of the development
of the law of physical solutions.98
Relying principally upon footnote 61 of the San Fernandoopinion,"
did not treat Jess Ranch the same as other water producers. Id. Specifically, Jess
Ranch contended that the base annual production right that it was awarded was not
calculated on the same basis as the base annual production rights of other producers.
Id.
95. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 746.
96. References to the "Mojave court"in this article mean the appellate court panel.
97. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 485, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 749.
98. By granting the stipulating parties' petition for review, the California Supreme
Court has effectively withdrawn the court of appeal's opinion. See Cal. Rules of Court,
Rules 976, 977, 979. Nevertheless, the appellate court's reasoning is relevant because
it frames the issues facing the high court, sets out the legal and policy arguments in
favor of recognizing traditional water rights priorities, and illustrates the practical difficulties associated with resolving disputes involving groundwater.
99. Footnote 61 of the San Fernandoopinion reads:
The principles by which the United States Supreme Court equitably
apportions water among states are illustrated in Nebraska v. Wyoming (1945) 325 U.S. 589, 618 .... After observing that apportionment between states whose laws base water rights on priority of
appropriation should primarily accord with that principle, the court
said: 'But if an allocation between appropriation States is to be just
and equitable, strict adherence to the priority rule may not be possible. For example, the economy of a region may have been established on the basis ofjunior appropriations. So far as possible those
established uses should be protected though strict application of the
priority rule might jeopardize them. Apportionment calls for exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors.
Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and
climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sec-
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the stipulating parties argued that San Fernando "has been consistently
interpreted as approval by the California Supreme Court of the use of
equitable apportionment as a basis to allocate water among users in an
overdrafted basin."'00 According to the stipulating parties, the trial
court was required to consider environmental conditions, developed
water uses in the basin, economic reliance on existing water usage, and
other pertinent factors.'0 ' They also alleged that San Fernando cautioned against a mechanical application of mutual prescription because that approach "does not necessarily result
in the most equitable
0 2
apportionment of water according to need.'

The Mojave court flatly rejected the arguments that City of Pasadena
and San Fernando, as well as Article X, Section 2 ' of the California
Constitution, allow for or encourage any modification of priorities in
the context of a physical solution. 0 According to the panel, City of
Pasadenawas not dispositive because in Mojave neither the stipulating
parties nor the trial court relied on the doctrine of mutual prescription.0 5 The Mojave court also concluded that City of Pasadenaand San
Fernando did not support the stipulating parties' arguments regarding
equitable apportionment. 00 The panel further determined that its recent decision in Hi-Desert County Water District v. Blue Skies Country Club,
Inc., 07 as well as Wright v. Goleta Water District'0 " and In re Waters of Long
tions of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent
of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas if a limitation is imposed
on the former-these are all relevant factors. They are merely illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the
problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests
which must be made.'
City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1298 n.61, 14 Cal. 3d 199,
265 n.61 (1975).
100. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 490, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 755-56.
101. Respondents' Brief at 13-14, 19, Mojave (No. E017881). In fact, the stipulating
parties' brief sets out more than ten equitable factors which, they maintain, show the
propriety and equitable nature of the negotiated physical solution imposed by the trial
court.
102. Id. at 21 (citing San Fernando,537 P.2d at 1265, 14 Cal. 3d at 265).
103. As discussed previously, Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution requires that all water rights be limited by the concept of reasonable and beneficial use.
Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 498-99, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 383 (1935).
104. Respondents' Brief at 17-18, Mojave (No. E017881).
105. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 488, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 752. "The City of Pasadena
case does not support the position that an appropriator can acquire rights without
prescription." Id.
106. Id. at 490-91, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 757.
107. Hi-Desert County Water Dist. v. Blue Skies Country Club, Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d
909, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1723 (1994).
108. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 174 Cal. App. 3d 74 (1985).
The Wright court held that limiting the unexercised rights of overlying users in a
groundwater basin adjudication is improper. Id. at 749, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 88. However, it has not yet been finally determined whether unexercised overlying rights can
be prescripted. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1318
n.100, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 293 n.100 (stating that the prescriptive rights of appropriators
"would not necessarily impair the private defendants' rights to ground water for New
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Valley Creek Stream System,' 9 did not impliedly support application of the
equitable apportionment doctrine. Instead, the Mojave court stated
that flexible application of water rights priorities allowed in the context of surface water adjudications could not be applied in the
groundwater area."' Ultimately, the Mojave panel held that neither the
California Supreme Court nor any appellate court had endorsed "a
pure equitable apportionment which disregards existing rights of overlying owners
and that neither footnote 61 nor Article X, Section 2
permitted the trial court to "disregard existing water rights in order to
fashion an allegedly equitable solution based on prior usage rather
than current beneficial use.""2
To support its conclusions, the panel relied upon legal precedent
stating: (1) that absolute extinguishment of a riparian right would
raise a "serious constitutional issue;"," 3 (2) that proportionate shares of

groundwater pumping for overlying owners should be based upon current, beneficial need for water rather than upon average use over a period of years;" 4 and (3) that overlying owners
may use self-help to pro5
tect their rights by continually pumping.
The Mojave court also expressed its disagreement with the stipulating parties' interpretation of Imperial IrrigationDistrict v. State Water Resources Control Board,' 6 ("liD 2') and with the reasoning of liD 2 itself."7
The panel questioned the "unusual addendum" in the ID 2 opinion
which referred to California water rights law as an "evolving process of
governmental redefinition of water rights.""' In fact, the Mojave panel
determined that the addendum actually added to the uncertainty of
California water rights law."9 The opinion challenged the idea that the
1928 constitutional amendment resulted in a legal development that
created a system to marshal the state's water resources to satisfy the
(sic) overlying uses for which the need had not yet come into existence during the
prescriptive period"); see also Hi-Desert County Water Dist., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 23 Cal.
App. 4th 1723 (1994) (holding that trial court improperly rendered all pumpers'
rights equal in priority when golf course had, by exercising its pumping rights prior to

the adjudication, guaranteed a right to pump 535 acre feet free of any assessments in
the physical solution).
109. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 25 Cal. 3d 339

(1979).
110. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492-94, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 759-60.
111. Id. at 492, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 758.
112. Id. at 496, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 765.
113. Id. at 494, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 761-62 (citing Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 663, 25 Cal.
3d at 761-62).
114. Id. at 494, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 762 (citing Tehachapi-Cummings County Water
Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992 (1975)).
115. Id. at 496, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 764 (quoting Hi-Desert County Water Dist. v.

Blue Skies Country Club, Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 915, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1723, 1732
(1994)).
116. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr.
250, 225 Cal. App. 3d 548 (1990).
117. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 763.

118. Id.
119. Id.
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ever-changing needs of society.
The Mojave panel also rejected the stipulating parties' contention
that trial courts are bound to impose a physical solution if one is available. According to the panel, the doctrine of physical solutions originally contemplated only modifications of engineering and diversion
facility activities to ensure the highest and best use of water."' Acknowledging that the California Supreme Court has sanctioned somewhat broader trial court application of the physical solution principles
to assure the beneficial use of water, the Mojave court nevertheless
concluded that the high court did not contemplate wholesale disregard of the existing water rights of overlying owners or riparians who
refused to participate in a negotiated solution.1 2' Rather, according to
the panel, the "purpose of a physical solution is to avoid a waste of water without
unreasonably or adversely affecting the rights of the par,,22
ties.
III. CALIFORNIA WATER LAW DOCTRINES
A. Development of the Reasonable Use Doctrine
Over the past 70 years, California courts have almost uniformly departed from the application of strict rules of priority where equitable
considerations have suggested modification of traditional propertybased water rights principles. 23 This movement away from strict application of priorities is related to several interrelated legal developments
in California water law, including the adoption of Article X, Section 2
of the California Constitution, the California Supreme Court's recognition of the public trust
doctrine, and evolving principles of Califor24
nia groundwater law.'

120. Id. at 496, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 765 (quoting I Rogers & Nichols, supra note 18, §
441, at 579).
121. Id. at 496-99, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 765-70.
122. Id. at 499, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 769 (quoting Hi-Desert County Water Dist. v.
Blue Skies Country Club, Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 918, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1763
(1994)).
123. The redefinition of water rights during the mid-1900's has been explained as
follows: "The concept of an immutable, vested right with an absolute priority was replaced with a flexible, context-related right. The limits of the new right were contingent on supply, competing uses of water, and the amount of benefit obtained from exercising the right." ARTHUR L. LITTLEWORTH & ERIC L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER 95

(1995). See also Clifford W. Schulz & Gregory S. Weber, ChangingJudicial Attitudes Towards Property Rights in Calfornia Water Resources: From Vested Rights to UtilitarianReallocations, 19 PAC. L.J. 1031 (1988).
124. Commentators have challenged the notion that water rights have ever been or
should ever be equated with traditional property rights. SeeJoseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 257 (1990); Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVrL. L. 473 (1989); see also
CAL. WATER CODE § 104 (West 1997) ("It is hereby declared that the people of the
State have a paramount interest in the use of all the water of the State and that the
State shall determine what water of the State, surface and underground, can be converted to public use or controlled for public protection."). See generallyJoseph L. Sax,
Some Thoughts on the Decline of PrivateProperty, 58 WASH. L. REv. 481 (1983).
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The rejection of absolute water rights priorities by California
courts has sprung in part from the adoption of Article X, Section 2 of
the California Constitution 25 and increased concomitantly with the judicial application of this constitutional amendment. However, to find
the origin of the doctrine of reasonable use, 1261oo
one must look much
further back in California's water jurisprudence. In the seminal water
case of Lux v. Haggin1 7 the California Supreme Court recognized the
doctrine of reasonable use between riparians. The court held that riparians were entitled to a reasonable use of water, and that what is a
reasonable use is a question of fact, depending upon the circumstances of each particular case. 128
In its opinion in Katz v. Walkinshaw,9 in which the California Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of correlative rights, it also further embraced the reasonable use doctrine. The court noted approvingly:
The doctrine of reasonable use, on the other hand, affords
some measure of protection to property now existing, and
greater justification for the attempt to make new developments. It limits the right of others to such amount of water
as may be necessary for some useful purpose in connection
with the land from which it is taken. 30

The constitutional provision requiring reasonable and beneficial
use of all waters.' in the State resulted directly from the California Su-

preme Court's decision in Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison
Co.' In that case, Herminghaus, a riparian rancher, objected to Edison's construction of a reservoir which impeded flows of the San Joaquin River. Herminghaus used the peak flows of the river to inundate
ranch lands and sought to retain the full flow of the river. She claimed
that an appropriator could not cut off her riparian right in any significant measure.
The court agreed, rejecting contentions that the
rancher's use wasted water and contravened the common good.'

125. Case law favoring utilitarian allocation of water over strict prioritization may
also be due, in part, to the recognition that rigid application of water rights priorities
ignores the fact that domestic use of water is the highest use of water in the state. See
CAL. WATER CODE §

106 (West 1997).

126. See generally United Sates v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr.
161, 171, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 105 (1986) (holding that the reasonable use doctrine

was deemed the "cardinal principle" of California water rights law).
127. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 69 Cal. 255 (1886).
128. Id. at 755, 69 Cal. at 394.
129. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 141 Cal. 116 (1903).
130. Id. at 771, 141 Cal. at 134.

131. See Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972,
986, 3 Cal. 2d 489, 524 (1935) (holding that Article X, Section 2 of the California Con-

stitution applies to overlying and appropriative use of groundwater).
132. Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607, 200 Cal. 81 (1926).
133. Id. at 615, 200 Cal. at 100-01.
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Subsequent to the passage of the constitutional amendment in
1928, the Court reconsidered and rejected this absolutist position.
Barbara,3 4
Seven years after Herminghaus, in Gin Chow v. City of Santa
the California Supreme Court was faced with a very similar factual
situation. In Gin Chow, Santa Barbara built a dam upstream from
Chow's riparian property.'35 Chow argued that any diminution of his
riparian right was unlawful, and "It is insisted that however small the
invasion of the riparian right may be and however slight the benefit
may be to the riparian owner, still it must be presumed, as a matter of
law, that damage to his lands has resulted entitling him to an injunction.
The court ruled that Chow received minimal benefit from the flow,
that requiring flow to reach his property constituted a waste of water,
and that therefore his use was unreasonable. Thus, the court refused7
to grant the riparian a complete priority over the appropriator.
"[W] hat is an unreasonable use is ajudicial question depending upon
the facts of each case. Likewise, what is a reasonable or unreasonable
use of water is ajudicial question to be determined in the first instance
by the trial court. '' 3' The court also modified riparian rights in cases
brought in the years following Gin Chow.' 9
In Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore IrrigationDistrict,'4"
the court determined that Lindsay-Strathmore's pumping and export
of water out of the Delta, although beneficial, was not necessarily reasonable in light of competing uses and circumstances. In explaining
how Article X, Section 2 had changed water law, the court explicitly
stated that strict priorities would not always prevail and that the needs
of others could be part of the lower court's analysis of the situation at
issue:
Under this new doctrine, it is clear that when a riparian or
overlying owner brings an action against an appropriator, it is
no longer sufficient to find that the plaintiffs in such action
are riparian or overlying owners, and, on the basis of such
finding, issue the injunction. It is now necessary for the trial
court to determine whether such owners, considering all the
needs of those in the particular water field, are putting the
134. Gin Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d 5, 217 Cal. 673 (1933).
135. Id. at 6-7, 217 Cal. at 677-78.
136. Id. at 13, 217 Cal. at 694.
137. Id. at 18, 217 Cal. at 706.
138. Id.
139. See Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 2 Cal. 2d 351 (1935) (allowing City
to impound creek flow, and ostensibly awarding downstream riparian only reasonable
amount of water necessary for beneficial uses); see also City of Lodi v. East Bay Mun.
Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439, 448, 452, 7 Cal. 2d 316, 337, 344 (1936) (modifying riparian
rights to accommodate appropriator and explaining how court's holding would have
been different if case had been decided before adoption of Article X, Section 2).
140. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 989,
3 Cal. 2d 489, 531 (1935).
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waters to any reasonable beneficial uses, giving consideration
to all factors involved, including reasonable methods of use
and reasonable methods of diversion. From a consideration
of such uses, the trial court must then determine whether
there is a surplus in the water field subject to appropriation.14
In the 1960's, the court extended the reasonable use doctrine further. In Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District,1 2 a unanimous supreme
court determined that riparians' use of substantial creek flow to deposit rock, sand and gravel on their land constituted an unreasonable
use of water. In reaching this conclusion, the court refused to enjoin a
water district appropriator which had blocked flow and mineral deposit through construction of a dam. The court further held that
since a
reasonable use of water depends on the circumstances of
each case, such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from state-wide considerations of transcendent importance. Paramount among these we see the ever increasing
need for the conservation of the water in this state, an inescapable reality of life quite
apart from its express recognition
4 3
in the 1928 amendment.
Thus, the court effectively precluded exercise of the right for the purpose for which it was being used.
A decade later, the court further clarified the limits on the exercise
of a higher priority riparian right and held that riparians could be
made to endure "some inconvenience or to incur reasonable expenses" for the benefit of junior appropriators. 14 In Forni, the State
Board filed an action to restrict certain wine grape growers from directly diverting water from the Napa River during the two-month
spring frost period. The complaint alleged that the growers' diversions
sometimes resulted in a dry river and deprived downstream interests of
flow to utilize for their own frost protection. The appellate court held
that the upstream riparian diversions were unreasonable in both use
and method of use. "As we have repeatedly underscored, the overriding constitutional consideration is to put the water resources of the
state to a reasonable use and make them available for the constantly
increasing needs of all the people."'' 5 Application of strict water rights
priorities would have compelled the court to award the entire flow of
the river to riparians and senior appropriators. Recognizing the unjust
141.

Id. at 986, 3 Cal. 2d at 524-25.

142. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 67 Cal. 2d 132 (1967).

143. Id. at 894, 67 Cal. 2d at 140.
144. People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851,
856, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 751-52 (1976).

145. Id. at 856, 54 Cal. App. 3d at 751.
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allocation of water that would have resulted, the court ordered that a
compromise physical solution be crafted.
Three years after Forni, in In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, the court determined that the State Board had explicit power to
limit and reprioritize future riparian rights.146 Long Valley involved a
stream adjudication conducted by the State Board under the auspices
of Water Code Sections 2500 et seq. Ramelli, an owner of riparian land
in the watershed, claimed a prospective riparian right to irrigate more
than 2,800 acres of undeveloped land. He made this claim despite the
fact that for the previous 60 years he and his predecessors had irrigated only 89 acres.
The court upheld the State Board's determination that Ramelli's
unexercised riparian rights should be given a priority lower than the
presently exercised appropriative rights of others in the watershed.' 7
While the court ruled that Ramelli's riparian claim to the future use of
waters could not be entirely extinguished, it held that the State Board
"may make determinations as to the scope, nature and priority of the
right that it deems reasonably necessary to the promotion of the state's
interest in fostering the most reasonable and beneficial use of its
scarce water resources."148 This holding modifies, at least in the context of a State Board stream adjudication, earlier case law holding that
a dormant riparian right was paramount to an active appropriative
right. 49 More importantly, the decision implicitly recognizes that adjudications are not conducive to inflexible applications of water rights
priorities.
As stated by the Long Valley court:
It is well established that what is a reasonable use of water varies with the facts and circumstances of the particular case (citations omitted). And it appears self-evident that the reasonableness of a riparian use cannot be determined without

considering the effect of such use of all the needs of those in
the stream system (citation omitted), nor can it be made "in

vacuo isolated from the statewide considerations of transcendent importance." "

The high court also seemingly suggested that "vested" water rights
could be completely extinguished if such action constituted 5the sole
method to ensure the reasonable and beneficial use of waters. '
The authority of courts to modify water rights priorities was further
146. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 25 Cal. 3d 339
(1979).
147. Id. at 668-69, 25 Cal. 3d at 358-59.
148. Id, at 669, 25 Cal. 3d at 359.
149. E.g., Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 498-99, 2 Cal. 2d 351 (Cal. 1935).
150. Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 665, 25 Cal. 3d at 354 (citingJoslin v. Main Mun. Water
Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 67 Cal. 2d 132 (1967)).
151. Id. at 667, 25 Cal. 3d at 357.
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solidified in cases subsequent to Long Valley. In Imperial IrrigationDistrict v. State Water Resources Control Board, 2 ("lID 2'), a California appel-

late court held that the State Board could stop an
from wasting water since the district only had vested
sonable use of water. 15 In a statement challenged by
the lID 2 court explained that water use entitlements
evolved 5 4 "beyond traditional concepts of vested

irrigation district
rights to the reathe Mojave panel,
in California had
and immutable

rights:"
All things must end, even in the field of water law. It is time
to recognize that this law is in flux and that its evolution has
passed beyond traditional concepts of vested and immutable
rights. In his review of our Supreme Court's recent water

rights decision in In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream System (citation omitted),'-" Professor Freyfogle explains that California
is engaged in an evolving process of governmental redefinition of water rights. He concludes that "California has re-

gained for the public much of the power to prescribe water
use practices, to limit waste, and to sanction water transfers."

He asserts that the concept that "water use entitlements are
clearly and permanently defined," and are "neutral [and]

rule-driven," is a pretense to be discarded. It is a fundamental truth, he writes, that "everything is in the process of
changing or becoming" in water law.
In affirming this specific instance of far-reaching change, imposed upon traditional uses by what some claim to be evolutionary process, we but recognize this evolutionary process,
and urge reception and recognition of same upon those
whose work in the practical administration of water distribution makes such change understandably difficult to accept. 56

The Mojave panel took exception to the liD 2 court's suggestions
that California water law is in flux. According to the panel, "such
152. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr.
250, 225 Cal. App. 3d 548 (1990).
153. Id. at 261, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 563-64.
154. Id. at 267, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 573.
155. In reWater of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 749 P.2d 324, 338, 44 Cal. 3d 448, 472
(1988). In Hallett the court recognized an unexercised riparian right held by the federal government on its reserved lands, but held that the State Board had authority to
evaluate (and presumably to limit) any new proposed use of that water. Thus, the
court has even limited the nature of a vested right on federal reserved lands. Id. at
337-38, 44 Cal. 3d at 471-72; see also United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697
F.2d 851, 854-55 (9th Cir. 1983) (declaring that when determining reasonable use as
that term is understood in Western water law, consideration should be made of the
alternative uses of water).
156. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr.
250, 267-68, 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 573 (1990) (citing Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1546-47 (1989)).
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statements only create the uncertainty which our Supreme Court (sic)
has cautioned us against."'57 In drawing this conclusion, the Mojave
court relied on the fact that Article X, Section 2 has not changed substantively since 1928. However, the panel did not specifically address
the line of cases showing the judicial development of the law of reasonable use.
In another fairly recent case, United States v. State Water Resources
Control Board,"' (the "Racanelli" decision), an appellate court held that
the State Board could place restrictions on the state and federal water
projects without regard to their respective priorities. That case determined, inter alia, which parties would be responsible for curtailing
their water usage to provide mandated outflow from the SacramentoSan Joaquin Rivers/San Francisco Bay-Delta estuary. The Bureau of
Reclamation, operator of the federal Central Valley Project, alleged
that it had a higher priority than the State Water Project. Accordingly,
the Bureau argued that the State Board had no authority to compel
the federal project to contribute equal flows for Delta water quality.
The court disagreed, declaring that
[t] he scope and priority of appropriative rights are properly
defined by the Board acting within its power to consider the
relative benefits of competing interests and to impose such
conditions as are necessary to protect the public interest ....
[T]he Board... acted well within its authority and did not
infringe upon or otherwise unlawfully impair the 'vested' appropriative rights of the U.S. Bureau. '"
Although the California Supreme Court's most recent water law
opinion, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,' ° was not a reasonable use case, the court once again refused to apply strict priority principles. In that case, the court was faced with a conflict between appropriative water rights and the public trust doctrine. The Defendant, Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power ("DWP"), urged the court to
reject the application of the public trust doctrine to DWP's water diversion license. On the other hand, the Plaintiffs argued that the public
trust doctrine limits all appropriative water rights. The court rejected
both priority arguments:
We are unable to accept either position. In our opinion,
both the public trust doctrine and the water rights system
157. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 495, 64 Cal. App.
4th 737, 763 (1998).
158. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 182 Cal.
App. 3d 82 (1986).
159. Id. at 189-90, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 133; see also National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 729 n.30, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 447 n.30 (1983) (inferring that unreasonable use may be any use less than the optimum allocation of water).
160. NationalAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d 709, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983).
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embody important precepts which make the law more responsive to the diverse needs and interests involved in the
planning and allocation of water resources. To embrace one
system of thought and reject the other would lead to an unbalanced structure, one which would either decry as a breach
of trust appropriations essential to the economic develop-

ment of this state, or deny any duty to protect or even consider the values promoted by the public trust. Therefore, [we
must seek] an accommodation which will make use of the
pertinent principles of both the public trust doctrine and the
appropriative water rights system .... 16'
The case law recited above illustrates that reasonable use, the public trust doctrine and other concepts in California water law are not
static62 and that water rights may be reprioritized and significantly limited if the type or method of use in question is no longer reasonable.
In the context of the Mojave adjudication, the most noteworthy
case outlined above may be Forni. There, the court made clear that
senior users could be made to endure some inconvenience for the
good of other local interests and that courts should bear in mind the
161
needs of all California water users when resolving a water dispute.
Moreover, Long Valley indicates that land-based water rights may be reprioritized and limited if the circumstances so dictate. The Mojave
court's holding that immutable overlying rights can in no way be impacted by a physical solution is fundamentally inconsistent with these
cases.
B. Physical Solutions
A parallel development allowing and encouraging courts to utilize
"physical solutions" to resolve water disputes has come concurrently
with the development of the reasonable use doctrine. Courts have
shown their willingness to approve and encourage physical solutions
requiring parties to share the responsibility of water cutbacks. A physical solution resolves the parties' competing claims to water by satisfying, in a cooperative approach, the reasonable needs of each user.
Judicial recognition of physical solutions grew out of the distaste
for prohibitive injunctions, the more drastic remedy associated with
early water rights infringement cases 464 Courts appeared hesitant to
enjoin any reasonable and beneficial use of water when a less harsh solution might be available. The importance of physical solutions in resolving water disputes was elevated further with the implementation of
161. Id. at 727, 33 Cal. 3d at 445.
162. See ARTHUR L. LrLEWORTH & ERic L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER 89 (1995)
(citing United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 187-88,
182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 130 (1986)).
163. See a/soJoslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 67 Cal. 2d 140 (1967).
164. See, e.g., Montecito Valley Water Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 77 P. 1113, 1118,
144 Cal. 578, 592 (1904).
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the Article X, Section 2 requirement that the state's water resources be
utilized "to the fullest extent of which they are capable.' 65 "Since the
adoption of the 1928 constitutional amendment, it is not only within
the power but it is also the duty of the trial court to admit evidence relating to possible physical solutions, and if none is satisfactory to suggest on its own motion such physical solution."
Nevertheless, a
court's physical solution power was limited: physical solutions could
not be applied to eliminate vested rights and should "be adequate to
protect the one
having the paramount right in the substantial enjoy6 7
ment thereof.'

Still, the equitable nature of the judicial role in water rights disputes was squarely recognized. In Tulare, the court remanded the action to the trial court to determine the amount of, and to protect, the
water necessary to secure Plaintiffs' rights.'" In this context, the court
outlined the nature of the trial court's duty:
[T] he trial court should not lose sight of the fact that this is
an equity case. The equity courts possess broad powers and
should exercise them so as to do substantial justice. Heretofore, the equity courts, in water cases, apparently have not
seen fit to work out physical solutions of the problems presented, unless such solutions have been suggested by the parties. But it should be kept in mind that the equity court is
not bound or limited by the suggestions or offers made by
the parties to this, or any similar action. "9

Thereafter, the California Supreme Court regularly ordered lower
courts to ascertain whether physical solutions could be formulated, to
impose them where appropriate "regardless of whether the parties
agree," to utilize them to prevent unreasonable waste of water, to re-

tain continuing jurisdiction to revisit any unsatisfactory aspects of the
solution, and to protect prior appropriators without "unduly restraining" lower priority water rights holders.
165. City of Lodi v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439, 450, 7 Cal. 2d 316, 341
(1936).
166. Id.
167. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 499, 2 Cal 2d 383-84 (1935); see also
Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 81 P.2d 533, 562-63, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 557-59 (1938).
168. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 101315, 3 Cal. 2d 489, 579-83 (1935).
169. Id. at 1010, 3 Cal. 2d at 574.
170. City of Lodi, 60 P.2d at 450-53, 7 Cal. 3d at 341-45; see also Reclamation Dist. No.
833 v. Quigley, 64 P.2d 399, 402, 8 Cal. 2d 183, 188 (1937) (stating the trial court
should have attempted to ascertain the most reasonable physical solution); Meridian
Ltd. v. City and County of San Francisco, 90 P.2d 537, 571-72, 13 Cal 2d 424, 491-93
(1939) (physical solution allowed); Montecito Valley, 77 P.2d at 1122, 144 Cal. at 578
(directing the court to fashion a physical solution); Peabody, 40 P.2d at 497-99, 2 Cal.
2d at 380; Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 76 P.2d 681, 688-89, 10 Cal. 2d
677, 687 (1938) (ordering trial court to develop physical solution for benefit of
school); Allen v. California Water & Tel. Co., 176 P.2d 8, 22-23, 29 Cal. 2d 446, 488-90
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In Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, the court reaffirmed the trial
court's responsibility to fashion a physical solution even if the parties
did not suggest it: (1) to ensure that water is not wasted; and (2) to
preclude the imposition of an injunctive remedy that might ultimately
be injurious to one or both parties."' In Vail, the court even set out
specific suggestions for the trial court to use on remand to allocate
the
72
waters of the Santa Margarita River between the two litigants.
In Forni, the case involving grape growers' rights to water from the
Napa River, the appellate court called for a physical solution. On remand, both riparians and appropriators were required to build water
storage facilities to give them access to water during periods of peak
demand. 73 Physical solutions have also been employed to resolve several large, multi-party groundwater and surface water rights cases in
Southern California.
Each of these actions terminated at the trial
court level.
The importance of the law of physical solutions as it applies to the
Mojave case is several-fold. The law states that courts have equitable
power and a duty to consider utilizing physical solutions where it is
feasible to do so. The Mojave panel's opinion would have limited this
authority by virtually eliminating the trial court's power to curtail water
users with "paramount" rights. This holding is also in conflict with
previous California Supreme Court decisions involving the use of
physical solutions to reach an equitable apportionment of water rights.
C. Equitable Apportionment
The doctrine of equitable apportionment is a water allocation
method customary to Western water law that originally derives from
federal common law.7 5 Equitable apportionment has been considered
by several California courts reviewing groundwater disputes."" Al(1946).
171. Rancho Santa Margarita,81 P.2d at 562, 11 Cal. 2d at 559-60. "[Ilt has been held
that it is not only within the power, but it is the duty of the trial court, to work out, if
possible a physical solution .... " Id.
172. Id. at 563, 11 Cal. 2d at 560.
173. People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851,
855-58, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 750-54 (1976); see also California Trout, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 788, 801-02 n.6, 218 Cal. App. 3d 187, 208-10 n.6 (1990) (noting
that the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power could be compelled as a price of
continued appropriation from streams feeding Mono Lake to take reasonable steps to
restore the creeks and fisheries to their natural state, so long as there was no associated waste of water).
174. See, e.g., Orange County Water Dist. v. City of Chino, Orange County Superior
Court Case No. 117628 (1969) (ground and surface water rights to Santa Ana water
system); Chino Basin Mun. Water Dist. v. City of Chino, San Bernardino Superior
Court Case No. 1644327 (1978) (general adjudication of Chino Basin, a large
groundwater basin); Western Mun. Water Dist. v. East San Bernardino County Water
Dist., Riverside County Superior Court Case No. 78426 (physical solution involving
certain parties in upper watershed of Santa Ana water system).
175. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 617-19; Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 555 (1963).
176. E.g., City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 28, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 924-
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though not recognized by the term "equitable apportionment," the
doctrine was first applied by the California Supreme Court in City of
Pasadena. There, the court determined that rigid application of water
rights priorities in the basin would result in:
An unequal sharing of the burden of curtailing the overdraft .... Such a result does not appear to be justified where
all the parties have been producing water from the underground basin for many years, and none of them have acted to
protect the supply or prevent invasion of their rights until
this proceeding was instituted. Moreover, it seems probable
that the solution adopted by the trial court will promote the
best interest of the public, because a pro tanto reduction of
the amount of water devoted to each present use would normally be less disruptive than total elimination of some of the
uses. 177
This affirmance of the trial court's pro tanto reduction of each user's
water right was an attempt by the court to reach an equitable apportionment. An absolute application of the priority rule in City of Pasadena would have compelled later appropriators to bear the full brunt
of groundwater restrictions, while78 earlier appropriators would have
been free to resume full pumping.

In San Fernando, the California Supreme Court reexamined and
reworked the concept of mutual prescription to reach an equitable
apportionment. The court recognized the superior status of Los Angeles' Pueblo rights'79 and precluded the application of prescription as
against public entities, 8 ° but also determined that overlying owners
could retain their priority and rights through the doctrine of selfhelp. 181
San Fernando is an extremely important case to the extent it suggests the court's support of flexible application of the priority rule.
The court again acknowledged that application of rigid allocation
schemes may not produce fair results and will not necessarily lead to
the most equitable apportionment of water.82 Most illustrative of this
movement towards equitable apportionment is footnote 61 of the decision. Quoting the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Nebraska
v. Wyoming, the California Supreme Court wrote:

26, 933-35 (1949); Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 918, 924-26, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1000-03 (1975).
177. Pasadena,207 P.2d at 32, 33 Cal. 2d at 932-33.
178. Id.
179. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1288-90, 14 Cal. 3d
199, 252-54 (1975).
180. Id. at 1304-05, 14 Cal. 3d at 274.
181. Id.atl3l9n.101, 14 Cal. 3d at293 n.101.
182. Id. at 1291-98, 14 Cal. 3d at 256-265.
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[I]f an allocation between appropriation States is to be just
and equitable, strict adherence to the priority rule may not
be possible. For example, the economy of a region may have
been established on the basis ofjunior appropriations. So far
as possible those established uses should be protected though
strict application of the priority rule might jeopardize them.
Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and climactic
conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the
extent of established uses, the availability of storage water,
the practical affect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the
damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to
downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the formerthese are all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative
not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the
problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which must be made.'
Other factors to be considered when a court applies an equitable
apportionment are set out in Tehachapi-Cummings County Water District
v. Armstrong.
By analogy to riparian rights, where there is insufficient water
for the current reasonable needs of all the overlying owners,
many factors are to be considered in determining each
owner's proportionate share: the amount of water available,
the extent of ownership in the basin, the nature of the projected use-if for agriculture, the area sought to be irrigated,
the character of the soil, the practicability of irrigation, i.e.
the expense thereof, the comparative profit of the different
crops which could be made of the water on the land-all
these and many other 8considerations
must enter into the so4
lution of the problem.

In their brief to the appellate court, the stipulating parties compared the Mojave Basin adjudication to the factual situation in City of
Pasadena. Specifically, the stipulating parties contended that, like in
City of Pasadena, the Mojave Basin overdraft had commenced long before the filing of the litigation in the matter.18 5 In addition, the Cardozo Appellants had not commenced their pumping in the Mojave Ba-

183. Id. at 1298 n.61, 14 Cal. 3d at 265 n.61.
184. Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918,
925, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1001-02 (1975).
185. Respondents' Brief at 22, City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr.
2d 477, 64 Cal. App. 4th 737 (1998) (No. E017881).

Volume 2

WATER LAW REVIEW

sin until after the overdraft had begun. 8 6 Also, the stipulating parties
alleged that many of the other factors set out in footnote 61 of the San
Fernando opinion indicated that an equitable allocation of the basin
waters would be the most fair and just result.'
Above all, the court
was asked to recognize that the multi-billion-dollar economy of the basin had developed
during the more than four decades since the over88
draft began.

The appeals court opinion in Mojave declined plaintiffs' invitation
to reach an equitable apportionment in the Mojave basin."' However,
the numerous cases supporting physical solutions and apparently signaling a judicial recognition of equitable apportionment were not satisfactorily distinguished by the Mojave appeals court decision. In addition, the Mojave panel's substantial reliance on Wright v. Goleta Water
District'9° to justify its refusal to reach an equitable apportionment
seems misplaced. There, overlying landowners filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to determine the relative rights to a
groundwater basin in Santa Barbara County.'
The trial court in
Wright held that the unexercised rights of overlying landowners had a
lower priority than the rights of appropriators who exercised their water rights. 9 2 The trial court drew this conclusion by analogizing the
case to the stream adjudication involving riparian rights in In re Waters
of Long Valley Creek Stream System' As indicated earlier, in that case the
California Supreme Court held that the State Board had the authority
to define and limit unexercised riparian rights in considering those
rights in relation to all other water rights of a stream system pursuant
94
to the statutory adjudication procedure set out in the Water Code.'
However, the appellate court in Wright rejected the trial court's
analogy to riparian rights law. The court of appeal's opinion acknowledged that the trial court's conclusion promoted certainty in Califor186. Id.
187. Respondents' Brief at 23, Mojave (No. E017881).

The stipulating parties

pointed out that: (1) all of the parties to the litigation had actual or constructive
knowledge of their contribution to the overdraft; (2) the physical solution would not

unduly impact agricultural interests and could in fact provide benefits to those indi-

viduals and corporations by allowing for transfer of water rights in certain circumstances; (3) the physical solution protected groundwater flow and historical stream

amounts; (4) underground storage capacity in the basin was maximized; (5) junior
water users might be unfairly impacted if water rights priorities were strictly enforced;
(6) most water rights in the basin were subject to heavy dispute; and (7) no party

could show, including the dairy farming Cardozo Appellants, that they would be significantly or economically impacted by any of the assessments proposed to be part of

the physical solution. Respondents' Brief at 23-24, Mojave (No. E017881).
188. Respondents' Brief at 23, Mojave (No. E017881).
189. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 488, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 754-55.
190. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 174 Cal. App. 3d 74 (1985).

191. Id. at 743, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 78.
192. Id.
193. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 25 Cal. 3d 339
(1979).
194. Wright, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 746, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 83 (citing Long Valley, 599 P.2d
at 668-69, 25 Cal. 3d at 356-59).
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nia water rights law by setting forth firm water rights for the parties to
the adjudication.195 Indeed, the appellate court stated that, in philosophical terms, it agreed with the trial court's position.1 96 The opinion,
nevertheless, concluded that stare decisis and due process considerations compelled the judicial recognition of the validity of unexercised
overlying rights because, unlike the restrictions placed on riparian
rights in cases such as Long Valley, People v. Shirokow,'9 7(prescriptive
rights), and National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 98 (public trust
doctrine), groundwater is exempt from the pervasive regulations affecting surface water'

9

[A]bsent a statutory scheme for comprehensive determination of all groundwater rights, the application of Long Valley
to a private adjudication would allow prospective rights of
overlying landowners to be subject to the vagaries of an individual plaintiffs pleading without adequate due process protections (italics added). Therefore, we must reverse the
judgment and remand the matter for a re-determination in
accord with the principles enunciated in Tulare District v.
Lindsay-StrathmoreDistrict... (italics added). 200
It should be recognized that the Wright court's refusal to limit overlying rights focused on due process considerations not applicable to
the Mojave decision. The Mojave Basin physical solution was developed over a lengthy period and all major pumpers participated in that
outcome. No claim was made by the Cardozo Appellants that they
were not given notice of the negotiations, not allowed to participate in
the negotiations or at trial, or that their due process rights were violated. The Mojave panel also ignored the fact that the Wright court re-

manded the matter to the trial court to follow the principles outlined
in Tulare, a case which is noteworthy for the Supreme Court's lengthy
discussion of the trial court's duty to use its equitable powers to encourage or fashion a physical solution. Finally, contrary to the Wright
holding, stare decisis does not call for unwavering commitment to overlying rights. Thus, the Mojave panel abided by the strict letter of the
Wright holding, while ignoring the reasoning of that case.

195. Wright, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 749, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 86.
196. Id.
197. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 26 Cal. 3d 301 (1980).

198. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 33 Cal. 3d 419
(1983).
199. Wright, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 749, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 89.
200. Id. at 750, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 89. In Wright and in Tulare IrrigationDistrict v.
Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District, 45 P.2d 972, 3 Cal. 2d 489 (1935), the California
Supreme Court explained the effects and relationship between Article X, Section 2 of
the California Constitution and the long-standing riparian rights doctrine. Tulare, 45
P.2d at 985-87, 3 Cal. 2d at 524-26.
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IV. ISSUES FACING THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
The California Supreme Court may be ready to explicitly recognize
the goal of equitable apportionment in California groundwater law.
This acceptance could take one of many forms. For example, footnote
61 from the San Fernando decision may indicate the direction the high
court's opinion will take. Consistent with footnote 61, even if equitable apportionment were more formally recognized by the court, water
rights priorities would still remain a primary focus ofjudicial action in
groundwater rights disputes.
Another issue facing the California Supreme Court is what is
meant by certainty in water rights. In light of the Mojave court's finding that "certainty" is promoted by judicial recognition of the absolute
sanctity of overlying water rights, the meaning and proper application
of that term may need to be reevaluated and clarified by the California
Supreme Court. This is especially true in light of the California Supreme Court's language in Peabody v. City of Vallejo which seems
to
20
equate certainty with the "substantial enjoyment" of a prior right. 1
Assuring certainty of water rights has always been a challenge facing California water law. The California Supreme Court's line of decisions limiting the application of strict priorities and encouraging
physical solutions hinges upon the practical policy that uncertainty is
the bane of California water rights and that "vested" water rights are a
principal source of that uncertainty. 20 2 Among other problems, uncertainty
inhibits long range planning and investment for the development and use of waters .... [D]ormant riparian rights
"constitute the main threat to nonriparian and out-ofwatershed development, they are the principal cause of insecurity of existing riparian uses .... They are unrecorded,
their quantity is unknown, their administration in the courts
provides very little opportunity for control in the public interest. To the extent that they may deter others from using
the water for fear of their ultimate exercise, they are wasteful,
in the sense of costing the economy the benefits lost from deterred uses."2°
A long line of cases, beginning with Gin Chow, illustrates the intertwined concepts of reasonableness and certainty. The relationship between reasonableness and certainty is undeniable. 4 As explained in
201. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 499, 2 Cal. 2d 357, 383-84 (1935).
202. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 666, 25 Cal. 3d
339, 354-55 (1979); Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 275
Cal. Rptr. 250, 225 Cal. App. 3d 548 (1990).
203. Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 666, 25 Cal. 3 at 355.
204. As the concept of reasonableness has evolved, so it appears, has the concept of
certainty. Once certainty seemed to focus on assuring that individual local producers
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the stipulating parties' petition for review of the Mojave decision to the
California Supreme Court:
This Court has held that the constitutional requirement of
creating the maximum beneficial use of state waters man-

dates the quantitative determination of rights in a comprehensive adjudication of all rights to use a water source (citation omitted). Quantification is necessary to create certainty
as to amounts which may be produced. Such certainty generates water producers' investment in facilities which in turn
causes water to be put to maximum reasonable and beneficial

use (citation omitted).205

In the modern context, limiting unexercised riparian or overlying
rights and quantifying water rights as part of a stream or basin adjudication creates certainty. Economic investment, whether urban or agricultural, relies on a secure water supply and on the orderly movement
of water and water rights. The Mojave panel seems to have turned the
concept of certainty on its head by determining that certainty is manifested by recognizing the immutable unquantified and unregulated
water rights of an overlying owner, while simultaneously concluding
that: "[u] ncertainty is promoted by a [trial court] judgment which disregards all existing and future riparian, overlying and prescriptive
rights, and allocates water on the basis of the amount of actual production (regardless of whether there
'' 6 was a right to produce) in one of the
five years prior to filing of suit. 1
To bolster its holding that overlying water rights cannot be disregarded in the Mojave Basin without the concurrence of the Cardozo
Appellants, the panel relied on Wright v. Goleta Water District. However,

Wright expressly recognizes that certainty is promoted by declaring
firm, quantified water rights for each party to a groundwater adjudication, not
by leaving overlying owners with unregulated, unquantified
20 7
rights.
Long Valley, in a riparian setting, recognized the pernicious
effects of uncertainty concerning the rights of water users,
including the inhibition it causes on long-range planning

had sufficient available water to meet their needs. See Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 996, 3 Cal. 2d 489, 545 (1935). Now, certainty seems to be examined from a broader statewide perspective. See Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 225 Cal. App. 3d
548, 570-71 (1990); Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 666, 25 Cal. 3d at 355.
205. Respondents' Brief at 14, City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr.
2d 477, 64 Cal. App. 4th 737 (1998) (No. E017881).
206. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 760-61.
207. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 748, 174 Cal. App. 3d 74, 86
(1985). Indeed, as early as 1935, the California Supreme Court recognized that uncertainty is created where water rights holders are unable to appropriate a fixed quantity
of water. Tulare,45 P.2d at 996, 3 Cal. 2d at 545.
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and investment for development and use of water, and the
fostering of costly and piecemeal litigation (citation omitted)
(italics added). Those same factors should apply with equal
vigor to groundwater rights since the Legislature "has totally
failed to enact a program that would fulfill the State's own
policy declarations (citation omitted) (emphasis added)."
Like the unexercised riparian right, the unexercised
groundwater right of an overlying landowner is unrecorded,
of unknown quantity, with little opportunity for control in
the public interest, and wasteful to the extent it deters others
from using water for fear of its ultimate exercise (citations
omitted).
Even though it may appear a logical extension of Long Valley
to allow a trial court adjudicating competing claims to
groundwater to subordinate an unexercised right to a present appropriative use, we must hold such extension inappropriate (italics added). Philosophically, we agree with District's position but stare decisis and due process
considerations, not a concern under the current riparian
statutory scheme, compel us to reach the opposite conclusion
in this case. 20R1
Based upon this reasoning, the Mojave court's position on the certainty issue and its reliance on Wright is untenable. Under the appellate court decision, the Cardozo Appellants' water rights remain unquantified and limited only by the doctrines of reasonable and
beneficial use. The stipulating parties cannot be certain as to the
amount of water that will be used by Cardozo Appellants and thus how
much water will be available for other basin water users. The Cardozo
Appellants themselves do not know the amount of their rights. 0 9
Moreover, by leaving Cardozo Appellants' rights undefined and
keeping the farmers out of the physical solution, they need not participate in the mechanisms embodied in the solution to guarantee the
health of the groundwater basin. Nevertheless, the Cardozo Appellants will enjoy the benefits of the physical solution in the form of increased recharge to the Mojave Basin. Thus, they reap at least some of
the rewards attendant to the improved water supply to the basin without contributing to the stipulating parties' effort. This result ignores
the practical realities of resolving overdraft problems in groundwater
basins, and causes the type of "inconclusive fragmentary definition of
water rights" and uncertainty the California Supreme Court has sought

208. Wright, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 749, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 87.
209. In a similar vein, the Cardozo Appellants' water rights may be less certain under
the Mojave opinion than they would be under the physical solution. Their overlying
use of water to grow alfalfa could still be deemed unreasonable in the future. See generallyJoslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 67 Cal. 2d 140 (1967).
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to discourage.2 0
The California Supreme Court may also opine on other water law
issues presented in Mojave. The existing decisions raise uncertainty
about who curtails water use in an overdrafted basin. The San
Fernando case clearly holds that municipal appropriators cannot be
prescripted against because of Civil Code section 1007.211 However, the
holding in Blue Skies implies that an overlying user cannot lose its right
to water it has pumped. This conflict leaves unresolved which user
curtails its water use when there is not enough water available in the
basin. Is it the appropriator who cannot be prescripted against, or is it
the overlyer who cannot lose its right to water that it has pumped?
The court may explain how the statutory policy declaring domestic
212
use of water to be the highest use of water impacts the Mojave Basin.
Finally, the court may also settle arguments raised at the trial court
level that the Cardozo Appellants should be precluded by the doctrines of laches and estoppel from contesting pumping by the municipal purveyors. Municipal pumping, and the basin's severe overdraft,
have been known to the general public for more than four decades.
Thus, the stipulating parties have argued that the Cardozo Appellants
lost their fight of protest by not contesting the municipal water production sooner.
V. CONCLUSION
The Mojave case illustrates that the rigid application of water rights
in a groundwater adjudication is incongruent with California water
law. In this era of increasing demand and limited supply, traditional
water rights priorities can no longer be the sole component of a
court's analysis. Inflexibility is not a practical method for determining
water rights in a modern society, especially one with a growing emphasis on municipal and industrial water allocation. As illustrated by the
result reached by the Mojave panel, inequitable results flow from rigid
application of water rights priorities. The California Supreme Court
now has the opportunity to revisit and advance groundwater law and to
help fashion a contemporary solution to overdraft problems.

210. See In reWaters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 666, 25 Cal. 3d
339, 355-56 (1979).
211. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1305, 14 Cal. 3d

199, 275 (1975).
212. Cal. Water Code §106 (West 1997).
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INTRODUCTION
Mining has been a driving force in our nation's industry since the
mid 1800's, providing millions with jobs and generating billions of dollars in revenue.' In recent years, however, public focus has shifted
from viewing the industry as a supplier of economic benefit to perceiving it as a national polluter and environmental adversary. Mining is a
major target of government entities and environmentalists because of
the vast environmental degradation it has caused and the threats it
poses to both human health and aquatic life.2
A graduate of the University of Denver College of Law, Ms. Cavanaugh is a solo

practitioner in general practice.
1.

MATTHEW BENDER, AMERICAN LAW OF MINING

§30.05 (2d ed. 1996).

2. THOMAS MICHAEL POWER, NOT ALL THAT GLITTERS: AN EVALUATION OF THE
IMPACT OF REFORM OF THE 1872 MINING LAW ON THE ECONOMY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 1-

5 (1993).
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While it is undeniable that mining is an integral part of the national economy, that powerful position is no longer sufficient to protect it from the reaches of modern environmental regulations. Specifically, mining's unregulated or under-regulated discharges into
water, particularly ground water, have allowed pollution to spread at
alarming levels into rivers, streams, water supplies and, ultimately, into
our homes. This article focuses on the need for new federal mining
regulations to protect ground water, water supplies, and human health
from mining contamination by examining the impact of mining wastes
on the environment via ground water contamination, and the varying
perspectives on reform since the enactment of the Clean Water Act
("CWA").
Ground water is one of the most critical unresolved issues in
United States' environmental and health protection today. It is underregulated and continues to serve as a daily transporter of pollution.
The most significant example of the lack of ground water regulation is
its omission from the Clean Water Act,3 the paramount regulation of
waste discharge into water.
Ground water provides twenty four percent of the nation's domestic agricultural and industrial water, with over fifty percent of the
United States population using ground water as its major source of
drinking water. Actual ingestion of contaminated ground water and
subsequent harm to human health have been minimal thus far because of the purification process to which drinking water is subjected. 6
The effects, however, of contaminated ground water on rivers, streams,
and aquatic life have been massive.
Pollution generated by active and abandoned mines causes widespread damage to aquatic life, agricultural lands, animals, and drinking water supplies.8 The chief conduit of this pollution is water, most
3. Clean Water Act §§101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 125-1387 (1994). The Clean Water
Act is the most significant environmental regulation protecting water bodies in the

United States, governing discharge of pollutants into "navigable waters." The Clean
Water Act defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States, including territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994). The definition of navigable waters does not encompass ground water, leaving it susceptible to continued pollution.
4. Lawrence Ng, Note, A Drastic Approach to Controlling Ground Water Pollution, 98
Yale L.J. 773, 773-74 (1989).

5. Id. at 774.
6. Telephone Interview with Greg Parsons, Watershed Manager, Colorado Water
Quality Control Division (Jan. 27, 1997).
7.

Telephone Interview with Aimee Boulanger, Staff Writer, Mineral Policy Center

(Jan. 24, 1997).
8.

See infra notes 12-25 and accompanying text (discussing the Summitville min-

ing disaster and its affects on aquatic life in the Alamosa River). Contamination of the
Alamosa has also posed crop irrigation problems due to the highly acid state of the
water. Deborah Mendez, Mining Legacy Lingers; State Grapples With Abandoned Sites,
Open Shafts, Toxic Wastes and Scarred Land, ROcKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 26, 1996, at 8A. In
Clear Creek - Central City, Colorado, heavy metals such as arsenic, cadmium, chromium and copper contaminated private drinking wells, forcing residents to obtain
drinking water from a municipal reservoir. Beverly A. Reese, Perpetual Pollution,
CLEMENTINE,

Winter 1995, 5-6. Lincoln Park, near Canon City, experienced ground
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notably ground water.9 Ground water is the first recipient of mining
poisons. As the contaminants leach off rocks and drip out of shafts
into the soil, they enter ground water, which then spreads the pollution into aquatic, agricultural, and human life by its passage through
the earth and connection with tributary waters. Rivers and streams
have the same power to spread pollution, but those threats have been
addressed in federal and state legislation.
By virtue of its daily use as both a recreational source and a water
supply, contaminated surface water demonstrates the dangers of
ground water contamination and its power to spread poisons into surface waters. In Colorado, 1200 miles of rivers and streams have been
polluted with heavy metals produced by mining." This pollution has
eradicated fish populations in many instances, and has an overall detrimental effect on the recreational uses of Colorado's rivers.
The country's most infamous case of mining pollution, the Summitville mining disaster in Colorado, spilled cyanide and heavy metals
into the Alamosa River via ground water contaminating water, killing
fish, impacting agricultural irrigation, and threatening human drinking water sources.' 2 In 1986, the Summitville Consolidated Mining
Company began mining for gold in the San Juan Mountains at the
headwaters of the Alamosa River, using a process called cyanide heap
leaching." The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") gave the
company permission to dam a valley and use it as a heap leach pad instead of requiring a contained pad site, though that valley had a creek
running through it that fed into the Alamosa River. The plastic used
to line the heap began leaking cyanide
into the creek. The cyanide
4
also flowed into the ground water.'
Though the state was aware of the spreading contamination in the
water contamination caused by uranium and molybdenum, which forced residents to
abandon their private wells for drinking water purposes and be connected to Canon
City's water supply. EPA, NAT'L SUPERFUND PRIORITIES LIST SiTES: COLORADO (March
1995).
9. Ground water is "any water not visible on the surface of the ground under
natural conditions." It is classified as tributary or nontributary to natural streams.
Colorado Dep't. of Natural Resources v. Southwestern Colorado Water Conservation
Dist., 671 P.2d 1294, 1300 n.2 (Colo. 1983) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(19)
(1973)), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984).
10. Tributary water is "water in the unconsolidated alluvial aquifer of sand, gravel,
and other sedimentary materials, and all other waters hydraulically connected thereto
which can influence the rate or direction of movement of the water in that ...aquifer
or natural stream." Southwestern Colorado Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d at 1300 n.2
(quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(11) (1973)).
11. Telephone Interview with Robert Robinson, Environmental Engineer, United
States Bureau of Land Management (Feb. 6, 1997). Trout in the Arkansas River have
an average life expectancy of three years, compared to the national average of seven

years, due to the high metal concentrations in the water.
12. Todd Hartman, Poisoned Legacy/Debate Rages Over Cleanup of Alamosa River,
COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, Nov. 18, 1996, at Al.
13. Cyanide heap leaching involves constructing an impermeable lined pad on the
ground, dumping crushed raw ore on the pad, and sprinkling it with cyanide solution
that leaches the gold from the ore. JAMES S. LYON ETAL., BURDEN OF GILT 22 (1993).
14. Id.
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Summitville area and the potential threats it posed to the environment, Summitville was allowed to continue operating the mine. The
state, with no funds available, feared financial responsibility for the
clean up if it forced Summitville to close. 5 The company agreed to
begin reclamation of the site in 1992, but, in the face of huge clean up
costs, filed for bankruptcy in December 1992.16 At the time of Summitville's bankruptcy, the cost of cleanup was estimated to be sixty million dollars. 7
Since 1993, the cost of operation and cleanup has been estimated
to be between $38,000 to $50,000 a day. 8 The EPA added the mine to
its Superfund listing in May 1994.' 9 A 1996 estimate indicates it will
cost three to four million dollars a year over the next twenty years to
make the river safe for agricultural uses; however, that funding will not
be adequate to raise standards sufficiently so that the fish population
may be replenished.
Present clean up costs of the Summitville mine pose an extensive
financial burden and the state is considering lowering Alamosa River
water quality standards to a financially attainable level." In 1981, under CWA regulations, state scientists rated the Alamosa as capable of
supporting fish, the highest water quality rating possible for the river
under the Act.2 ' The severity of the damage caused by the contamination, and the large financial costs of the clean up, have forced state
regulators to find that replenishing fish in the Alamosa is an unattainable goal22 because financial ability is a determining factor in how well
a site is cleaned up.23

15. Currently, there are no federal funds for clean up of hardrock mines, unless
they have been labeled a Superfund priority site. Deborah Mendez, Mining's Legacy
Lingers; State Grapples with Abandoned Sites, Open Shafts, Toxic Waste, Scarred Land, RocKY
MTN. NEWS, Dec. 26, 1996, at 8A.
16. John Sanko, State Implores Feds To Push Water Treatment At Mine: Congressional
Stall On Funding Threatens Summitville Cleanup Efforts, Official Says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, September 27, 1995, at 6A.
17. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (discussing cleanup costs of the
Summitville mine and subsequent law suits against the owner and manager); See also
Stuart Sanderson, Mining - Two Views: Is EPA Doing a GoodJob Cleaningup Summitville?,
DENV. POST, Feb. 4, 1996, at G01.
18. LYON, supra note 13, at 23.
19. Sanko, supra note 16, at 6A.
20. Robinson, supra note 11.
21. Hartman, supra note 12, at Al.
22. Id. More than $105 million has been spent on Summitville. The state has
spent more than $46.9 million on water treatment and the EPA has not been able to
contain silver releases in accordance with the stringent state standards. Stuart Sanderson, Mining - Two Views: Is EPA Doing A GoodJob Cleaning Up Summitville, DENY. POST,
Feb. 4, 1996, at G01.
23. Hartman, supra note 12, at Al. EPA project manager, Jim Hanley, admitted
that lowering the water quality standards of the river deprived residents of its historical
uses. Superfund law controlling the cleanup will force the EPA to develop a long-term
plan for which taxpayers must pay. Id.
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PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE SUMMITVILLE DISASTER
AND ITS IMPACT ON REFORM
Public attention concerning mining and cyanide leaching has generally focused on the impact on human health. Neither cyaniderelated deaths nor significant human health effects from cyanide mining were reported prior to Summitville, and few public complaints
were ever voiced.24 Cyanide itself, while a deadly poison, breaks down
quickly in the environment when exposed to sunlight or pH-neutral
conditions. 2' However, because of its long-term and far-reaching effects, Summitville changed the public's perception of cyanide leach
mining, drawing national attention to the problems associated with
mining waste and the need for reform.
While the Summitville disaster has drawn public attention to mining reform and the need for increased regulation of ground water, it
has also generated controversy regarding the types of safeguards
needed to protect against contamination, as well as opposition by mining companies to federal mining reform. In instances such as Summitville, years of pumping and treating ground water have only slightly
reduced levels of contamination, and, because of the low level of success in these cases, mining companies now question whether future
uses of ground water justify the effort and expense of such remedial
treatment.
The controversy and opposition regarding ground water protection and mining reform adversely affect water supplies by slowing the
reform process and allowing contamination to go untreated. 6 In addition to objecting to standards that establish permissible levels of waste
discharge, mining companies protest the removal of mill tailings 7 that
often leak into ground water. As a result of these continued controversies, residents in areas with these tailings have found their wells
contaminated and are discouraged from using the water for human or
agricultural purposes, and in some instances have been either provided with bottled water or connected to a city water supply system
with water treatment facilities. 281
24. Parsons, supra note 6.
25. Philip Miltocker, Cyanide Spring,CLEMENTINE, Autumn 1989, at 7.
26. See Russell V. Randall & Peter D. Robertson, Safe Drinking Water Act, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK BY PATTON, BOGGS & BLOW 220 (Timothy A. Vanderver, Jr. ed. et al., 1994) (discussing the EPA's slow implementation process of the Safe
Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"), equating it with the slow implementation of the Clean
Water Act). The authors note the EPA's hesitancy to use its enforcement powers over

local governments as one of the main implementation problems.

27. Mining Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C. (1994)).
28. SeeJohn D. Collins, Reclamation and Ground Water Restoration in the Uranium Milling Industry: An Assessment of UMTRCA, Title II, I IJ. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 23, 47

(1995-1996) (discussing Homestake Mining Company in New Mexico and the severe
impact mill tailings have on residential water supplies). Even with a water treatment
pumping system implemented in the late 1970s, by 1983, Homestake Mill was placed
on the Superfund National Priorities List, due to ground water contamination. Hook-

Issue I

MINING CONTAMINATION OFGROUND WATER

REGULATION OF MINING AND THE MINING LAW OF 1872
Presently, most federal regulation of the hard rock mining industry
is done under the Mining Act of 1872 ("Mining Act").2 The Mining
Act has been the subject of great debate and controversy in the United
States Congress. Senators and Representatives continue to struggle to
reach compromises in amending the law to include protection and
0
3safeguarding
clean up of the environment by mining companies, while
federal land.
the industry's interest in mining mineral-rich
Controversy surrounds the law because it lacks provisions addressing environmental impacts of mining on land and allows unnecessary
degradation of land.3 ' The primary problem with the Mining Act and
its impact on ground water contamination is that the federal legislative
view has not been modified to include present-day concerns regarding
environmental preservation and protection of human health. Existing
regulations require that the impact of mining on the land be no
greater than "what would normally result when an activity is being accomplished by a prudent operator in usual ...operations of similar
0,2
character ....
In pushing for amendments to the 1872 law, environmentalists are
demanding legislation that provides more stringent reclamation and
water quality standards.5 Presently, taxpayers fund much of the Superfund cleanups caused by mining disasters, except in instances where
functioning state reclamation provisions require mining companies to
34
accept responsibility for reclamation prior to mining.
THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE COURTS' LEGISLATIVE
INTERPRETATION OF THE OMISSION OF GROUND WATER
An essential component to the reform of the Mining Act is the reform of the CWA."5 The Mining Act, like the CWA, is central to the
debate over reform because water is an essential element in the mining
process and the recipient of many of mining's wastes. The controversy

ups of residential housing to a municipal water system cost the mining company $3.4
million. In the 1970's, the reclamation plan Homestake submitted to the EPA totaled
$20 million, $8 million of which was designated for restoration of ground water. Id. at

48.
29. Mining Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
30. The Mining Act has been amended numerous times, most recently in 1994. See
Sanderson, supra note 20, at GO.
31. Power, supra note 2, at 8-11.
32. BLM Surface Management 43 C.F.R § 3809.0-5(k) (1997).
33.

LEGISLATIVE SUMMARY: MINING LAW, 52 CONG.

Q. WKLY REP. 43, Nov. 5, 1994,

3169-70 (1994).
34. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-302(1) (1998). The Colorado statute is an example
of a functioning state reclamation provision that requires mining companies to show
they have sufficient funds for reclamation before beginning mining.
35. Clean WaterAct §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
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surrounding mining and its environmental and health effects has
arisen because of increased public concern in the last two decades
about the effect of water quality on human health. The primary purpose of the CWA is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters,)3 6 by making the discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters unlawful, unless done in
compliance with the permit requirements of the Act. 7
The key issue in the controversy surrounding the CWA is Congress'
refusal to expand the definition of navigable waters to include ground
water. Legislative intent to omit ground water from inclusion in the
Act has been inferred from a Senate report that stated, "ground water,
due to its ... almost complete absence of living organisms can accept
more pollutants with less.., direct degradation ... . Ground water
pollution is not as serious a national problem as is surface water pollution."38 In 1971, Representative Les Aspin argued before the Committee on Public Works, that "ground water should be included after the
term 'navigable water' in sections 401(a)(1) and 402(a)(1), allowing
ground water to be regulated in the same fashion as other water
sources."39 The Committee rejected Aspin's argument because there
"[was] not sufficient information on ground water to justify the types
of controls that are required for navigable waters. 40 Based on this debate, courts have continued to hold that Congress did not intend that
the EPA undertake regulation of ground water pollution without the
basic information Congress thought
necessary to decide what types of
• 41
controls might be appropriate.
Subsequently, many federal courts
have found that the CWA evinces no intention to impose federal control over any phase of subsurface water pollution. Courts continue to
hold that the power to regulate ground water has been vested in the
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). "Navigable waters" are defined as waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). "Discharge" is defined as
the addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source. 33 U.S.C. §
1362(12)(a). A "pollutant" is defined as "dredged spoil, solid waste.... sewage, garbage, chemical wastes,.. . rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). Because mine drainage is
considered an industrial waste, it qualifies as a pollutant. "Point source" is defined as
"any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, [or] conduit ... from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
38. Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1325 n.23 (5"' Cir. 1977) (quoting S. Rep.
No. 92-414, at 67 (1972), reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3739). Exxon quotes testimony from then Representative Aspin, proponent of amending the Clean Water Act
to include ground water, and opponent, Representative Harsha, who succeeded in
having the ground water language omitted based on his conclusion that there was insufficient knowledge or technology to devise water-quality standards for ground water.
Id. at 1326-30.
39. Id. at 1327 n.28.
40. Id. at 1328.
41. Id. at 1330.
42. See Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977); Kelly v. U.S., 618 F.
Supp. 1103 (W.D. Mich. 1985). Both cases hold that ground water is not covered under the definition of navigable waters in the Clean Water Act.
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states.

Since there is no specific federal statute that implements ground
water protection, it has been difficult for courts to hold mining companies liable for discharging contaminants into ground water. The issue has been litigated numerous times, with liability generally determined by a particular court's interpretation of the CWA's ground water
coverage. For example, in a 1994 case, Washington Wilderness Coalition
v. Hecla Mining Co.,45 involving the discharge of mining waste into navigable waters through ground water, the court interpreted the CWA's
legislative intent to mean that Congress "did not intend that discharges
to ...isolated ground water be subject to permit requirements.'4 6 Almost twenty-five years after the original debate over amending the
CWA to include ground water, courts continue to uphold the notion
that "[we] do not have the ... technology to devise water quality standards for ground water." 7
MODERN JUDICIAL TRENDS SUPPORTING THE INCLUSION
OF GROUND WATER IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT

Despite what some courts have viewed as clear legislative intent to
exclude ground water from the coverage of the CWA, some recent

court decisions have interpreted the CWA in a broad fashion, holding
that navigable waters encompass tributary ground waters."
While
courts have upheld the idea that non-tributary ground water, ground
water that is not hydraulically connected with surface water, 49may not
be inferred as covered under the Act, tributary ground water receives
43. Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7d,
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 930 (1994).
44. See Train, 554 F.2d 1310; Kelly, 618 F. Supp. 1103 (holding that ground water is
not covered under the Clean Water Act). But see United States. v. Earth Sciences, Inc.,
599 F.2d 368, 375 (10h Cir. 1979); Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining
Co., 870 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Wa. 1994). The later two cases interpret the Clean Water
Act broadly and find that tributary ground water is protected.
45. Washington Wilderness Coalition,870 F. Supp. at 983.
46. Id. at 989.
47. Id. at 990 (quoting 1 Cong. Research Serv., A Legislative History of the Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 93' d Cong., 1" Sess., at 594) (remarks of
Rep. Harsha).
48. See Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126 (10"' Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1055 (1986). Distinctions the courts have drawn in determining how tributary
waters fit under the Clean Water Act will be discussed later in this section. Tributary
water is "water in the unconsolidated alluvial aquifer of sand, gravel, and other sedimentary materials, and all other waters hydraulically connected thereto which can influence the rate or direction of movement of the water in that.., aquifer or natural
stream." Colorado Dept. of Natural Resources v. South Western Colorado Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294, 1300 n.2 (Colo. 1983) (quoting COLO. REv. STAT. § 3792-103 (11) (1973)), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984).
49. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-10 (10.5)(1998). "Nontributary ground water"
means that ground water, located outside the boundaries of any designated ground
water basins .. . the withdrawal of which will not, within one hundred years, deplete
the flow of a natural stream ... at an annual rate greater than one-tenth of one percent of the annual rate of withdrawal.
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limited protection under the CWA "when the regulation is undertaken
in conjunction with limitations on... discharges into surface waters."5
These decisions are critical steps toward protecting ground water from
mining contamination.
The decision in Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co.,5 ' interpreted
coverage of the CWA to include ground water by holding that the
CWA covered "discharge which reaches navigable waters through
ground water. 5 2 The plaintiff, an environmental group, alleged that
the Colorado Refining Company was illegally discharging pollutants
into Sand Creek in excess of permit limits degrading the water quality
of the surface water body,53 and discharging into ground water tributary to the creek, giving the court jurisdiction "to enforce.., an effluent standard
or limitation.., and to apply any appropriate civil penal54
ties.

Citing federal court cases55 where the term "navigable waters" has
been interpreted broadly to include navigable waters that encompass
"waters tributary to those which are navigable in fact," the district court
found the refinery in violation of the CWA, holding the prohibition
against discharging pollutants into "navigable waters," covered
dis6
charges which reached navigable waters through ground water.
The Sierra Club court based much of its reasoning on United States v.
Earth Sciences, Inc.,57 which interpreted the CWA to have broad coverage over the waters of the United States, and to "regulate to the fullest
extent possible those sources emitting pollution into rivers, streams,
and lakes."' 8 In Earth Sciences, the court held that unpermitted leach
mining waste polluting a creek via ground water seepage violated the
CWA. The court based its rationale for its interpretation of the Act
on its belief that the CWA was "designed to regulate discharges into
every body of water that may affect interstate commerce."6 ' The court
50.

United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 852 (7th Cir. 1977).

51. Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428 (D. Colo. 1993).
52. Id. at 1434.
53. Id. at 1429.
54. Id. at 1431 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)).
55. Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1432-34 (citing McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1196 (E.D. Cal. 1988); New York v. United
States, 620 F. Supp. 374, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Inland Steel Co. v. EPA 901 F.2d 1419,
1422 (7th Cir. 1990); Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129-30 (10" Cir. 1985);

United States v.Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1979)).

56. Id. at 1432-1434. The court stated, "[t]he Clean Water Act's preclusion of discharge of any pollutant into 'navigable waters' includes such discharge which reaches
'navigable waters' through ground water." Id. at 1434.
57.

Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d at 368.

58. Id. at 373.
59. Id.
60. Sierra Club, 838 F. Supp. at 1433 (quoting Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373). While
Earth Science's holding concerned the affects of unregulated discharge on interstate
commerce, its statements pertaining to navigable waters are appropriate here. The
court endorsed a broad interpretation of the Act, stating that "[iut seems clear Congress intended to regulate discharges into every creek, stream, river body or body of
water that in any way may affect interstate commerce." Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 375.
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found the discharge into the ground water was connected to, and polluted, Rito Seco Creek-an interstate commerce
6 water body, and ruled
the ground water was protected under the Act.

1

The connection between interstate commerce affected waters and
ground water is key in interpreting that the CWA includes tributary
waters. In order to protect ground water from the discharge of pollutants and subsequent contamination, courts must find that the affected
tributary ground water is connected to interstate commerce affected
waters. In cases where plaintiffs seek coverage of tributary waters under the Act but do not establish an interstate commerce connection,
they must show that the watercourse is "a tributary
of, or at least a con62
duit of, water to an interstate water course.,
In expanding the interpretation of the CWA to cover tributary
ground water, courts have held that in certain instances, tributary waters do not have to be connected to waters that are navigable in fact to
be protected by the CWA.63 In Quivira Mining Co. v. United States,6" the

court found ground water may be protected under the Act based on
the fact that surface flow fed underground aquifers that connected to
navigable-in-fact streams. 65 A stream need not be navigable in the
traditional sense. Tributary water flowing on some occasions, is protected by the Act. 6
The interpretation of ground water as an interstate commerce affected water body covered under the CWA is of particular significance
to the mining industry, because it allows for protection of ground water from waste that has seeped through the earth and imposes liability
on mining companies for any ground water contamination. Tributary
waters that seep into the earth have been held to be interstate commerce affected waters, because the waters of the tributary body soak
into the earth's surface and "after a lengthy period, perhaps centuries,"
the 6underground
water connects with waters that are navigable in
7
fact.
Decisions interpreting the CWA to encompass ground water uphold the congressionally declared goal of "restor[ing] and maintain [ing] the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the nation's
waters." ' By enforcing limitations on mining companies' mill tailings,
acid run off, mine waste, and cyanide discharges affecting tributary
ground water, providing strict penalties for these violations, and ensuring that reclamation be funded by mining companies, courts can
lessen the financial burden of the EPA and state taxpayers.

61.

United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1979).

62. Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1356 (D.
N.M. 1995).
63. See Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129-30 (10th Cir. 1985).

64. Id. at 126.
65. Id. at 130.
66. Friends of Santa Fe County, 892 F. Supp at 1355.
67. Quivira Mining Co., 765 F.2d at 129.
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
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If Congress chooses to amend the CWA to specifically include
tributary ground water, this will add additional environmental protection. If tributary ground water is specifically included in future legislation, the quality of the nation's waters will be improved and the time
and expense of litigation will be reduced. In addition, long-term effects on the environment will include a replenishment of aquatic life
and a reduction in fears of water contamination and human health
threats posed by contamination 6
FEDERAL STATUTES WHICH ADDRESS MINING WASTES
AND GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION
The EPA administers three statutes that deal with remedying contamination in aquatic contexts, and which have potential to have significant impact on the mining industry if ground water protection becomes a focal point in Congress. These statutes are the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")," the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Conservation and Liabili r Act ("CERCLA"), 1
and the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA").
Although RCRA,
CERCLA and the SDWA were originally designed as preventive
mechanisms for ground water protection and waste disposal management, 7 regulations and implementation procedures have resulted in
the statutes being used as corrective mechanisms for already existing
contamination, rather than being focused on contamination prevention.74
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and Its Effects on
Ground Water
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) is the only federal statute directed at protecting underground sources of water and thus is the only
statute that currently gives direct coverage to ground water. 75 The protection mechanisms for underground sources of water are used to protect aquifers from contamination thereby safeguarding the water for
human consumption.7 6 The statute established standards for the public water system at a level that would protect human health. The levels
promulgated by the statute control maximum contaminant levels, pro69. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
70. Resource Conservation Recovery Act §§ 1001-11012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k)
(1994).
71. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act §§
101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
72. Safe Drinking Water Act §§ 1401-1465, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (26) (1994).
73. Linda A. Malone, The Necessay InterrelationshipBetween Land Use and Preservation
of Ground Water Resources, 9 UCLAJ. Envtl. L. Poly 1, 15, (1990).
74. Id. at 16, 26-27.
75. Randall & Robertson, supra note 24, at 236.
76. Id.
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tect sole source aquifers and control underground injection of wastes."
The SDWA is critical in the reform of mining law and protection of
ground water because it is specifically directed at controlling the
amount of waste in ground water. However, there are particular problems with the language and meaning of the statute. While the SDWA
affects disposal of wastes into underground water, it deals strictly with
waste that is "injected'7 8 into ground water (waste which enters
through "bored, drilled or driven wells, or through a dug well").'9 Because most mine waste enters ground water by seeping through the
soil and not through any type of well, these provisions directed at underground contamination fail to safeguard against contamination
caused by mining.
Another major problem with the SDWA's protection of ground water and drinking water supplies is that the statute covers only public
water supply systems and does not protect residents utilizing private
wells. 0 Public water systems are defined as systems of piped water for
human consumption that have "at least fifteen service connections or
regularly serve at least twenty-five individuals."" As a result of this narrow coverage, private well users suffer health effects from contaminated ground water as well as monetary burdens of having to obtain
drinking water from other sources.
Resource Conservation And Recovery Act (RCRA)
RCRA establishes a comprehensive "cradle-to-grave" scheme for
regulating hazardous wastes. 82 Congress created RCRA with the intention of remedying ground water contamination that was generated by
non-point source pollution, which escaped coverage under the Clean
8 4

Water Act, 83 by implementing standards and cleanup requirements.

Heap leaching contamination and surface run off contaminants
meet the definition of "solid waste" under RCRA, since "hazardous
waste" includes "a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes."" Mine
wastes are classified as hazardous waste under RCRA because they are
77. Malone, supra note 68, at 18.
78. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h (d)(1)-(2) (1994).
79. Randall & Robertson, supra note 24, at 236.
80. Id. at 233-37.
81. 42 U.S.C. §300f(4)(a) (1994). Exempt from the definition are systems that
have only distribution and storage facilities, obtain all water from a public water system
but are not owned or operated by it and do not sell water. 42 U.S.C. § 3 00 g (1)-(3)
(1994).
82. Edison Electric Institute, v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 996 F.2d
326, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The regulations cover the generation, transportation,
treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes. Id.
83. Malone, supra note 68, at 26.
84. SALLY BENJAMIN & DAVID BELLUCK,STATE GROUND WATER REGULATION: GUIDE TO
LAws,STANDARDS AND RiSK ASSESSMENT 20 (1994).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1994). Solid waste is defined as "any garbage, refuse,
sludge ... or other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained
gaseous material resulting from... mining...." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1998).
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solid waste which may "cause, or significantly contribute to an increase
in mortality, an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness, or... pose a substantial... hazard to human health
or the environment when improperly
8 6 treated, stored, transported or
disposed of, or otherwise managed.
RCRA section 70037 enables the EPA Administrator to bring suit in
federal court against any owner or operator of a storage facility or a
past or present generator of hazardous waste, 88which includes a mining facility and owner. Unfortunately, section 7003 is generally only
applicable to active sites, and may not be applied retroactively for reclamation. Additionally, under section 7002, a citizen is empowered to
bring suit, and may sue for private enforcement of the statute because
the statute authorizes "any person" to "commence a civil action on his
own behalf."' A citizen aggrieved by mining waste can thus bring a
cause of action against the mining facility responsible for generating
the waste. 9'
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Conservation
and Liability Act (CERCLA)
The most powerful and feared federal statute in the mining industry is the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA).92 CERCLA's primary goal is to "protect and
preserve public health and the environment from the effects of releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances to the environment. 93 CERCLA focuses on remedying ground water contamination
through a variety of programs. 4 The is statute are more ground water
protective than the CWA because CERCLA's terms are more broadly
defined and allow for the imposition of liability for "the substantial
threat of release" 95 of a pollutant. Where it has been difficult to regulate the discharge of mining waste into ground water because of the
lack of applicable terminology in the Clean Water Act, under
CERCLA, a "facility" is broadly defined as "any building, structure, in-

86. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5)(A)-(B) (1994).
87.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a)

(1994).
88. Malone, supra note 68, at 37.
89. See United States v. Northeast Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 146 (1987). See also United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp.
1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
90. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. §

6972(a)(1) (A) (1998).
91. See generally United States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 112 S. Ct. 1627
(Ohio 1992). Ohio successfully brought a citizen suit under the provisions of RCRA
against the United States government for violations of RCRA permit provisions.
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-6992(k) (1994).
93. John C. Cruden, CERCLA Overview, SA 85 ALI-ABA 517, 521 (1996).
94. BENJAMIN & BELLUCK,supra note 77, at 21-22.
95. Cruden, supra note 86, at 527.
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stallation, equipment, pipe or pipeline, .. well, pit pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, [or] landfill.
,,96 The broad nature of the definitions allow a greater number of actions to be filed against mining polluters.
CERCLA's power over the mining industry is activated when
there is a release or a substantial threat of release of a hazardous substance or a pollutant or contaminant, which may present an imminent
and substantial danger to the public health or welfare. 97 Though
CERCLA's broad definitions allow for easier imposition of liability on
mining companies that release contamination into ground water, the
statute is not a sufficiently proactive answer to preventing ground water contamination and protecting human health. While CERCLA may
be activated by a "substantial threat" of release, it is generally focused
on remedying ground water contamination, not preventing it.98
COLORADO METHODS OF RECOVERY BASED ON COMMON
LAW REMEDIES TO GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION
In addition to the potential statutory liability of the SDWA, RCRA,
and CERCLA for ground water pollution, liability may be derived from
the common law. States and other plaintiffs apply common law doctrines, particularly nuisance, to protect ground water and residents
who rely on the ground water supply.' Common law remedies include
injunctive relief, court-ordered cleanups, and actual damages including costs of obtaining water supplies, lost profits, and reduced property
values.0
Common law issues of liability resulting from nuisance continue to
govern claims for emotional distress, breach of contract, trespass, and
damages. The common law has recognized that "regardless of whether
the occupant of the land has sustained physical injury, he may recover
for discomfort and annoyance ...and for mental suffering occasioned

by fear for the safety of himself when such discomfort or suffering has

96. 42 U.S.C. §9601(9)(A) (1994).
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
98.

BENJAMIN & BULLOCK, supra note 77, at 22.

CERCLA suits at Summitville: An

example of EPA CERCLA litigation against a potentially responsible party is the suit

filed by the EPA against Robert Friedland, former manager of the Summitville Mine.
The EPA and United States Attorney filed a civil action against Friedland to recover
for the $120 million expended on the clean up of the mine, claiming Friedland per-

sonally made decisions pertaining to mining, financing, pollution control and operation which led to the contamination of ground water surrounding the mine and sub-

sequently 17 miles of the Alamosa River. Former Goldmine ManagerMoves to Dismiss EPA
Claimfor Damages, COLO. SPRINGS GAzETrE TELEGRAPH,Jan. 10, 1997, at B4. In June of
1995, a mid-level manager for Friedland's former firm was indicted on 35 counts of
violating the Clean Water Act. Each count carries a maximum sentence of three to
five years and fines of up to $250,000.00. Kris Newcomer, Gold Mine Indicted in Environmental Disaster: Pollutant Dumping Charged at Summitville Superfund Site, ROcKY MTN.
NEws,June 16, 1995, at 6A.
99.

100.

BENJAMIN & BELLUCK, supra note 77, at 28.
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proximately been caused by trespass or nuisance. ' ' Disruption of an
individual's water supply has been considered analogous to trespass or
nuisance because it interferes with the owner and occupier's use and
enjoyment of the land.
Under Colorado common law, landowners have a duty to prevent
activities and conditions on their lands, which create an unreasonable
risk of harm to others." 3 Property owners, including mine owners,
have no right to permit "continued degradation of the environment.., thus creating a hazard to public health.' 0 4 In 1994, in State v.
The Mill, °5 the Colorado Supreme Court declared that a land owner
cannot reasonably expect to put property to a use that constitutes a
nuisance, even if the owner's intended use is the only economically viable use of the land.0 0 In that case, the court defined a public nuisance as "doing or failure to do something that injuriously affects the
safety, health, or morals of the public or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to the public." 'o Under Colorado
law, land use that results in pollution constitutes a nuisance.' 0
The Mill reinforced ground water protection by holding the tort of
nuisance available to a plaintiff when improper handling of toxic
wastes contaminated a property owner's drinking supply.'0 9 The Court
held that the owner of a uranium mill who was discharging tailings
into a body of water had no right to use the Property in a manner that
could result in the spread of contamination.
Another Colorado Supreme Court case has held that the discharger of mining pollution has a duty to prevent resulting contamination, and a breach of that duty is punishable with damages."' In addition to constituting a nuisance, the court held the spread of pollution
via waste contamination an invasion of a riparian owner's rights."2
When the discharge of tailings and waste from mining mills leads to
contamination of subsurface waters, and in turn affects land and crops,
the lower riparian owner is entitled to damages. 11 Additionally, a
101. Acadia v. Herbert, 353 P.2d 294, 299 (Cal. 1960).
102. Id. at 300. Plaintiff recovered damages for himself and his family for emotional
distress caused by the fear of drinking contaminated water.
103. State v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1002 (Colo. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1159

(1995).
104. Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer, 940 P.2d 1025, 1032 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
105. The Mil4 887 P.2d at 1002.
106. See id. at 1001. While the mining contamination present at the site was the result of the prior owner's actions, under Colorado nuisance law the present owner is
prohibited from making use of the land if it will spread contamination. See id. at 1002.
107. Id. at 1002.
108. "[A]ny unlawful pollution or contamination of any surface or subsurface waters... or of the air," constitutes a nuisance." Id. (quoting COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-13-

305 (1963)).
109. See Carter v. Chotiner, 291 P. 577, 578 (Cal. 1933).
110. The Mil4 887 P.2d at 999-1001.
111. Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 44 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Colo. 1934).

112. Id.
113.

Id.
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court may issue a permanent injunction against the polluter."'
COLORADO METHODS OF RECOVERY FOR SUITS BASED
ON HEALTH THREATS POSED BY GROUND WATER
CONTAMINATION
Under Colorado law, damages are allowable for annoyance and
discomfort in cases of injury to real property.5 Injury to real property
includes injury to a resident's water supply. I~ In instances such as Eagle Mine, numerous suits have been •filed
117to recover for private injury
•
In order to recover on a
caused by ground water contamination.
claim based on fear of future health risks caused by mining contamination, plaintiffs must provide substantial evidence of the potential for
disease or cancer. 8 Along with providing proof, plaintiffs must show
that their fears regarding health are "reasonable reactions to alleged
exposure. 1 9 Plaintiffs must prove that their fears are based on "objectively verifiable and reliable medical information.""
STATE REGULATION OF GROUND WATER
In addition to relying on common law remedies and federal statutes, states are implementing ground water regulations to address the
dangers of ground water contamination. States are formulating their
own ground water protection statutes based on the congressional belief that the primary responsibility of protecting ground water rests
with the states.1 2 ' As discussed earlier, Congress intended to leave
ground water regulation to the states due to the local nature of ground
water pollution and use, 22 and the belief that states are better
equipped to determine appropriate ground water programs. 123 Many
114. Id.
115. Weld County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1318 (Colo. 1986).
116. The most notorious spot for health threats posed by ground water contamination is Leadville, Colorado. Health effects of mining contamination have lead to allegations of high lead levels in children's blood, resulting in lead poisoning and possible

learning disabilities. Leadville, one of the richest spots for ore deposits, is now a Superfund site. Approximately 2,000 waste dumps spread throughout the sixteen square

mile town of Leadville have led to children's health threats. The contamination that
poured out of the Yak Tunnel and into the Arkansas River subsequently seeped into

the soil and ground water in the town. Leadville Fights Rap as the Town That Mining Poi-

soned, COLO. SPRINGs GAzETTE, Sept. 15, 1993 at B5.
117.
118.

See Satsky v. Paramount Communications, 7 F.3d 1464, 1466 (10th Cir. 1993).
Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 832 n.13 (10th Cir. 1995).

119. Id. at 833.
120. Id.
121. BENJAMIN & BELLUCK, supra note 77, at 28.
122. Id. at 30.
123. The EPA has stated "the primary responsibility for coordinating and implementing ground water protection programs has always been and should continue to
EPA, OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR, PROTECTING THE
NATION's GROUND WATER: EPA's STRATEGY FOR THE 1990's. THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
be vested with the States."
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states have chosen to set their own levels of permissible waste discharge, acceptable levels of contaminants in water, and their own reclamation standards. In many cases, under the CWA, states must meet
minimum standards of water quality set by the federal government, but
are free to develop their own programs mandating more stringent
standards.
In many instances, state regulations offer protection missing from
federal statutes and play a critical role in protecting ground water and
the environment from contamination. State ground water programs
are more comprehensive than federal programs, directly addressing
prevention of ground water contamination and providing for regulatory and enforcement provisions. 2 In addition, state laws generally
provide for ground water protection responsibility and liability for
damages resulting from contamination."
The negative side to state regulation, however, is unequal levels of
enforcement and varying environmental effects.'2 6 Given that ground
water passes between states, a more effective answer to preventing and
controlling ground water contamination would be national regulation.
While each state has its own uses for its waters, as well as varying geography, contaminated ground water has the same effect on human
health and aquatic life whether it is in New York or California.
In Colorado, ground water protection is authorized by the Colorado Water Quality Control Act,' through Basic Standards for Ground
water. 2 The Classification and Water Quality Standards for Ground
water' were established in 1991 to provide "for the adoption of use
classifications and water-quality standards for ground water in specific
areas of the state and to adopt an interim narrative standard to protect
ground water prior to the adoption of site-specific use classifications
Where ground water quality is good, the
and numerical standards."
set
to
assure
it
remains of good quality, and, in areas
standards are
where contamination has occurred, the standards may be lower, but
are set so that the contamination levels are not permitted to worsen."'

EPA's GROUND WATER TASK FORCE 212-1020 (July 1991).
124. BENJAMIN & BULLOCK, supra note 77, at 19.

125.

Id. at 30.

126. See RCRA Special Waste: HearingBefore the Subcommittee on Transportationand Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 127-28 (1991)

(statement of Philip M. Hocker, President, Mineral Policy Center).
127. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-101 (1998).
128. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-204(3) (1998).
129. 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-41 (1997).
130. BENJAMIN & BULLOCK, supra note 77, at 168 (quoting COLORADO GROUND WATER
UNIT AND EPA REGION VIII: PROFILE: COLORADO GROUND-WATER PROGRAM (Draft, Dec.

1991)).
131.

Id. at 168.
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COLORADO MINING LAWS HELPING TO PROTECT
GROUND WATER
In addition to implementing ground water contamination and water quality legislation, Colorado's mining law reform helps to protect
ground water. The Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Act 32 is an example of legislation that discourages mining companies from contaminating ground water. The statute makes mining companies responsible for the "life of the mine.0 33 This regulation mandates that
companies that have taken over defunct mines are responsible for any
ground water contamination resulting from the site, regardless of the
fact the purchasing company had no control over the mine at the time
the contamination occurred.14 Additionally, an amendment to the
statute requires simultaneous reclamation of mines.131
In 1993, the General Assembly enacted the Colorado Voluntary
Clean-Up and Redevelopment Act 6 to encourage reclamation of mine
sites and to avoid future contamination disasters. The statute allows
for special consideration for companies that reclaim old mining sites.13
In exchange for cleanup, the companies may mine for a specified
number of years and then be released from their permit, and all liabil38
ity.
The Act satisfies both the goal of the mining industry to "redevelo [p] existing industrial sites" and environmentalists'
goal of "protec3 9
tion of human health and the environment.',

Thus far, indications are that the statutes are encouraging mining
companies to reclaim the sites and take greater responsibility for their
actions. For example, in 1996, mining companies in Colorado spent
over ten million dollars in the cleanup
of contaminated dirt, water and
4
waste to satisfy EPA requirements.

1

CONCLUSION
Existing federal and state regulations are insufficient to address the
gravity of the ground water contamination that exists in the nation today. The present provisions in the SDWA, CERCLA, and RCRA that
apply to ground water are clean up-based requirements and are inadequate to address the modern day threats of ground water contamina-

132. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-102 (1998).
133. Kerri S. Smith, Mining Firms Go Green, Regulations Spur Care of the Environment,
DENVER POST, Oct. 27, 1996, at AO.

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-301(1998).
Id.

138. Smith, supra note 126. In some instances, mining companies will continue to
monitor water quality standards, though they have supposedly been released from li-

ability.
139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-16-302(1) (1998).
140. Smith, supra note 126.
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tion caused by mining. A single federal program focused on ground
water protection must be implemented so that the federal focus concerning ground water is no longer only remedial, but preventive as
well.
Additional legislation, most importantly the addition of tributary
ground water protections to the CWA, is essential to prevent and contain ground water contamination. The congressional goal of the CWA
is clearly stated in the language of the legislation as protecting the waters of the United States; yet, because ground water is omitted from
the Act, the congressional goal is not being met. Modern judicial
trends, such as Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., and Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining Co., which support a broad interpretation of the Act to include tributary ground water, have made persuasive arguments regarding ground water's effect on surface waters.
Most importantly, these commerce-based arguments demonstrate the
power of ground water contamination to affect every aspect of human
life. But while such decisions are crucial in protecting ground water,
their implications have not reached far enough. Federal courts remain divided on expanding the scope of the CWA, with many still relying on the congressional debates of 1971 and excluding ground water
from its protection. The lack of uniformity in judicial decisions allows
for continued ground water contamination and environmental degradation, demonstrating the need for Congress to consider once again
the addition of ground water to the CWA.
Along with persuading Congress of the importance of ground water reform, mining industry opposition to reform must be addressed
and considered in the reform process. While Summitville-type threats
could be eased if ground water were regulated by federal legislation,
mining proponents continue to support state regulation of the industry, 41 believing federal reform would give the government too much
power.1 2 To combat reform efforts, mining proponents are pitting the
economic necessity of mining against the need to protect the water
supply and the environment. Mining proponents argue that federal
ground water regulations and the reform of the Mining Act will force
mining companies to shut down and move to foreign countries, taking
with them thousands of jobs and millions of dollars in revenues.
They contend amendments to the Mining Act will result in unattainable environmental standards that will further impede the productivity
of the industry by posing huge financial burdens.1 44 In the past, these
industry arguments have been successful in Congress. However, if the
reform focuses on mining reclamation and water protection programs
that will respect the mining companies' goal of profit maximization,
reform has a better chance of success in Congress and during the implementation process. While such a goal may be difficult to attain, the
141. Legislative Summary: Mining Law, CONG.
142. Sanderson, supra note 17, at GO.
143. Sanderson, supra note 17, at GO.
144. Mendez, supra note 15, at 8A.

Q. WKLY.

REP., Nov. 5, 1994, at 3169-70.
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key to formulating and implementing reform is to have the mining industry and the environmentalists work together to achieve progress.
The adversarial relationship that exists between the mining industry
and environmentalists must change in order for effective reform to
take place.
While congressional intent to leave ground water regulation to
states has resulted in some states producing stringent ground water
regulations, by allowing ground water to continue to be regulated on
state levels, the spreading of ground water contamination between the
states remains uncontrolled. Instances of mining contamination have
repeatedly shown the power of ground water to carry contamination
throughout the environment. In cases such as Summitville, an entire
aquatic region has been destroyed. Other instances, such as the Yak
Tunnel in Leadville, Colorado, show how contaminated ground water,
bringing with it high levels of lead, has contaminated private wells and
gotten into the blood of children. 115 Federal reform is needed so that
the contaminated ground water that is now unregulated may be addressed.
In formulating a federal response to ground water contamination,
Congress should look to the successes of state mining programs, such
as Colorado's 1993 Voluntary Clean-Up and Redevelopment Act. This
law is an example of possible proactive answers available to the mounting problems of funding cleanups and the controversy that exists between the EPA and the mining companies. While Colorado's Voluntary Clean-Up and Redevelopment Act is an example of state
legislation and its scale is smaller than federal reform, it is an example
of legislation which works with the mining companies to reclaim the
environment, while at the same time allowing the companies to continue prospering.
The issue of ground water and the CWA has not been fully addressed by Congress in the past twenty-five years. Repeated instances
of contamination across the country show the need for federal legislation of ground water. Regulation of ground water is a crucial step currently missing in the protection of our national environment and
natural resources.

145.

Robinson, supra note 11.
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INTRODUCTION
Our nation's primary defense against water pollution, the Clean
Water Act ("CWA")' is powerless to stop toxic discharge from abandoned mine sites, and needs to be fortified by a system through which
'volunteers" are rewarded for cleaning up these creek killers. When
water percolates through mine works, it can emerge as toxic runoff
from tailings piles and/or tunnel drainage. This effluent remains unregulated because it either falls under the category of a non-point
source discharge, beyond the regulatory scope of the CWA,2 or no financially solvent owner exists to hold liable under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response,
Compensation,
and Liability Act
("CERCLA"). However, rewarding an entity that cleans up a polluting
* A graduate of the University of Denver College of Law, Randall Cherry also
holds a Masters Degree in Geophysics from the University of Colorado at Boulder. Mr.
Cherry is an Associate with the Denver firm Lowe Mewer, LLC, and practices intellectual property law.
1. Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act [hereinafter Clean Water
Act] 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994) (defining a point source as "any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance .... ").
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 [hereinafter CERCLA] § 107(a)(1)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)(2) (1994) (defining a liable person as "the owner and operator of ... a facility," or "any person who at
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orphaned mine site with the right to discharge effluent into the water,
a saleable commodity, can encourage clean up where the laws have
failed to protect the water. This is possible by exchanging orphan
mine site clean up with more lenient effluent standards in the form of
tradable credits. By properly controlling the amount of effluent credits earned by a clean up project, water quality will improve with the
added benefit that the efforts and expenditures of private entities will
accomplish this improvement.
This article addresses such efforts to clean up orphaned mine site
water pollution. It first explains the two main sources of pollution discharge from orphan mine sites. Next the solution of effluent trading
is introduced, and then the potential problems of effluent trading and
their potential solutions are analyzed. Some examples of effluent trading programs, and finally, the current status of the partially implemented Clear Creek effluent trading program are examined to illustrate how effluent trading is being conducted on a major Colorado
river.

THE PROBLEM
Orphaned mine sites may have one or two sources of discharge:
tailings piles and mine tunnels. Mine sites typically leave tailings piles
made of material left over from the extraction of ore, which may discharge both dissolved ore and high silt levels . Tailings contain ore at
concentrations too low to remove with economic efficiency. Mining
companies treat the tailings as waste material, dumping the waste in a
location convenient to the mine. Although the ore content is too low
for economic removal, the tailings remain exposed to the elements
and contain enough ore to discourage vegetation growth. Water from
rainstorms, fog, ground water, surface runoff, and other sources percolates through the tailings and, through a process called "leaching," dissolves small amounts of ore into the water. When the water exits the
tailings pile, it flows into nearby streams carrying the dissolved ore with
it. 6 Such effluent discharge also contains high levels of silt because tailings are unconsolidated, unvegetated piles of finely divided earth
which erode quickly as surface water runs over the pile. The surface
runoff flows into streams and causes abnormally high silt loading.
Thus, discharge from orphaned mine site tailings in the Clear Creek
area typically contains heavy metals such as copper and zinc, and has a
high silt content.7 Tailings discharge is seasonal in nature, fluctuating
the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substances were disposed of ...").
4. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF
908-F-95-002, HISTORIC

INTERIOR, PAPER No.

EPA

THE WEST'S Toxic LEGACY: THE CRITICAL
LINE BETWEEN WATER QUALITY AND ABANDONED MINES 1 (1995).
HARDROCK MINING,

5. Id.
6. Id.

7. Memorandum from Katharine Teter, USEPA Orphan Sites Technical/Legal
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with surface water runoff levels, and peaking in the springtime.' The
discharge can also reach high levels during floods due to the increase
in precipitation and running surface water. Examples of tailings pile
discharges in the Clear Creek watershed include the Anchor Mine
which has about 12,000 cubic yards of tailings bisected by a creek, resulting in discharges of high levels of dissolved iron, copper, and silt;
and the Pozo Mine which has about 4,500 cubic yards of tailings that
contribute an estimated 105 tons of silt to the water per year. 9
The second source of mining discharge is tunnel drainage. Subsurface water percolates through the bedrock, seeps into the tunnels,
then flows by gravity through the tunnel system and exits the mine. In
a large mine or when there is significant subsurface water, the discharge rate can be many gallons per minute ("g.p.m."). As with tailings discharge, tunnel discharge will leach ore material from the mine
and into nearby ground water and streams. An example of tunnel discharge in the Clear Creek watershed is the McClelland Mine where the
flow rate is twelve to twenty-three g.p.m. discharging one to three
pounds per day of dissolved metal, mostly zinc. 0
Water pollution from orphaned mine sites is beyond the reach of
the traditional pollution regulation methods for one or both of two
reasons. The CWA was written to regulate point source discharges
which are discharges from a "discernible, confined and discrete conveyance... ,"" such as pipes, ditches, channels, tunnels, conduits, containers, rolling stock, etc. Tailings pile discharge is not a point source
discharge under the statutory definition. A non-point source discharge is typically diffuse discharge that occurs over a large area where
no single outfall can be identified. Some examples include stormwater
runoff from city streets, acid rain, and leachate from mine tailings
piles.
Tunnel drainage, on the other hand, is a point source discharge,
but in the case of an orphan mine regulation under the CWA or
CERCLA is not possible because there remains no financially solvent
responsible party on which to attach liability. Most of the mine sites in
the Clear Creek watershed are mining claims from before the twentieth century which have long since dissolved and the owners (unknown,
untraceable or insolvent) have abandoned the mines.

Working Group, to Holly Fliniau, EPA Region VIII 3-5 (Dec. 15, 1995) (on file with
author).
8. See Elise M. Fulstone, Effluent Trading: Legal Constraints on the Implementation of
Market-Based Effluent Trading Programs Under the Clean Water Act, 1 ENVrL. LAw 459, 472,
(1995).
9. Teter, supra note 7, at 3-5.
10. Id.
11. Clean Water Act § 301(e), 33 U.S. C. § 1311(e) (1994)(noting that "[e]ffluent
limitations... shall be applied to all point sources of discharge of pollutants ... .
12. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc. 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10' Cir. 1979).
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THE SOLUTION
The CWA achieves its goals 5 primarily by formulating and enforcing performance standards 4 through permits 5 on each entity discharging effluent into surface waters. As additional discharge standards ef-6
fect more businesses, the stringent requirements under the CWA1
have come under criticism as being an inefficient and a sometimes
counterproductive method to improve the environment." For businesses to grow, new businesses to form, and to continue improvements
in environmental cleanup and pollution prevention technologies,
other means must be employed to protect water quality. In the Clear
Creek watershed, the State is considering effluent trading as one type
of compliance method. 8
Discharging effluent is a necessary part of many industries, and can
be considered a commodity in demand; but, the right to discharge can
be a commodity in short supply. With the law of supply and demand
in effect, discharge rights can gain real market value, and where allowed, could be bought and sold by entities. Because clean up of orphaned mine sites cannot be forced on owners by fines or litigation,
the alternative is to make site cleanup attractive to others by rewarding
them with increased discharge rights in the form of tradable effluent
credits.
Effluent trading allows individuals to increase their own discharge,
but still achieves a net reduction of total pollution because the increase in an entity's pollution discharge reduces the discharge of another polluter. For example, suppose X is discharging at the maximum allowable rate under the CWA but wants to increase its
discharge. Effluent trading would allow X to achieve that by either reducing the discharge of another polluter to a specified amount, or by
buying the right from a third party who has reduced the discharge of
another polluter. Simply put, the right to discharge comes in the form
of credits earned by reducing the discharge of another entity. This

13. Clean Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994) (explaining that the goals of
the statute are to, inter alia, "restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological

integrity of the Nation's waters.").
14. Id. §§ 301-320, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1330 (1994) (explaining effluent limitations).
15. Id. §§ 401-405, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1345 (1994) (explaining the licensing, permitting and certification requirements of the Act).
16. Peter Cleary Yeager, IndustrialWater Pollution, 18 CRIME &JUST. 97, 118 (1993).
17. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN.

L. REv. 1333, 1335-37 (1985) (arguing that current Clean Water Act regulatory

methods: 1) waste money by ignoring variations among plants and industries; 2) im-

pose disproportionate penalties on new products and processes by imposing more
stringent standards on new sources; 3) discourage development of new environmental

technologies; 4) encourage costly litigation by using centralized determinations of
complex pollution source controls; and 5) employ an inefficient "all or nothing" regulation strategy that does not adequately deal with new problems).
18. See Memorandum from Katharine Teter, Orphan Sites Technical/Legal Working Group, to Holly Fliniau, EPA Region VIII 7 (Jan. 22, 1996) (on file with author).
19. J. H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY,' AND PRICES 93-95 (1968).
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tradable right allows free market forces to adjust discharge reductions
in the most cost efficient manner."
A net reduction in pollution requires that the quantity and quality
of discharge right earned be less than the discharge reduction. There
are two ways to achieve a net reduction in pollution. One way is to implement a "trading ratio," which sets the amount of pollutiondischarge increase allowed for an amount of pollution-discharge reduction. If Xincreases its discharge the same amount, that Ydecreases
its discharge, the trading ratio is then 1:1. A trading ratio of 1:1 means
no net reduction of pollutants in the river. A trading ratio of 2:1
would mean for every two gallons of discharge reduction there is an
allowable discharge increase of one gallon.' If X were allowed to increase its discharge by 50,000 gallons by reducing Y's discharge by
100,000 gallons, the trading ratio would be 2:1. Trading ratios of less
than 1:1 are necessary for effluent trading to be attractive to those interested in reducing water pollution.
The other way to achieve a net reduction is to allow "cross effluent"
trading. Cross effluent trading-trading different types of pollutants
with different potentials for harm, recognizes the greater benefits of
removing the more harmful pollutants from the water. Cross effluent
trading would allow X to increase its discharge by 100,000 gallons for
an equal reduction in Y's discharge (a trading ratio of 1:1), if the pollutant contained in X's discharge is less harmful than the pollutant in
Y's discharge. This trade would benefit the environment if Y's discharge was an extremely hazardous substance, such as lead or mercury
where small amounts could have a devastating impact on an ecosystem,
and X's output was a less hazardous substance such as oxygen or heat.
Cross pollutant trading also provides increased flexibility for an effluent trading program because it allows for a greater number of dischargers to participate in the effluent trading program. The entities
discharging into a river are probably not all discharging the same pollutants. Barring them from trading different pollutant types would
prevent them from trading with each other, reducing the number of
dischargers able to participate in the effluent trading program.
The trading ratio is a significant factor in determining participation in an effluent trading program." In a simplified example, a trading ratio of less than 1:1 forces an entity to clean up more pollution
than it would be allowed to discharge. Even smaller trading ratios
mean more cleanup is required to earn a given amount of discharge
right, thus, smaller trading ratios result in more cleanup expense to
earn effluent credits. The right to discharge has value, but if the
cleanup cost incurred to earn that effluent credit is too high, it is uneconomical for the entity to earn effluent credits. Therefore, if the
trading ratio is too small, the effluent credit may be worth less than the
20. SeeAckerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1346.
21. Esther Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Costs Savings, 23 ENVr. L. 43, 65 (1993).
22. Id. at 66.
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cost to earn it and no entities will participate in effluent trading. 2 A
small trading ratio discourages a discharger from participating in the
program in several ways. It may cost a company less to clean up its own
discharge or to build manufacturing systems in other regions so that
discharge from the new manufacturing systems is not added to the local output. Under these conditions, the effluent trading program may
fail for a lack of participation. 4 The value of the trading ratio may influence how effective the effluent trading program is in cleaning up
the environment. 25 If the trading ratio is set larger than 1:1, an entity
must clean up less pollution than the amount of discharge right it
earns from the clean up, therefore, trading ratios larger than 1:1 result
in more pollution discharged into the environment.26 Entities would
eagerly participate in such an effluent trading program, but the environment would suffer and having such an effluent trading program
would be superflous.
When setting a trading ratio, a balance between high and low ratios must be struck for the program to succeed. If a ratio is too high,
the environment will suffer; if too low, businesses will not participate in
effluent trading.2 7 A way that trading ratios can be set high, but still
realize beneficial reductions in pollution levels, is to allow cross pollutant trading and set the trading ratio according to the pollutants being
traded. Where cross pollutant trading occurs, the trading ratio can be
higher than where similar pollutants are traded. This is because a
smaller reduction in very toxic pollutants is better than an equal reduction in less harmful pollutants. The trading ratio must be set with
the cost of reducing each pollutant discharge, and each entity's desire
to increase its own discharge must be considered.
Net improvement in the water quality brought about by the effluent trading demonstrates the success of an effluent trading program.
Improvement in water quality can be measured through improvements
in the aesthetic quality of the watershed, reductions in pollutants in
the water, or, where the pollutant reductions occur, reduced erosion
in the watershed and presence of native species at appropriate levels.
Since improvement in the environment is the goal, improvements are
more valuable if they occur in more polluted or more fragile areas of
the watershed where there is a greater need for cleanup.
Another crucial factor in effluent trading programs is the difference between abatement costs (the cost of reducing an entity's own
pollution) and credit costs (the cost of site cleanup efforts).2 8 Where

23.
24.

See id. at 67.
Matthew Polesetsky, Comment, Will a Market in Air Pollution Clean the Nation's

DirtiestAir? A Study of the South Coast Air Quality Management District's Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 359, 372-73 (1995).
25. Bartfeld, supra note 21, at 68.
26. See id. at 67.
27. Id.
28. See generally Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for
Theoy and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 372 (1989) (discussing clean up costs).
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only simple steps are required to reduce an entity's discharge, the
abatement cost would be smaller than expensive steps required to reduce the discharge. If site cleanup efforts were minimal and inexpensive, the credit cost would be smaller than if the site required complicated cleanup efforts. Because abatement cost and credit cost relate to
different dischargers, the costs are independent of one another and
allow the possibility of a credit cost higher than an abatement and vice
versa. For example, where the discharger is an orphan mine site with
large tailings piles, the remediation effort could involve relocating the
tailings at a substantial cost, but the remediator may be a small discharger who can reduce its effluent by a relatively inexpensive change
to its manufacturing process. In this example, the remediator would
have an abatement cost smaller than the credit cost.
For an effluent trading program to work, there must be a significant difference between abatement costs and credit costs for the participating entities, or else credit trading lacks incentive. Where credit
costs are higher than abatement costs, it is cheaper to clean up an entity's own discharge rather than clean up another's, and instead of participating in effluent trading, the entity will simply clean up its own
discharge.0 Larger differences between credit and abatement costs
are most likely found where cross-pollutant trading is allowed, because
there is a greater likelihood that inexpensive remediation projects with
associated low credit costs will be found in regions where there are entities with high abatement costs. Cleanup cost is affected by the type of
technology used to do the cleaning, and different types of pollution
discharge require different types of cleaning technology; thus, cross
pollutant effluent trading is a good way to assure significant differences between abatement and credit costs.

3

Different costs may also

be found among varying types of dischargers of the same pollutant.
Where there are similar pollutant dischargers, some may have more
modern and cleaner manufacturing processes than others in the region. For those with modern facilities, it may be cheaper to reduce the
discharge from the older facilities than to further reduce their own
discharge.
Abatement costs, credit costs, and the trading ratio all combine to
influence whether an effluent trading program will work. Where the
trading ratio is low, the cost differences must be higher for effluent
trading to occur. These larger cost differences can make effluent trading profitable, despite the low trading ratio. Where the trading ratio is
closer to one, the cost differences can be smaller for effluent trading
and still be profitable to participants.

29. See Charles W. Howe, Literature Review of Tradable Pollution Credit Systems,
Task 2C of the Orphan Sites Feasibility Study 5 (Sept. 26, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with Hydrosphere Resource Consultants).
30. See Alexandra Teitz, Assessing Point Source Discharge Permit Trading: Case Study In
Controlling Selenium Discharges to the San Francisco Bay Estuary, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 79, 88
(1994).
31. Id. at 87.
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POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF EFFLUENT TRADING AND
THEIR POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Potential problems accompany an effluent trading program, any of
which can effectively halt the program or degrade the environment.
One problem that may degrade the environment is the spatial concentration of effluent by one entity collecting and redeeming too many
credits at one source. A discharging entity may find itself in the position where it is economically valuable to purchase many effluent credits and redeem them at one source, releasing a dangerously large
amount of pollutants in one location. Without a limit to the number
of pollution credits an entity can redeem for one discharging source,
pollution trading may actually damage the local environment.
Another potential problem that may degrade the environment is
temporal concentration, which is similar to spatial concentration except that the concentration of effluents occurs in time, not necessarily
in location.32 Temporal concentration occurs when one or more discharges are able to accumulate many pollution credits over a long period of time which are then redeemed at one time. Although a temporal concentration may release a large amount of pollution, it can
also release a relatively small amount of pollution and still damage the
environment by releasing the pollutants in such a short period of time
that the environment's ability to safely assimilate the pollutants is temporarily exceeded, resulting in long term damage.
Spatial and temporal concentrations can be simultaneously discharged, and, where this occurs, the damage to the environment can
be so severe that the advantages of effluent trading would be negated.
Spatial and temporal concentrations of discharge are potential problems that should be addressed before implementation of a pollution
trading program, or the program may fail due to one catastrophic
event.
A possible solution to credit redemption problems may be effectuated by regulating the redemption of credits to prevent too much discharge at any one time. In 1981 the State of Wisconsin implemented
an effluent trading program on the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers involving a total of forty-seven participants along 535 miles of river. In this
program, the redemption of credits is regulated based on the river's
abilit7 to assimilate pollutants according to its flow rate and temperature.
This approach to regulating credit redemption spreads discharge from
credits over time, reducing the chance of creating "toxic
' 5
hot spots.
Another form of redemption regulation that prevents toxic hot

32.
33.
34.
35.
(1994)

Howe, supra note 28, at 2.
Id. at 6.
Id.
PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND Poucv 386

(defining a "toxic hot spot" to be a concentration of pollution in one location).
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spots is zoned credit trading. 6 Zoned trading prevents pollution concentration by dividing the participants into zones and regulating the
trading between these zones either by preventing trades between cer-8
tain zones" or setting different trading ratios between each zone pair.
The Wisconsin and Fox River trading program utilizes zoned trading.
In that program, dividing the region into two trading zones and preventing inter-zone trading prevents toxic hot spots. Zoned trading
may prevent toxic hot spots, but it introduces new difficulties to the
trading program such as market thinning and increased transaction
costs. Market thinning occurs when trading is prevented between
zones. Reduction in the number of trading participants may result in
too few participants to make a viable credit market.40 Increased transaction costs may occur if setting different trading ratios between each
pair of zones prevents toxic hot spots. Transaction costs increase due
to the increased administrative burden of setting multiple trading ratios, and trading is discouraged due to a greater credit expense.41
Some authors have suggested that the high transaction cost caused by
the administrative burden of trading in the Wisconsin Fox River Water
Permit program has prevented that program's successful implementation.42
A way to prevent too many credits from simultaneous redemption,
thereby causing a toxic hot spot is to regulate the timing of credit redemption. One suggested form of redemption-time regulation is
where depreciation is built into a discharge credit. 4 Where the
amount of discharge allowed under credit decreases by a set percentage each year, the incentive to accumulate credits over a long period
36. Id. (suggesting zoned trading as a way to prevent concentration of pollution
due to too much credit redemption in one area).
37. Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptionsfor Environmental Concerns:How the Patient
Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 98 (Spring 1989) (describing the Wisconsin Fox River Water Permit program's method of preventing pollution concentration along two points of the river where pollution tends to "peak").
38. MENELL & STEWART, supra note 35, at 386 (suggesting solutions to the problem
of pollution concentration due to unregulated credit redemption).
39. Hahn, supra note 37 (describing the Wisconsin Fox River Water Permit program's method of preventing concentration of pollution along two points of the river
where pollution tends to naturally concentrate).
40. Polesetsky, supra note 24 (listing one of the ingredients to a successful emissions trading program as a sufficient number of sellers and buyers so that the credit
market is subject to the economic laws of supply and demand); see also Hahn, supra
note 37 (suggesting that preventing inter-zone trading has impaired the success of the
Wisconsin Fox River Water Permit program).
41. James T.B. Tripp & DanielJ. Dudek, Institutional Guidelinesfor DesigningSuccessful TransferableRights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 377 (Summer 1989) (noting that
the greater the administrative burden involved in credit transfer, the less economic
value the credit has and so the less effective the program will be); Polesetsky, supra
note 24 (noting that transaction costs increase the cost of credit trading and discourage trading).
42. Tripp & Dudek, supra note 41, at 388.
43. MENELL & STEWART, supra note 35, at 387 (suggesting a depreciation rate as a
way of reducing the number of permits available for redemption and as a way to improve the environment under a discharge trading program).

Issue 1

MINE WASTE, CLEAN WATER, AND GOOD BUSINESS

of time is reduced and temporal concentrations are less likely to occur.
Another form of redemption-time regulation could be to set credit
expiration dates." Finite credit lifetimes would force credit use,
thereby preventing speculative credit collection.
Redemption-time regulation of discharge credits must be carefully
applied or the trading program could fail due to uncertainty in the future value of the credit 5 There will be too little trading if the lifetime
of a credit is made too short by depreciation or a finite lifetime because of the uncertainty involved in the value of existing credits as the
administrator of the program issues new credits. 46 Longer credit life-

times stabilize the value of credits and encourage participation by reducing uncertainty in the credit's future value.
Temporal concentration can also be encouraged by having credit
rights expire; but, may be imperiled in this setting similar to attempts
at prevention of simultaneous redemption. Participants holding expiring credits may try to sell them, although it would most likely be difficult to sell a credit about to expire. Additionally, redemption prior to
the expiration date could result in a sudden and large discharge of
pollution if the credit holder redeems many credits having the same
expiration date.
Despite some of the potential drawbacks, it appears that preventing toxic hot spots by adjusting the trading ratio based on time and location of the redemption is the preferred method because it would allow market forces to prevent hot spots but could still allow the most
flexibility in credit redemption." This method is an extension of the
idea used in the Wisconsin Fox River Water Permit program whereby
credit redemption is regulated based on the temperature and flow rate
of the river.4 Hot spots can be discouraged by adjusting the trading
ratio of a credit when it is redeemed based on how long ago and how
many previous credits have been redeemed in that location. When the
timing and number of credits redeemed in that location indicate that
the potential for a hot spot is increasing, the trading ratio of redeemable credits in that area can be reduced. As the potential for a hot
spot decreases, the trading ratio may increase. This method of hot
spot prevention will neither permanently devalue discharge credits,
nor limit their lifetime, but will allow a credit to be sold at full value

44. Id. (suggesting a limited credit life as a way of reducing the number of permits
available for redemption and as a way to improve the environment under a discharge
trading program); Hahn, supra note 37, at 97 (noting that the limited lifetime of a
Wisconsin Fox River Water Permit is five years after which time the parties waive all
rights to the credit).
45. Michael J. Casey, Economic and Tax Incentives for a CleanerEnvironment; A Survey
of Marketable Pollution Permits and Pollution Taxes, 1 DICK. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 40, 42
(1991).
46. D. Fraser MacFayden, Marketable Pollution Permits: Their Values, Theory, and Application, 9 DALHOUSIE L.J. 724, 739 (1985).
47. See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 35, at 386 (suggesting varying permit values
to prevent pollution concentration).
48. Howe, supra note 27, at 6.
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when hot spot formation has made redemption impractical for the
holder, and will allow market forces to discourage the creation of hot
spots. Market-force hot spot prevention has the disadvantage of requiring close monitoring of river conditions and outfall of participants. While this close monitoring increases transaction costs, a successful discharge trading program already requires close monitoring of
participants; thus, this method of hot spot control may not add any
significant costs to a successful program.
An effluent trading program needs a sufficient number of participants involved in the trading activity for the program to be worthwhile and to prevent market control byjust a few participants. A trading program will not work in a region where there are too few entities
to participate. 50 When a credit market is dominated by just a few entities, those entities are able to control the market and prevent the effluent credits from being traded at their real value, driving out participants.5 ' For example, in a region where there are only a few credit
sellers, those sellers can drive the price of credits above the credit cost,
making it uneconomical for others to buy credits. Where there are too
few credit buyers, the selling price of effluent credits drops below the
credit cost making it uneconomical for those wanting to clean up and
sell the earned credits to do so. In either case, the lack of alternative
selling or buying sources allows a few participants to dominate the
market, making credit trading uneconomical. A credit trading program that is failing due to a lack of entities can perhaps be saved by
expanding the trading region; however, insufficient participation may
not be solved by merely expanding the size of the trading region. The
reason for lack of participation should instead be directly addressed,
and this should include remedies such as lowering the trading ratio or
allowing cross pollutant trading. 2
Another reason why there may not be enough participants is the
"Good Samaritan" pitfall, where liability attaches to one who partially
cleans up a site. Discharge remaining after remediation efforts is subject to penalties and fines, thereby making the price of an imperfect
cleanup too high for an entity to risk any cleanup. This pitfall arises
out of a section of the Clean Water Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. In Committee to
Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, the ninth circuit held, pursuant to the CWA, that remediation efforts at a pre49. Id. at 13.
50. Teitz, supra note 30, at 89.
51. See Thomas H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation, 6
OXFORD REv. ECON. POL'Y, Spring 1990 at 17, 22.
52. See Thomas H. Tietenberg, Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution; A

Survey and Synthesis, 56 LAND ECON.

391,

396-98

(1980) (discussing emissions credit trading under the Clean Air Act).
53. Clean WaterAct § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994) (defining a 'discharge
of pollutant as any addition of any pollutant to the water ....).
54. CERCLA § 107(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2) (1994) (defining liable persons as
the "operator of a facility ....
").
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existing mine site made the remediating owner liable for all future discharges at that site, whether the owner created the discharge or had
merely tried to remediate an existing discharge.55 In Mokelumne River,
the site owner's good intentions, and even mostly successful efforts, did
not protect it from liability. The court interpreted the CWA to include
even those discharges that were the result of slightly less than perfect
remediation efforts. 6 However, CWA section 319 may protect a state
from incurring liability under the Non-Point Source Management
Program whereby states are charged with controlling non-point discharges.' CERCLA assigns liability to any person who is the current
owner or operator of a facility, or is the owner or operator of the facility at the time of the hazardous waste disposal.5" Whether this would
include persons attempting • to clean up an •orphaned
•
59 mine site is unclear because the issue has never been litigated.
In the case of
CERCLA liability, there is a defense offered to Good Samaritans.
CERCLA provides that no person shall be liable for damages that are
the result of remediation efforts taken in accordance with the National
Contingency Plan ("NCP")'0 or under the direction of an on-scene coordinator appointed in accordance with the NCP. 6' For a remediator
to benefit from the CERCLA Good Samaritan defense, the clean up
must be done through the EPA pursuant to CERCLA, or through a
program delegated to the state by the EPA 2
Because it is unclear just how much protection CWA section 319
and the CERCLA Good Samaritan clause afford, the State of Colorado
has entered into a 1992 Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU")
with the EPA to ensure protection from liability for any remediation
efforts done according to the MOU. 6' Site remediations granted pro55. Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305,
309 (9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting the Clean Water Act to "categorically prohibit[] any

discharge of a pollutant from a point source without a permit" so that any remaining
discharge after remediation efforts becomes the responsibility of the remediator).

56. Id.
57. Clean Water Act § 319(b)1, 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)1 (1994) (requiring a state to
establish a management program for "controlling pollution added from nonpoint
sources to the navigable waters within the state and improving the qualities of such wa-

ter.").
58.
59.

CERCLA § 107(a)(1)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)(2) (1994).
Memorandum from George Wyeth, Attorney for Solid Waste and Emergency

Response Division, EPA, to Gary Hudiburgh, Office of Water, EPA 3 (Mar. 24, 1995)
(on file with author).
60.

CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1994) (revising and republishing "the Na-

tional Contingency Plan for the removal of oil and hazardous substances ... [to] establish procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances,
pollutants and contaminants .... ").
61. Id. § 107(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1) (1994) (excluding from liability those
persons who remediate in accordance with the National Contingency Plan (NCP), or
under the direction of an onscene coordinator appointed pursuant to the NCP, except
where the person negligently causes harm).
62. Wyeth, supra note 59, at 2 (suggesting ways for states to avoid CWA and
CERCLA liability for remediation projects).
63. Memorandum of UnderstandingBetween the Colorado Department of Health, the Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Division and the United States Environmental ProtectionAgency
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tection from liability are called section 319 projects, named after that
section of the CWA. They receive liability protection through an
agreement with the EPA. Those agreements provide that remediation
of an orphaned mine site non-point source discharge done pursuant
to CWA section, including compliance with the MOU, would also receive protection from CERCLA liability. Because section 319 only applies to non-point sources, point source discharges such as a tunnel
discharge are not covered by the MOU. To be a candidate for section
319 project status under the MOU, a site must satisfy six criteria set out
by the MOU. The candidate site must be releasing pollutants and the
discharger must be defined as a "facility" under the NCP.64 A facility is
defined as "any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited.... stored, ...
disposed of,... or placed.... or otherwise
come to be located .. "6 A candidate site's discharge must involve
either a hazardous substance, or a pollutant or contaminant that may
present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or
welfare. A discharge cannot be a release of unaltered, naturally occurring substance in its natural location, parts of a structure released into
the interior of the structure, or parts of a drinking water system released into the water.66 To be eligible, a discharge must add significant
pollution from a non-point source into the waters, 67 there can be no
appropriate response to the release either from the responsible party
or any other party,8 and the release must contribute to the water falling below applicable water quality standards. 6
The MOU is an important step in resolving the potential liability
problem for remediators and helps to make an orphaned mine site effluent trading program more "user friendly"; but, because the MOU is
predicated, at least in part, on the regulations of CWA section 312, its
protective umbrella does not cover point source dischargers and so
leaves out tunnel drainage which can be a significant source of water
pollution. Additionally, because the MOU limits remediation efforts
only to significant polluters, a credit trading program may experience
a slow start because the only remediation projects for which protection

for CERCLA Liability of Clean Water Act Section 319 Projects 2 (June, 1992) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding].
64. National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1997) (defining facility "as any
building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline [including any pipe into
a sewer or publicly owned treatment works], well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment,
ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or any site or
area, where a hazardous substance has been.deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed,
or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.").
65. Id.
66. Id. at § 300.400(b)(1)-(3) (stating limitations on response).
67. Clean WaterAct § 319(a) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1329(a) (1) (B) (1994) (defining
covered releases as "nonpoint sources which add significant pollution to... the navigable waters .... ).
68. Memorandum of Understanding,supra note 63.
69. Clean Water Act § 319(a) (1) (A)-(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(A)-(B) (specifying, in part, what a non-point assessment report contains).
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will apply are large scale projects and most participants will wait to see
how well the program works before committing to a large remediation
project. The MOU is an untried document, and it is not clear how
much protection it actually affords a remediator because the mere existence of the MOU does not preclude a private party from bringing a
citizen suit against the remediator under the citizen suit provisions of
the CWA or CERCLA." Even where a remediator wins litigation with a
private party, the cost of litigation, and the fear of potentially losing
these types of civil actions will dampen a participant's desire to engage
in future remediation projects necessary to earn effluent credits, thus,
the program may fail for lack of participation.
EXAMPLES OF DISCHARGE TRADING
Most current discharge trading programs involve trading air emission credits under programs established by the 1990 Clean Air Act
(CAA) 71 which contains provisions for trading air emission credits." A
noteworthy air emission trading program is the sulfur dioxide ("SO,.)
trading allowance program for fossil-fueled electric generating plants,
which emit about eighty percent of the total SO, emitted in the United
States.73 74
Title 1V of the Clean Air Amendments of 1990 created the
program. This emission trading program is limited to trades between
point sources and is expected to reduce electric utility cost by twenty
percent over the cost under a traditional environmental regulation
policy75 while at the same time reducing acid rain deposition] Sulfur
dioxide is emitted by power generating plants from the mid-western
and eastern United States, primarily the Ohio Valley, and is deposited
as acid rain in the northeastern United States and southeastern Canada. The program administrator sets the allowable SO2 emissions per
year for each power station based on 1985 emission levels," and, for
the plant to be allowed to emit more than the set limit, it must possess
"allowances," which are tradable emission credits issued yearly by the

70. Id. § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (allowing "any citizen ...[to] commence a
civil action on his own behalf .. "); CERCLA § 3 10(a), 42 U.S.C. § 96 59(a) (1994)
(allowing "any person... [to] commence a civil action on his own behalf ...").
71. Clean Air Act of 1990 §§ 101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. II
1996).
72. Id. § 607f, 42 U.S.C. § 7671f (setting out the guidelines of class I and class II

emission trading).
73. MENELL & STEWART, supra note 35, at 410.
74. Clean Air Act of 1990 § 403(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (listing the regulations for
an SO2 emission trading program).
75. See Robert W. Magee & Walter E. Block, Pollution Trading Permits as a Form of

Market Socialism and the Search for a Real Market Solution to Environmental Pollution, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 51, 54-55 (1994) (noting the benefit of the free enterprise system's effect on minimizing cost).
76. Casey, supra note 45, at 46 (describing Title IV of the 1990 amendments to the

CAA).
77. Clean Air Act of 1990 § 402(18), 42 U.S.C. § 7651a(18) (defining 1985 SO,

emissions rate).
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Environmental Protection Agency based on the average number of
tons of SO 2 produced per year in the 1985-87 period. 78 There are no
provisions for the EPA to issue allowances to new sources, and new
utilities must obtain allowances from existing sources. 79 The tradable
emission credits have a trading ratio of 1:1. These allowances can be
sold to any party allowing additional emissions up to the amount of
pollution credit. For the plant to emit its usual amount of pollution, it
must keep and use its allowances; but, if the plant is able to reduce its
emission, the allowances may be sold to any party, held for future use,
or "retired" which is done by taking the allowances out of circulation
and donating them to an entity interested in preventing emissions.
Possible purchasers of allowances include other plants wishing to increase their own emissions ° or groups wishing to reduce the amount
of total SO 2 emitted for that year who would then buy allowances and
retire them. Possible sellers include other plants with extra allowances, and allowances held in reserve by the EPA. Under this program, the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") purchased allowances
for 10,000 tons of SO 2 for 1995 from Wisconsin Power and Light
("WPL") at a price believed to be between $2.5 million and $3.0 million which works out to between $250 and $300 per ton of SO 2 emission."' This surprised experts because the allowances appear to have
been sold at less than the SO 2 removal cost of $300 per ton.82 Apparently this was a good deal for the purchaser, TVA, but a bad deal for
the seller, WPL. In an example of a plant retiring allowances, Northeast Utilities donated 10,000 tons of allowances to the American Lung
Association. 3 The Utility cashed in on the tax advantages of a charitable contribution as well as good public relations. Even though the SO,
trading program does not explicitly limit the emission from any one
source, it sets a national aggregate limit for utilities that will be reduced over time.84
The SO2 trading program has been criticized because it makes no
allowance for location. Because the Ohio Valley is believed to be the
source of acid rain, the program should ideally try to transfer emission
allowances from the Ohio Valley to other regions not indicated as acid
rain sources. As it stands, allowances from any region can be traded
into any other region; hence, a region considered to be the source of
acid rain may actually be allowed to increase its SO 2 production. This
is less likely to occur in a non-point/point source trading program
where only point sources earn credits by reducing non-point source
discharge. Long Island Lighting Company ("LILCO"), located in New

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Howe, supra note 29.
MENELL & STEWART, supra note 35, at 409.
Id.
Howe, supra note 29, at 3.
Id.
Id.
MENELL & STEWART, supra note 35, at 409.
Howe, supra note 29, at 4.
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York, has proposed to sell allowances to Amax Energy, Inc. ("AEI")
which sells coal and natural gas to utilities in the Ohio Valley.16 AEI
plans to sell the credits along with the sale of coal and natural gas to its
customers." The State of New York fears this trade increases the potential for acid rain deposition. The state has filed suit against the EPA
to stop the trade. 8 The Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") has intervened in support of the LILCO/AEI trade and has argued that reviewing the environmental effects of each transaction will increase
transaction costs and prevent a viable market from forming. EDF argues that reviewing each transaction is unnecessary because the negative effects of a few trades will balance out positively in the long run.
Where the trading program is one for effluent into a river, downstream effects are not as great a problem because the effluent is confined to the river and so it is easier to control the pollution by regulating the redemption of pollution credits.
An example of an emission trading program among point source
emitters of like pollutants that can reduce aggregate emission is found
in Southern California. Southern California is a region of noncompliance for SO, and nitrogen oxide ("NOx..) quantities. 0 The emission trading program covers trading credits for SO, and NO x production. Tradable permits were issued to the largest polluters in the re92
gion. 9' New sources can only obtain permits from existing sources.
The discharge allowed by the permit is based on the amount of emission the emitter would have had in 1992, assuming full production levels and compliance with existing air pollution regulations."2 Because
the region is in non-compliance, the EPA requires that the region
show satisfactory progress toward compliance and imposes an eight
percent annual reduction in NO x permits and a six percent reduction
in SO 2 permits. 9 4 The SO and NO, credits may be traded between entities. By reducing the number of permits issued annually, the region
95
experiences a net reduction in pollution emissions. By allowing permit trading, market forces reward those entities that reduce emissions,
and penalizes those entities which do not reduce emissions. This system of rewards and penalties helps spread the burden of emission reduction to those entities most able to reduce their emissions.
An example more similar to effluent trading is the existing trading
program between point source and non-point source phosphorus dis86. MENELL & STEWART, supra note 35, at 412; see Matthew L. Wald, Lilco's Emissions
Sale Spurs Acid Rain Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 1993, at B1; see also Howe, supra

note 29, at 5.
87. MENELL & STEWART, supra note 35, at 412.
88. Howe, supra note 29, at 4.
89. MENELL & STEWART, supra note 35, at 412.
90. See id. at 415.; see also Howe, supra note 29, at 5.
91.

Teitz, supra note 30, at 86-7.

92.

MENELL & STEWART,

93.

Howe, supra note 29, at 5.

supra note 35, at 415.

94. Id.
95.

See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 35, at 415.
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chargers found at Lake Dillon, Colorado." Due to the rapid development in the region surrounding the lake, both point and non-point
sources contributed to high phosphorus levels in the lake, producing
eutrophic algae growth. Officials believed the point sources had reduced their effluent as much as reasonably possible. The expense of
further reductions precluded reductions on a scale large enough to
significantly impact phosphorus levels.97 However, the non-point
source emitters of phosphorus had not been subjected to any type of
effluent reduction program. An effluent trading program was developed to encourage the reduction of effluents from non-point sources.
Each point source emitter was given a phosphorus allotment. To
exceed this effluent allotment, a point source emitter needed to acquire allotment credits by funding non-point source effluent reduction programs"s at a trading ratio of 2:1." This way, the program would
encourage the reduction of phosphorus effluent from non-point
sources believed to be the sources most susceptible to effluent reduction. The trading program has been sparsely used so far because
growth in the area has slowed,'00 and treatment techniques for point
sources have improved reducing the point sources' need to use the allotments. In some cases the credits initially allocated to the point
sources were so generous as to preclude the need to trade.'' These
developments combined to make effluent trading unnecessary for
most point source entities at Lake Dillon. 0 2 While the Lake Dillon
program may be criticized due to the lack of trading, it should be
noted that the since the program has been implemented the point
sources have reduced their total contribution of phosphorus to only
2% of the allowable phosphorus content.' 3 Perhaps a better gauge of
the program's success is not actual trading, but actual pollution reduction.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE CLEAR CREEK WATERSHED
ORPHANED MINE SITE CLEAN UP PROJECT
The orphaned mine site clean up project in the Clear Creek watershed is an effluent credit trading program designed to reduce the
amount of pollution in Clear Creek from abandoned mines in the watershed. Because liability protection for tunnel drainage remediation
has yet to be finalized, tunnel drainage cleanup projects are not addressed, and only credits for tailings/waste pile clean up will be is-

96. Hahn, supra note 37, at 103.
97. Howe, supra note 29, at 7.

98. Id.
99. Hahn, supra note 37, at 103.
100.

Bartfeld, supra note 21, at 84.

101. Id.
102. Howe, supra note 29, at 7.
103. Bartfeld, supra note 21, at 84.
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sued. °4 The permitting process has been mapped out and the project
0
is entering the demonstration phase."
One site will be used as a pilot
to test the project. The project is guided by the Orphan Sites Technical/Legal Working Group ("OSWG"), a group of Clear Creek water
users. The OSWG is working with the Colorado Water Quality Control
Division ("CWQCD") and regional EPA administrators to develop implementation details of the Clear Creek pollution trading project.
For issuing permits under the authority of the CWQCD, the OSWG
has developed qualification guidelines for entities seeking to clean up
orphan mine sites.'" While this permit currently only applies to orphan mine site clean up in the Clear Creek watershed, the permit is
designed to be a statewide permit, applicable to any Colorado watershed in the future."' To apply for a permit, an entity must submit an
application that contains a description of the proposed remediation
project to the CWQCD, and the proposed project is subjected to a
public comment period.' After the permit has been issued and becomes effective, a pro'ect must be certified under the permit before
the project may begin.
The first clean up project is a demonstration project, intended to
test pollution trading effectiveness for cleaning up orphan mine sites.
The project will also serve as an educational demonstration to show
other potential participants the advantages of the clean up project. After the orphan mine site and the cleaning entity have been selected,
the Clear Creek Watershed Forum (a group interested in the clean up
of Clear Creek) will work with the entity to develop a remediation plan

104. Memorandum from Katharine Teter, Orphan Sites Technical/Legal Working
Group, to Holly Fliniau, EPA Region VIII 5 (Jan. 19 1996) (on file with author) (tunnel drainage is a point source discharge and, therefore, is not covered by the Nonpoint Source Management Program of § 319 of the CWA and remains beyond the
Memorandum Of Understanding's protection of remediators from Good Samaritan
liability incurred through imperfect remediation efforts).
105. Id.at 2.
106. Id.
107. Id. (To qualify for a permit, the candidate project must meet the following
terms: 1) where the discharge is caused by tailings/waste piles in contact with surface
water (including storm runoff), the tailings/waste piles must be removed in accordance with Best Management Practices ("BMP"); 2) the BMP to be used must be identified in the permit application; 3) where the discharge is caused by tailings/waste
piles in contact with subsurface water, the remediation work must remove/reduce the
tailings/waste pile, or reduce/eliminate the discharge pathway; 4) upon completion of
the remediation project, there can be no discharge; 5) there can be no increase in pollutant discharge during the remediation project; 6) the remediation project must be
completed in accordance with an approved work plan; and 7) there will be a net improvement to water quality after completion of the remediation work.)
108. Id. at 3. (The CWQCD issues public notice of the permit application and accepts comments for 30 days. During the 30 day notice period the CWQCD reviews the
application. At the end of the 30 day comment period the permit is issued or denied.)
109. Id. (To be certified, the entity conducting the project must submit an application which contains the following information: 1) the location of the tailings/waste
pile must be identified; 2) the final destination of the tailings/waste pile must be identified; 3) the remediation plan must be described; and 4) the erosion/sedimentation
control methods to be used during remediation work must be described.)
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and submit an application.
CONCLUSION
Orphaned mine sites are the main source of non-regulated pollution in the Clear Creek watershed. Because orphan mine sites are not
encompassed in the CWA, and there is no existing responsible party
with the financial capability to clean up the site, orphan mine sites are
not subject to traditional water pollution control methods. Pollution
trading is currently the only solution available to clean up orphan
mine sites. Successful implementation of a pollution trading program
is the only hope users of the Clear Creek watershed have of continuing
the improvement in water purity. Experience from other pollution
trading programs shows that careful consideration must be given to
the rules of the Clear Creek program to ensure that pollution trading
improves water quality. Full consideration can be best achieved by
having EPA, State officials, concerned citizens, and businesses involved
in pollution trading. Once the Clear Creek pollution trading program
is implemented, monitoring the watershed will be necessary to ensure
that pollution trading achieves its goals.

COMMENTARY
THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS
RiCHARD N. MORRISON.

INTRODUCTION
My assumption is that each of us will have the opportunity, in the
course of our professional practices, to offer a word of insight to our
clients about what they should consider as they make business decisions. The "should" of which I speak is most often derived from our
analysis of what the law requires; however, most of us instinctively recognize that our clients' litigation exposure should not be the center of
the client's consideration when making a business decision. There is
ample room for consideration of that which makes for good business
and social ethics. Indeed, one can make the case that good business
ethics are every bit as important to business success as is dutiful compliance with statutory law and regulation. Sometimes the opportunity
for ethical discussions occurs over a beer at the end of a long day of
lobbying Congress. Sometimes it occurs in the office. The point is
that we have opportunities to discuss ethics. We need to seize those
opportunities.
As legal counselors, there is no doubt that all of us consider ourselves professionals. In the historical sense, a "profession" was a vocation that required some degree of learning or science. The law was

A partner with the Phoenix, Arizona law firm Jennings Strouss & Salmon, P.L.C., Mr.
Morrison received hisJ.D. from the University of Houston, graduating as a member of
the Order of the Barons academic honor society. He practices water law on behalf of
irrigation districts, and irrigation water delivery districts. He also represents landowners, school districts, dairies, developers, a major university, and other municipal districts. In addition, Mr. Morrison's experience includes transferring water rights and
environmental permits, negotiation of Indian water rights settlements, and documentation of water rights for Arizona's general stream adjudication. He teaches agricultural law and water resources management at the Arizona State University School of
Agribusiness and Resources Management, and Chairs the Environmental and Natural
Resources Department atJennings Strouss & Salmon.
This commentary is excerpted from a speech Mr. Morrison delivered at a 1998
seminar sponsored by CLE International, Inc., who gave permission for its publication.
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among the learned professions. Today, the word "professional" seems
to have lost some of its luster. Dictionaries often define a profession as
any vocation or business. We, as attorneys, lament the apparent status
slippage of our profession in American culture. In the broadest sense,
I suggest that the restoration of the professional image of attorneys is
inextricably linked to our sense of ethics. In a narrower sense, a lawyer's ethical considerations are constrained and dictated only by the
rules of professional responsibility. However, the broader context requires consideration of the effects of certain actions, both right and
wrong, as well as the appropriateness of the motives involved.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct indicate that lawyers,
when counseling clients, should refer not only to the law but also to
moral, economic, social, and political factors as well as the wisdom
and morality of the client's objectives and the means used to achieve
them. In my experience, most seminars on ethics fail to emphasize
this rule, but perhaps we will make some progress toward correcting
such an oversight.
There are many specific environmental issues with ethical dimensions. For example, in the context of Clean Water Act reauthorization,
national consistency in rules and standards is essential. In other
words, to what extent do we believe water quality is a site specific issue?
Is there an ethical issue ifjudicial inconsistency promotes forum shopping by users of natural resources? To what extent are we prepared to
allocate sufficient resources in order to increase the research and development of scientific information and technologies and to formulate
a basis for future environmental programs? Similarly, are we willing to
set aside political boundaries in order to figure out how to work together to solve environmental problems? Can the country afford to
risk inviting voluntary participation in various environmental incentive
programs when farmers and ranchers control one billion acres in the
United States? And with the benefit of hindsight, one can certainly
wonder how point source regulation and the failure to regulate nonpoint sources is equitable with respect to the nation's waterways and
coastlines.
Part of our challenge is that defining an environmental problem
depends upon science. The fact of the matter is that research is typically site specific and, therefore, varies. At the same time, business
competitors want equality in the regulatory impact on businesses. In
short, I believe that it is certainly becoming harder and not easier to
behave ethically in relation to the environment. Much of the reason
for this stems from our increased recognition that we lack what we
need-more and better science to help us understand the consequences of our actions.
1. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 2.1 (1983). For those who would
like to read more on the subject, the WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW dedicated its entire Fall
1997 volume to legal professionalism. There are several interesting articles in the review that address a lawyer's moral duty as well as his or her professional duty. See 32
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 613, 613-1044 (1997).
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What do I mean when I say we need more and better science? Are
we confessing the limitations of our own scientific education? We are
reflecting an increased sense of alarm about public health concerns. A
good example of this problem is microbial pathogens and other contaminants in drinking water. It is estimated that between seven and
thirty million Americans each year develop a gastrointestinal illness,
possibly from drinking contaminated water. That is a wide range of
figures, but water quality is increasingly a concern, even for people
who live in a society that has advanced technology and enlightened
public policy. Recent evidence indicates that the effects of microbial
contaminants may not be limited to short term gastrointestinal diseases. Water borne contaminants may also be linked to certain longterm chronic conditions, such as diabetes and heart disease. Links
with miscarriages are also suspected.
Microbial contaminants present a challenge to water treatment experts. Established disinfection and filtration techniques do not always
remove such contaminants from drinking water. The effectiveness of
water treatment varies depending upon whether the water borne contaminant is a bacteria, a virus, or a protozoa parasite. This is one issue
that confronts us with a reality we do not often consider: we are vitally
dependent upon an environment that we cannot see. Microbes are invisible. Threats from unseen dangers convey a sense of drama and
make good copy, but they should remind us of a greater reality. We
live our lives in the midst of an environmental continuum, one that
ranges from the infinitely small to the infinitely large, and also ranges,
as far as we can tell, from the infinitely simple to the infinitely complex.
IS AN ETHICAL PARADIGM SHIFT7 AT HAND?
Ethics have traditionally dealt with relationships-how we treat
others. Social ethics seek a community of shared values wherein conditions exist for what Aristotle called "the good life for man." There
are, of course, disagreements over how to define the common good,
and lawyers in particular are in a position to influence public discourse
on the subject. Aldo Leopold suggested an ethic dealing with human
relation to the land, and the animals and plants on it. He proposed
that land can no longer be thought of as mere property subject to
economic manipulation. He criticized traditional ethics to the extent
that they focused on individual human beings as members only of an
inter-dependent human community. Leopold said we should expand
this community to include the land and its soils, water, plants and
animals as its integral parts. He argued that land is more than a commodity; it is part of an expanded community. Leopold expressed this
notion in his famous and frequently cited land ethic-that a thing is
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the
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biotic community.!
In a 1993 law review article, Professor Eric Freyfogle of the University of Illinois College of Law argued that our current law's basic messages about private property and ownership are misguided. He stated:
The flaws are many, and they emerge more plainly as we
learn more about ecology and gain a greater ability to sense
how we are damaging the Earth. Our environmental predicament is already grave and it worsens daily. One cause of
this predicament-and an important impediment to
change-lies in our legal culture, and our inherited sense of
land ownership. By all sobering accounts we humans are
spoiling and exhausting the land in ways that are unsustainable and, in human time-frames, largely irreversible.'

The law sends a message that people are distinct from the land,
and that the land is merely an object. Possessing no moral or legal
worth, land is a thing that is owned and dominated. Furthermore,
land can be divided and subdivided until "nature is no longer a whole:
it is a composite of many, differently owned parts. Each portion of the
land.., can be managed with little regard for its connections with the
surrounding parts of nature. 4 Professor Freyfogle drew several conclusions from this philosophy of ownership. First, the law deals mostly
with the present, thereby discounting the longer time-frame that
communities and ecosystems require for health. Second, injury to
property is defined by emphasizing harm to the human owners rather
than to the land as a productive part of an ecosystem. Third, since
market value is the key concept of finding injury, any non-market injury is irrelevant to the legal system, so most plants and animals are
valueless in court and hence immaterial. The law's message is that we
can rightly ignore them.5
Professor Freyfogle discussed the errors that are created by the
messages our legal system gives to property owners. For example, private property owners should understand that "[s] tanding timber is not
a discrete resource; it is part of a rich forest ecosystem. A prairie wetland is not a mere puddle, awaiting the drainage engineer; it is a vital
part in a global network of flood control, water purification, salt protection, and wildlife habitat."6
In a legal analysis of environmental ethics, one might wonder why I
have not acknowledged the impact of statutes such as the National
Park Service Organic Act,7 the Wilderness Act of 1964,' the National
2. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (Oxford University Press, 1966).
3. Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASEW. REs. 1269, 1269-70 (1993).

4. Id. at 1275.
5. Id at 1276-77.
6.

I. at 1279-80.

7. National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4, 22, 43 (1994).
8.

Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994).
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Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act,9 the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960," the National Forest Management Act," and
general statutes such as the Endangered Species Act and the National
Environmental Policy Act.' Indeed, the impact and potential for ecosystem management by government agencies is the subject of a recent
article by Professor Robert B. Keiter of the University of Utah College
of Law. 4 Professor Keiter discussed the competing utilitarian and
preservation philosophies-utilitarianism calling for the use of natural
resources to maximize human benefits and preservationism as evidenced in the current system of national parks and wilderness preserves." He noted, however, that except for the preservationist statutes, most statutes do not create a priority system between the
competing interests of ecosystem protection, and the production of
minerals, timber, and other commodities. ' °
I do not believe that government regulation alone is sufficient to
preserve the ecosystem, and so I return to the question of whether we
can identify an environmental ethic which will guide us and our clients
through the choices that affect natural resources. If we ask ourselves
what it means to act ethically in relation to the use of natural resources, we should ask not only about the impact on the non-human
environment, but also about how we deal with each other as professionals and as members of a civilized society in an increasingly technological and sophisticated world.
Another way to state this issue is: how do we feel about nature? Do
we respect it for what it is or do we see natural resources merely as as-

sets or inputs to the various activities constituting human enterprise?
This is a philosophical question, and it invokes our understanding of
where the world is going.
MOLECULES MAKE LOVE
I am reminded of the writings of Teilhard de Chardin. Teilhard
was born in 1881 to a pious, provincial French family. He was ajesuit
who, in the course of his studies, pursued geology and later paleontol-

9. National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd,
668ee, 715s (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-57, §§ 668dd, 668ee, 111 Stat. 1252
(1997).
10. Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§528-531 (1994).
11. National Forest Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949; Pub. L. No.
95-233, 92 Stat. 32; Pub. L. No. 100-409, 102 Stat. 1090; Pub. L. No. 101-626, 104 Stat.
4427; Pub. L. No. 103-437, 108 Stat. 4587 (codified as amended in scattered sections of

16 U.S.C.).
12. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
13. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 43414347 (1994).
14. Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Manage-

ment, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 293 (1994).
15. Id. at 296-98.
16.

See id. at 304-14.
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ogy. He intended to teach and research in these fields. He was well
on his way to doing so when he was conscripted for military service
during World War I. As a stretcher bearer during the ghastliest battles
of that conflict, Teilhard's personal faith was severely challenged. That
challenge led him to begin a vision that combined both his religious
understanding and his scientific education. His career took a fortuitous turn in 1923 when he was invited to join an expedition in China.
In the following 12 years he was part of nine more such exploratory
treks.
Teilhard advanced a far-sighted notion of evolution. His thoughts
contained amazing insights, notions that remain challenging and impressive even today. Ultimately, the Jesuits banned Teilhard because,
among other things, he said that molecules make love. By this he
meant to illustrate that at every level, from the simple to the complex,
all of life is constantly engaged in a struggle to relate to other life. He
wrote, "Man is not the center of the universe as once we thought in
our simplicity, but something much more wonderful (the arrow pointing the way to the final unification of the world)." 7 At the same time,
he did not see humanity as simply swept along in an evolutionary
stream. Rather, he encouraged each of us to see in our own acts the
secrets of evolution's proceeding and the responsibility for transmitting its past to its future .
I think Teilhard's views are fully consistent with at least some of the
arguments of the ecology movement to the effect that non-human life
has value in itself. This value is independent of any instrumental usefulness for limited human purposes. Ethicists have argued this theme.
Earnest Partridge wrote: "Nature, evolution and history have not all
converged through trackless time, simply to benefit us. For the sake of
our good mental and moral health, we need to remind ourselves that
we are but a step in the long road behind and beyond us." This perspective embraces the notion that there is a unity between man and
nature; humankind is in a position to control nature, but that control
must have its limits. Environmental ethical limits are set by the good
of the whole of which humankind is but a part.
CLOSING
Some assume that humanity will always be concerned for its ecosystems because humanity is dependent on them. One commentator recently stated that because England depended upon raw materials from
India, it had India's interest necessarily at heart; and because Southern
slaveholders depended on their slaves, they had their slaves' interests
at heart. Such arguments are not only logically flawed, but are histori-

17. PIERRE TEILHARD de CHARDIN, PHENOMENON OF MAN 224 (Bernard Wall trans.,
Harper & Row rev. English ed. 1965).
18. Id. at 226.
20. Earnest Partridge, Nature IsA Moral Resource, 6 ENVrL. ETHICS 101, 129 (1984).

Issue I

COMMENTARY

cally inaccurate. In my own lifetime, I am reminded of a fairly recent
argument made by some of my agricultural friends. They said that
farmers are the original environmentalists and have to be: they are dependent upon the natural resources with which they work. The statement has some truth in it, but as much as I love agriculture, it has
never seemed to me that agribusiness is especially concerned about
the Earth for its own sake.
In your own natural resources practice, do you not have opportunities to talk to clients about their ethical responsibility to the environment? I can think of one client encounter I would have relished.
In June of this year, a farmer named Tom Dorr appeared at a national
conference to describe the agricultural enterprise he deemed viable
for himself and for his area of the country. Tom envisioned farming
225,000 acres under centralized management, with the farm broken
up into 8,300 acre blocks. If he pulls it off, he will farm 70% of the
land in his county by himself. Although I am not sure, I think that
such an approach implies the destruction of small pastures and
wooded borders, of open hunting grounds and the security of trees. I
am among those who are drawn to such margins. I long for the differences that a fenced row, a stream, or a grove of trees makes on the
countryside. I grow increasingly concerned as agribusiness moves in
the direction of factory farms. However, agriculture is by no means the
only arena for the application of an environmental ethic, and I think
each of us would do well to consider the opportunities we have for advancing a system of environmental ethics as we practice law.
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SAM BINGHAM, THE LAST RANCH, Harcourt Brace & Company, San

Diego, CA (1996); 363pp; $14.00; ISBN 0-15-600539-5, softcover.

REVIEWED BY FEDERICO CHEEVER'

The San Luis Valley, in south-central Colorado, is like other parts
of the American rural Southwest, only more so: a flat, once fertile valley surrounded by abrupt craggy mountains that defy the comprehension of those who have not spent time with them; mysterious and biologically significant wetlands; small communities of people where
everybody knows everybody; and a persistent historical lack of usable
water. Sam Bingham's book, The Last Ranch, captures the life of one
ranching family near the north end of the Valley during the better
part of one year, from early Spring to Fall 1992.
Donnie and Karen Whitten, husband and wife, are the pivot
around which Bingham's inquiries rotate. Fortunately for Bingham
and his readers, the Whittens are energetic and inquisitive people involved in a range of issues that affect the ecological integrity of dry
grasslands and the future of cattle ranching in the Valley, in the
southwest, and on the planet. They are devotees of Allan Savory's Holistic Resource Management (described elegantly in the book's fourth
chapter) and its promise of transformed, environmentally friendly livestock industry in the dry, "brittle" grasslands of this continent and Savory's native southern Africa. They are personally involved in attempts
to employ Savory's ideas on Bureau of Land Management grazing allotments. They are acquaintances and joint venturers with the Coleman brothers and their revolutionary natural beef business. Donnie
Whitten also manages a ranching operation for John and Carol Wagner-a couple of good-hearted millionaires who enjoy ranching when
not tied up in the Carribean or New York, sympathetic representatives
of the "recreational ranchers" who are beginning to occupy so much of
the western range. And, of course, the Whittens worry about water
and grass.
The laudable qualities of the Whittens make The Last Ranch a far
better book than the standard "year on the ranch" format might suggest. But Bingham has even bigger game in his sites. The life of the
1. Federico Cheever is an Associate Professor at the University of Denver College
of Law.

Issue I

BOOK REVIEWS

Whittens and the Valley provide him with a vehicle for making a subtle
and essential point about the availability of water for human endeavors
and the health and structure of the biological fabric that captures,
holds, and filters that water. Between accounts of trips to the 4-H fair
at the Monte Vista rodeo grounds, cattle drives, and school board
meetings, Bingham illustrates again and again how human use of Valley lands has altered the successional process among the Valley's plant
and animal communities, thereby altering the biological-water dynamic. Observation after observation suggest that these human induced changes are slowly rendering many water-dependant human activities impossible, at least for independent operators like the
Whittens. For the Whittens' ranch the key to survival is grass (forage
for cattle) on their own land and on the Bureau of Land Management's Tracy allotment. There is much less of it now than there was
when earlier generations of Whittens occupied the land.
For Bingham, the Whittens' struggle to make a living running cattle represents a global problem-desertification of grazed grasslands, a
problem Bingham would ascribe, in large part, to miscomprehension.
Bingham is a veteran of aid programs in Africa and Navajo territory
and recollects how the same conventional notions of superior grazing
practices have led to catastrophe in the Sahel and the Southwest. He is
convinced that the conventional wisdom will only aid the encroaching
deserts in dry grassland areas around the world. Unlike his compatriot, Savory, Bingham is not full of answers. By limiting his horizon to
the Whittens, he can comfortably suggest potential lines of inquiry
without pursuing them very far. While this occasionally makes the
book seem like the Zen of Grassland Ecosystems, on balance Bingham's format suits the complexity of his subject.
The Whittens are plainly far ahead of most of the planet in their
understanding and acceptance of Bingham's point. They struggle to
reshape their cattle operation so it enhances, rather than destroys, the
water retaining qualities of the lands they use. They are not notably
successful. The land's responses to change can still baffle them. The
wounds they wish to heal have been inflicted over a century or more.
More unfortunate and less inevitable, the human forces arrayed
against them, from defensive and uninterested local ranchers and federal bureaucracy to international water development enterprises and
inappropriate notions of what a prize lamb should look like, seem
overwhelming (particularly after you read the epilogue).
Some of the book's best parts are devoted to the Whittens' allies in
their attempt to transform the way we think about water and nature.
There is Allan Savory, of course, endlessly energetic former Rhodesian
counterinsurgency specialist in quasi-voluntary exile from his native
land, less as a result of the victory of the rebels he fought than as a result of his radical views on grazing. There is Steve Berlinger, the outspoken, heretical manager of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's Monte Vista National Wildlife Refuge, and Royce Wheeler, the
opened-minded BLM range conservationist. Finally, there is Jim Coleman, the stockman who resists chemical treatment of weeds to protect
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his natural cattle operation. All join the Whittens in their decided upstream paddle against the forces of conventional wisdom. Bingham
provides a brief biographical sketch of each significant character, helping the reader to understand, sympathize and remember.
Expressed obliquely, in the account of an encounter at the Monte
Vista Wildlife Refuge between ranchers and an "Earthfirst! Vegetarian"
from Boulder, Colorado, is one of Bingham's postulates that dry grassland ranching will continue and that it should continue. Many environmentalists on this continent, some more articulate and knowledgeable than the maligned Boulderite, would dispute this. Within the
context of the book, Bingham's postulate works. The Whittens are
sympathetic people who care about the land. The idea of forcing
them off to the city to become computer programmers, or whatever, is
unacceptable to the reader after the first two chapters. Bingham's postulate also makes sense in the global context. While the United States
could afford to withdraw much, if not all, of its dry grasslands from agricultural production, banning cattle is not a reasonable option in the
Sahel or Central Asia. This is, however, an important limitation on
Bingham's analysis for those primarily interested in the American
Southwest.
As an added treat, Bingham provides us with a Valley-level view of
the last two grand schemes to tap the theoretically vast and consistently
chimerical groundwater reserves trapped in the soils under the San
Luis Valley. He traces the demise of American Water Development's
grand and half-baked plan to export groundwater to Denver, providing a concise and engaging account of the groundwater modeling issues which, through a six-week trial in Alamosa, sank the project. Even
better, we get a personal and autobiographical account from the expert witness who did the most to sink it, Devraj Sharma. Three chapters later, Bingham documents the rise of the Stockman's Water Company and its enigmatic prime mover, Gary Boyce, whose water export
scheme remains in the news and whose ballot initiatives-apparently
intended to shift the balance of water and power in the Valley-were
recently trounced by Colorado voters.
Like any book that covers so much territory so subtly related,
Bingham and his editors cannot always tell the difference between
wide-ranging and rambling. Periodically, Bingham briefly shifts the
scene to Africa or some international conference on the environment.
These interludes are not always illuminating. A brief discourse on
Donnie's failed attempt at lobster farming in the high desert and a
lengthy account of a trip to a Dick Lamm political event in Denver do
not seem to serve the book's purpose; but, they are entertaining.
The Last Ranch is a particularly useful book for lawyers. It instructs
us about the intricacies of natural systems without descending into
technical jargon. It describes the troublesome groundwater quantification business without presenting an equation. Most significantly, it
provides a lasting antidote to our inclination to slice the world into
separate cognitive boxes-water, wetlands, cattle, grass, weeds, wildlife,
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and property-which neither makes sense to the living systems of
which they are all part, nor to the people who live in them.

DAVID M. GILLILAN AND THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION: SEEKING A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE, Island

Press, Washington D.C. & Covelo, California (1997);
$30.00; ISBN 1-55963-524-X, softcover.

REVIEWED BY CAROL D. ANGEL
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The authors tell us that they intended, in writing this book, "to
provide readers with a comprehensive understanding of the many issues surrounding instream flow, and to shed new light on a poorly understood but very important natural resource topic.' 3 This is a lofty
and laudable goal: instream flows are certainly at the heart of many water use issues in the West today. A comprehensive, balanced analysis
would be useful to a broad range of interested parties, from local, state
and federal officials, to private water users, to environmental organizations, to the public at large. This book is a start, but unfortunately not
a finish.
In many areas, the authors have indeed been comprehensive,
painstakingly cataloging the full range of state and federal approaches
to protection of instream flows. This volume pulls together a wide
range of information in one accessible format, which is helpful as an
introduction to the subject of instream flows. Because the book's
thorough approach inexplicably vanishes in several key areas, however,
it cannot offer a comprehensive understanding of the issues. Specifically, the book fails by refusing to look squarely at opposition to instream flow protection; and by glossing over the uncertainties in the
science supporting the need for and quantification of instream flows,
which has been the crux of several recent instream flow controversies.
The book's first two chapters are promising. After a brief introduction, the authors provide a clear, concise, and balanced summary of
the development of water law and water use in the western United
States. The discussion is simplified enough to provide a reader coming to the subject cold with a basic understanding of western water law,

2. Senior Assistant Attorney General, Federal and Interstate Water Unit, Colorado
Attorney General's Office. The reviewer represented the State of Colorado in opposing federal claims for National Forest instream flow reserved rights in Colorado Water
Division 1 (the South Platte basin) and is now representing Colorado in ongoing settlement negotiations for similar claims in Water Divisions 2, 3 & 7 (the Arkansas, Rio
Grande, and San Juan basin). The opinions expressed in this review, however, are
solely those of the reviewer and do not represent any official position of the Attorney
General's Office.
3. DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING A
BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE 4 (1st ed. 1997).
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yet well-documented so that details can be explored through use of the
references. Even though the chapter is tiled, "The Loss of Instream
Flows," it commendably avoids condemning the 19th century with
20th-century hindsight, and instead explains the aridity of the West
and the social, economic, and political climate that created both the
prior appropriation doctrine and diminished instream flows. Only toward the end of the chapter does one of the book's besetting sins surface for a moment-broad factual statements without support or reference. Statements in this chapter (and sprinkled throughout the rest
of the book) refer to dry and nearly dry rivers throughout the West.4
One statement goes so far as to list specific major rivers that are "dry or
virtually dry,, 5 yet the only reference provided is for one of the halfdozen examples. In all probability, the authors' factual assertions are
correct, but it is inappropriate simply to have to take their word for it.
This lack of precision and documentation detracts from the book's
credibility, and increases lamentably in Chapter Three. After describing the historical water development that has depleted instream flows,
the authors turn to describing the different functions served by instream flows. The chapter is divided into two parts, first qualitatively
describing general instream flow purposes, and then discussing quantification of flows for the various purposes. This is a useful effort, and
appears to be an exhaustive list of possible instream flow needs. But
the descriptions are maddeningly general and poorly documented.
Entire paragraphs of assertions concerning the relationship of flow to
fish food sources, dissolved oxygen, or spawning beds roll by without
any references. Not only must we again take the authors' word that
they know what they are talking about, but also the reader is left with
no idea where to start looking for more detailed information to supplement a one-page summary of a complex scientific issue.
The trend continues in the second half of the chapter, concerning
quantification methods. Many factual assertions are made without
support, and methods are sketchily described and uncritically presented. The authors are quite capable of providing proper documentation, as shown by their meticulously footnoted discussions of aesthetics' and hydropower.
This chapter's overall lack of adequate
supporting authorities and critical review does not provide readers
with "the best available information" on this complex subject, even
though the authors acknowledge that such information is necessary.9
More important, these topics are some of the most disputed issues in
instream flow protection. The adequacy of the scientific basis for the
need for particular instream flows and the accuracy of the determination of quantities of instream flows needed are often at the heart of in4. E.g., id. at 32, 40, 50.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 83 (discussion of riparian vegetation).
Id. at 58-60.
Id. at 64-70.
Id. at 306.

Issue 1

BOOK REVIEWS

stream flow controversies." In my experience, the current issues concerning instream flows tend to focus more on proof, quantities, and
locations, rather than on philosophical objections to the concept. By
failing to understand these controversies and the resultant need for
complete and accurate information on the scientific basis for instream
flows, Gillilan and Brown fail to provide the reader with the promised
"comprehensive understanding of the issues" surrounding instream
flows.
Sprinkled throughout this generally frustrating chapter are some
thoughtful discussions of complex issues. As mentioned, the discussion of possible instream flow needs is wide-ranging, including such often-overlooked uses (in the West, at least) as navigation. The authors
provide a short but clear explanation of the difference between natural instream flows and regulated instream flows, and a balanced discussion of the use of regulated flows from dams to provide instream flow
benefits." Several times they acknowledge potential conflicts between
different instream flow purposes.12 Yet the authors do not seem to
recognize their own inconsistencies, such as the confusing and contradictory discussions of the benefit of vegetation within or adjacent to the
channel for fish "cover,"' the beneficial, erosion-reducing effect of riparian vegetation on the flood plain or in the stream channel, 4 the
need'5 for high flows to clear banks of vegetation for easy fishing access, and the channel maintenance detriment of encroaching vegetation which reduces erosion in stream channels. 6 Further, because all
the above discussions are without any supporting references, there is
no place to go for clarification.
In several segments of Chapter Three, the authors also begin to
discuss the economic value of instream flows, leading into Chapter
Four. That chapter is entitled, "How Much Water Should Be Left In
Streams?" The question is never clearly answered, as the chapter degenerates into a muddle of economic jargon and graphs. On the way
to the chapter's inconclusive conclusion, there are some basic, understandable points. Instream flows have value, and may be more valuable than current off-stream uses of water. Instream flows (and indeed, all water uses) have both negative externalities (costs or losses
suffered by people who are not parties to and do not control water use
decisions) and positive externalities (benefits enjoyed by people who
10. Examples include controversies about water needs of Columbia River salmon,
id. at 244-48, endangered fish in the Colorado River, id. at 275-76, whooping cranes in

Nebraska, id. at 276-77, and stream channels in the national forests, id. at 190-93.
11. Id. at 63-64.
12. Id. at 51, 57, 69-70.
13. Id. at 46.
14. Id. at 54.
15. Id. at 58.
16. Id. at 74.
17. Unless the answer is, "the point at which the net benefit of instream flow is
maximized, signified by Q , [on the accompanying graph]." Id. at 109. This less than
helpful statement is literally the last clause of the last sentence of this chapter.
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are not parties to and do not control water use decisions, and who are
hard to track down and make pay for the benefit). Water use is complex and there are high transaction costs in transferring water from
one use to another. These points seem well-supported, although the
comparison of instream flow and off-stream use values would be more
convincing if there were comparisons to higher-value municipal and
industrial uses instead of just agriculture, since instream flows have
been asserted against such uses.' - These economic considerations provide a useful context for determining the need for, and methods of,
instream flow protection.
In the rest of Chapter Four, however, the authors launch into an
argument that "special measures" are necessary to protect instream
flows. It is nowhere clear what "special measures" means. Their discussion of this topic is the first appearance of the second, and most
striking, flaw in their approach-the failure to address real, as opposed
to speculative, criticisms of instream flow protection. They start out by
purporting to address "three arguments that have been made against
special protection measures."' 9 These arguments are not attributed to
anyone or any source, and are apparently straw men created by the
authors. Somewhere in the West there may very well still be people asserting that all instream flows are waste; that no instream flow protections are needed because the existing water use regime of senior rights
will guarantee that water is always in streams; or that free water markets will solve all instream flow needs. If so, they should be identified,
and their arguments presented in their own words. In any case, the
authors' rebuttal of these points does not clearly connect with their argument that special protective measures are justified. Their final
point-that markets may not work, is the most easily understandable,
and has some merit. But it is inconsistent with their later criticism of
states' refusal to create unlimited private instream flow rights or a free
market in instream flow rights.
Chapters Five and Six are relatively straightforward, discussing the
various methods adopted by the western states to address instream flow
protection. They essentially update, and cite heavily to, the 1993 survey of instream flow protection from the Natural Resources Law Center.2 ° This provides a comprehensive and useful summary, but not
without the usual flaws-some discussions without support,2 ' and a
failure to understand all facets of the issues. For example, federal interests are reported without editorializing, while state concerns2 are
placed in unattributed quotation marks to indicate disagreement.
18. E.g., id. at 152-53, 304 (Mono Lake case) and id at 209-12 (Cache la Poudre bypass flows controversy).
19. Id. at 97.
20. LAWRENCEJ. MACDONNELL & TERESA A. RICE, EDS., INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION
IN THE WEST (revised edition, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado
School of Law, Boulder, 1993).
21. E.g., GiLuLAN & BROWN, supra note 3, at 119 (Colorado instream flow law), and
id. at 125-26 (Colorado Water Conservation Board Instream Flow Donation Program).
22. Id. at 128.
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Chapter Seven is without question the worst chapter in the book,
purporting to analyze the effect of instream flows on other water uses.
The first problem is the placement of the analysis. The book discusses
all instream flow protection methods, from state-created water rights,
to federal reserved water rights, to public trust conditions, to a wide
range of federally-imposed regulatory water use controls. Yet this key
analysis, purporting to show that instream flows have no potential for
harming senior water uses and little potential for harming junior uses,
is placed after the discussion of state-created instream flow protection,
but before the three chapters describing the many federal methods of
instream flow protection. It speaks only of instream flow "rights" and
does not discuss at all the instream flow demands made through antedated federal rights or regulatory authorities against senior, established
water uses. Contrast this with the authors' frank discussion in their
concluding chapter, where instream flow protection methods are set
out in a table and characterized by whether they can be "imposed on
unwilling parties,"" and where the authors expressly acknowledge that
they are advocating reallocation of existing water rights and water uses
to instream flows.
The flaws in this analysis are compounded by the failure to consider the geographic extent of various instream flow protection methods. First, the analytical framework is inaccurate. The effect of instream flow rights is analyzed in a series of tables, describing effects on
upstream senior and junior rights; and downstream senior and junior
rights. But instream flow rights cover reaches of streams, so there
should be a third category, describing effects on those rights diverting
within the instream flow reach. This category is the hardest-hit, because even off-stream uses that are minimally consumptive (domestic
use, for example, or storage in a reservoir for releases to be used far
downstream) may be limited or eliminated entirely if located within a
designated instream flow reach.
Second, the analysis is not grounded in reality. Throughout Chapter Seven, the authors emphasize that instream flows are nonconsumptive, resulting in "the absolute loss of water for consumptive
purposes only where the instream right is located so far downstream
that diversion below the instream reach is not possible, as when an instream flow right is located just above a river's outlet to the sea., 25 This
statement is true in the abstract. Instream flow reaches, however, can
be long or short, and instream flow demands can be made downstream
of hundreds, if not thousands, of established water uses, particularly
when federal regulatory requirements are considered.26 A review of
the possible instream flow purposes listed in Chapter Three gives the

23. Id. at 298-99.
24. Id. at 304-05.
25. Id. at 167.
26. For example, demands for water under the Endangered Species Act for habitat
hundreds of miles downstream in Nebraska have been asserted against water uses in
the Colorado Front Range. Id. at 211, 276-77.
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clear impression that instream flow claims under various state or federal authorities can be made for substantial quantities of water on virtually every stream mile in the West. The potential for "absolute loss of
water for consumptive use purposes" is real. Further, water uses are
not fungible. If the City of Greeley has to forego water to satisfy a Forest Service or Fish and Wildlife Service instream flow requirement, it is
no help to Greeley residents if that water is still available to a city in
Wyoming or Nebraska.
Thus, because they do not address all of the possible methods of
instream flow protection or the potential geographic scope of instream
flows, the authors' cheery reassurance that "the existence of an instream flow right is not likely to have any adverse impact on most other
water users, is either naive or disingenuous. This is all the more
frustrating because the latter half of Chapter Seven, explaining the effect of instream flows on limiting the flexibility of water use by preventing water rights transfers, is clearly and fairly explained.
The next three chapters deal with federal instream flow rights and
other federal regulatory authorities or activities affecting instream
flows. In general, they present a thorough and comprehensive summary, hitting all the major points. Again, the references and authorities could be much more complete and consistent. These chapters
could also have used a tough editor to restore professionalism and
eliminate bias. Federal interests and motives are explained with sympathy, even to the point of telling us, for example, what a federal
agency "understood""8 or that it was "surprised" at the outcome of litigationY. In contrast, objections to federal actions are reported
brusquely, often placed in sarcastic quotation marks to indicate how
foolish the authors think they are."° Reams of law review articles have
been written on the United States v. New Mexico"' case, from a wide spectrum of viewpoints, yet the authors chose to cite only one, criticizing
the decision. Nevertheless, these chapters do the job they set out to
do.
The concluding chapter, however, sets us back to square one. It is
primarily a recap of the need for instream flows, combined with the
authors' puzzled speculations about why anyone would oppose such a
laudable goal. Ultimately, they attribute opposition to fear and ignorance, opining that it is "easy to fear, reject or ignore that which is not
known." 2 This would have been a far better book if the authors had
considered the application of this statement to themselves. The vast
majority of the book's discussions of opposition to instream flows are
completely without references or attribution. Yet volumes have been
written from all perspectives (including some that are highly critical)
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 167.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 191.
30. E.g., id. at 210, 284.
31. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
32. GILUiLAN & BROWN, supra note 3, at 302.
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about federal instream flow reserved rights, federal "non-reserved
rights," the public trust, and the interaction of federal regulatory statutes and water uses.S If the authors had trouble finding written materials, they could have done what they did so effectively to flesh out
their discussions of state and federal instream flow programs-pick up
the phone and talk to someone. Without an exploration of real as opposed to imagined problems with specific methods of instream flow
protection, this book is incomplete. The neophyte who relies on it as a
blueprint for analyzing instream flow protection will be blindsided by
real water users with real, practical concerns about the effects of instream flows. The experienced practitioner will find it a thorough
catalogue of flow protection methodologies and needs, but one which
adds little to understanding the overall issues.
This review should not be read as opposing instream flows. As
mentioned above, I think the current issues concerning instream flows
are more a matter of how, and how much, rather than whether they can
or should be protected at all. This review results mostly from dashed
expectations. The authors obviously put a great deal of work into this
book, and it had great potential to be a useful, authoritative introduction, informing the continuing debate on this subject. The path necessary to redeem the book's flaws seems basic and obvious, and it is
disappointing that it was not taken.

33. E.g., Bennett W. Raley, Chaos in the Making: The Consequences of Failureto Integrate
Federal Environmental Statutes with McCarran Amendment Water Adjudications, 41 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12-1 (1995); Wendy Weiss, The Federal Government's Pursuit of Instream Flow Water Rights, 1 U. DENv. WATER L. REv. 151 (1998).
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Terry L. Anderson and Pamela Snyder, Water Markets: Priming the Invisible Pump, The Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., (1997);
228pp; $19.95; ISBN 1-882577-43-4, hardcover.
Water Markets examines the market forces behind the allocation
and consumption of water resources in the United States and is the
culmination of several years of research on the prospects for using
markets to solve water problems. This book builds on Anderson's first
edition of Water Crisis: Ending the Policy Drought by exploring the
changes in water policy in recent years, and providing alternatives to
the current water policy in this country. The book is well organized
with tables located throughout, notes at the end of each chapter, an
extensive list of authorities, and a comprehensive index.
Chapter One illustrates why a water crisis exists worldwide and specifically in the United States. The authors include references to various studies to show how growing population and declining resource
availability is causing a water crisis. Anderson and Snyder indicate that
government regulation of resources perpetuated the water crisis and a
free market would better preserve our nation's water resources. This
chapter looks at historical trends of water allocation institutions and
the idea of decentralization of those institutions.
The second chapter focuses on the political economy of water policy. The authors compare increased government involvement and traditional water economics approaches to theories extolled by free market environmentalism. They evaluate both approaches based on water
use efficiency, environmental quality and fiscal responsibility. In the
authors' opinion, efficiency results when market processes are applied
to water problems, and decentralization would provide the most efficient and productive system of water allocation.
Chapters Three through Eight examine different aspects of the existing water market. Topics covered include the evolution of water institutions, the interrelation between politics and water, the appropriation doctrine, instream flows, and pollution and ground water deeds.
The authors offer insight on problems that exist with the current policies and propose changes that would produce a more efficient and
longer lasting water market.
The last chapter, "We've Come a Long Way, Baby," concludes the
book by providing the reader a summary of changes in the water market since 1980.
Water Markets is a good informational book for the reader who
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wishes to examine the efficiency of the water market system and understand the economic forces behind the doctrines that control water
policy.
Tracy Rogers

Carraro, Carlo, ed., International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues, Edward Elgar Pub., Brookfield, Vt. (1997);
199 pp; $80.00; ISBN 1-85898-524-2, hardcover.
Most new environmental phenomena are inherently global.
Commodities like air and water are managed as common-property
goods. Since no institution has the power to globally regulate the use
of these resources, it becomes difficult to achieve broad environmental
agreements and necessary to create a method of negotiation that will
lead to self-enforcing agreements.
InternationalEnvironmental Negotiations compiles articles from professors around the world concerning methods of negotiating these selfenforcing agreements. The authors recognize the difficulty in achieving self-enforcing agreements with a large number of signatories; especially where there are significant differences in costs and benefits for
the countries involved. Most of the authors use complicated economic
formulae to analyze self-enforcing agreements, and conclude that a
self-enforcing agreement can only be achieved with a small number of
signatories.
The editor's introduction discusses various attempts to achieve international agreement, such as the 1994 Montreal Protocol on chlorofluorocarbons, and explains the difficulties that may be encountered
in international environmental negotiations. The editor also gives a
brief introduction of the theories and techniques addressed in each
chapter.
Chapter Two explores the economics of self-enforcing agreements
between countries with differing economic and environmental structures. Such self-enforcing agreements are called "heterogeneous international environmental agreements" ("IEAs"). For example, in the
global warming context all countries have different abatement costs
that yield different benefits. Those differing costs and benefits can
have a large impact on sustaining a potentially globally beneficial IEA.
The author notes that two main problems of heterogeneous IEA analysis are: (1) a need for signatories to reach agreement about obligations
and (2) a need to devise "credible punishments" to sustain the agreement.
Chapter Three analyzes burden sharing and coalition stability in
environmental negotiations while taking asymmetries between countries into account. Using this approach, countries must decide
whether to join a coalition given an agreed upon burden-sharing rule.
Each country then sets environmental policy by maximizing its own
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welfare function. The authors discuss the two problems that arise under this approach. First, countries must decide which way to cooperate, and second, a strong incentive exists to free ride, which leads to
coalition instability.
Chapter Four recognizes the difficulty of achieving environmental
agreements without a supranational authority and suggests using an
arbitrator to aid in dispute resolution. This approach provides another tool to solve the problems of asymmetries and conflicts between
countries.
Chapters Five and Six discusses combining research and development cooperation to achieve stable agreements, and the environmental benefit that can be achieved by offsetting the incentive to free
ride. The possibility of using technology transfers to stabilize environmental agreements is analyzed in Chapter Five. Chapter Six analyzes the use of issue linkage. Since stable coalitions tend to be small,
transfers and issue linkage have been proposed in environmental economics literature to expand environmental coalitions.
Chapter Seven explores the important issue of asymmetric information and how it affects international environmental agreements.
The chapter specifically addresses the problem of finding a viable costsharing method for parties to adopt in an IEA where asymmetric information exists. It also discusses the fact that the cost each country
must bear, if it decides to take abatement action, will outweigh the
benefit but may be smaller than the aggregate benefit to all countries.
Chapter Eight provides an analysis of the problem of trade and environmental policies. The author uses economies with heterogeneous
agents as a framework. The magnitude of negative production externalities depend on production volume and technology used. This
chapter focuses on technologies that are more costly, but that reduce
pollution, which results in a trade-off between productivity and environmental benefits. The chapter also gives suggestions for using trade
threats as penalties when negotiations fail.
Chapter Nine discusses new research ideas and uses a different
method to analyze self-enforcing agreements. The authors of this
chapter show methodological advances to analyze the regional formation of an environmental coalition. They incorporate this into a discussion of how to measure the costs and benefits of carbon dioxide
emissions in the context of international agreements aimed at slowing
global warming.
In Chapter Ten the authors discuss their theoretical observations
of international environmental agreement stability. This chapter defines a self-enforcing international agreement more precisely and explores "the scope for implementing such agreements in different strategic environments." IEAs must be self-enforcing since they are not
binding, and each country must find it in its own best interest to sign
an agreement and not to free ride.
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InternationalEnvironmental Negotiations provides an excellent overview of analytical methods for addressing international environmental
negotiations from an environmental economic perspective.
Shana Smilovits
Mark S. Dennison, Storm Water Discharges: Regulatory Compliance
and Best Management Practices, CRC Press,Inc.,Boca Raton,
Florida (1996); 44 7 pp; $59.95; ISBN 1-56670-198-8, hardcover.
As its name suggests, Storm Water Discharges: Regulatory Compliance
and Best Management Practices offers a practical guide in layperson's
terms to help facilities navigate through complex storm water discharge requirements. The author, Mark Dennison, goes beyond a
simple discussion of regulatory compliance and its technological aspects and actually provides insight into the development and implementation of storm water pollution prevention plans. The book serves
as a practical handbook complete with general and industry-specific
tables, checklists, glossaries, and a sample Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan.
Dennison first provides an overview of the storm water pollution
problem. He outlines the pollutants in storm water and their associated impacts. He also provides insight into storm water control practices, maintaining that such practices should focus on land disturbance
rather than land use, depending upon the area's stage in the urbanization process. Dennison then examines the requirements of storm water discharge regulation. This examination includes the Clean Water
Act's NPDES permit program as well as the Environmental Protection
Agency's storm water program and nonpoint source pollution control
programs.
The next section of the book provides a dissection of the storm water discharge permit process and the technical requirements of that
process. Chapter Three describes the options available to facility operators in obtaining permit coverage for storm water discharges associated with their industrial activity. Chapter Four describes the technical
requirements of the storm water permit application process discussed
in Chapter Three. Dennison provides a pragmatic approach to the
technical aspects of compliance, offering solutions to potential problems that may arise during sampling.
Chapter Five offers practical guidance to the development and implementation of storm water pollution prevention plans. This is the
focus of Dennison's book and it covers every step from the creation of
a Pollution Prevention Team to the identification and evaluation of
Best Management Practices ("BMPs"). Dennison explains how to implement the plan, suggests how to evaluate and revise the plan, and
details the administrative requirements of such plans. Consistent with
the practical approach of the book, Dennison even provides pollution
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prevention plan worksheets. Chapters Six and Seven build upon
Chapter Five by setting out industry-specific and activity-specific BMPs,
respectively. These two chapters provide thorough examples of how
effective BMP plans are implemented for particular industries and activities that may contaminate storm water.
Chapters Eight and Nine describe site-specific BMPs designed to
minimize, reduce, and eliminate storm water contamination from
various industrial activities. Specifically, Chapter Eight addresses flow
diversion, exposure minimization, and mitigation practices that may
help reduce contamination at industrial facility sites, and Chapter
Nine addresses erosion prevention, sediment control, and infiltration
practices.
Storm Water Discharges is a functional handbook that guides companies through the regulatory and technical aspects of storm water discharge requirements.
CandaceDeen

Wendy Nelson Espeland, The Struggle for Water: Politics, Rationality,
Identity in the American Southwest, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, Ill. (1998); 281pp; $47.00; ISBN 0-226-21793-0,
hardcover.
The Struggle for Water details the successful fight against the proposed Orme Dam by the Yavapai community in Ft. McDowell, Arizona.
The author, a professor of sociology at Northwestern University in
Chicago, chronicles the water problems of Arizona, their effects on the
Yavapai people, and her own work with the Central Arizona Water
Control Study ("CAWCS"). Espeland worked for CAWCS as a graduate
student, studying the social impact on the Yavapai of the proposed
dam. As a whole, the CAWCS investigated the Arizona water supply
and flood plans.
The Orme Dam, first proposed by the Bureau of Reclamation in
1944, faced fierce opposition from the Yavapai, who gained support
from CAWCS. That group formed an Environmental Impact Assessment for the Bureau of Reclamation, in compliance with NEPA regulations, on the area around the Ft. McDowell reservation. The Bureau
chose the reservation for the dam due to its key location for controlling three tributaries of the Gila River: the Salt, Verde, and Agua Fria
rivers. The City of Phoenix wanted the dam erected in order to control future flooding after two floods in 1978 and 1979 destroyed homes
zoned residential despite their position in a flood plain.
The book presents the issue from a sociological perspective, specifically examining theories of rationalization and commensuration.
Espeland outlines these theories in the first chapter. She summarizes
rationalization as a maximization of choices to meet a goal, and defines commensuration as measuring two or more different issues with a
common standard. Her analysis comes from three different perspec-
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tives, what she terms as the "Old Guard", the "New Guard" and the
Yavapai community. The Old Guard consisted mostly of forties and fifties engineers and damming proponents who were surprised at the
opposition from the New Guard-the CAWCS, critics of the plan working within the agency. The Yavapai refused to give up their community and home to correct Phoenix's and central Arizona's poor planning to provide water sources and control. Espeland's writing is drawn
from Bureau of Reclamation fieldwork, interviews with CAWCS, government documents, media coverage, and her own personal records.
The book is divided into six chapters. In the first chapter, the
author outlines the history of the proposed Orme Dam, and the sociological theories she weaves into the story throughout the book. The
second chapter looks at the Old Guard. Espeland gives the reader
background on the Bureau of Reclamation and its army of engineers
who built dams all over the western U.S. during the mid 20th-century.
She proposes that the pro-engineering attitude of the agency and its
approach to projects "fostered an insularity" that prohibited the Bureau from having the foresight to anticipate negative responses from
the environmental movement, and inhibited its ability to cooperate
with emerging environmental legislation.
Chapter Three continues to focus on the Bureau of Reclamation,
with a specific look at its development of the Central Arizona Project
and the Orme Dam. Espeland delves into the politics of the project
and its symbolism within the agency's Old Guard for its "work and the
value of [its] ... mission."

She proposes that the pride and egotism

behind the dam project kept the agency from taking a rational approach to its decisions concerning the area. Chapter Four then explains the emergence of a New Guard through the agency's own small
division of the CAWCS. She contends that this "marginal group of
employees," of which she was a part, were able to change the status
quo within the Bureau. She explains that CAWCS and NEPA regulations played a key role in bringing about a different policy and mission
for the agency, utilizing rationalization and commensuration.
The final chapters look at the Yavapai community and the author's
sociological theory in greater detail. Chapter Five details the struggle
for water in central Arizona and the Yavapai people's own struggle to
keep their home. Ultimately those two camps opposed each other
over the Orme Dam proposal. Using her sociological insight and personal work with the Yavapai community, Espeland successfully conveys
their side of this story with emotion and interest. Chapter Six fleshes
out the sociological theories of rational decision making procedures
and commensuration touched upon in the first chapter, and summarizes their relationship to this fight over water and natural resources.
In this final chapter Espeland also explains the broader, contemporary
implications of these theories with regard to agency politics.
While the perspective of this book is sociological, within it lies a
success story for anyone interested in the use of natural resources in
the Southwest, bureaucracy decision making, and politics. Espeland
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may be a sociology professor, but a good portion of this book is rooted
in environmental law and regulation. Parts of some chapters were first
published in the Law and Society Review and Law and Social Inquiy journals. The author also recognizes the American Bar Foundation and
the Center for Dispute Resolution (at Northwestern University) for
their assistance with her dissertation on the topic and ultimately this
book.
Jennifer Lee

Michael S. Greve, The Demise of Environmentalism in American Law,
merican Enterprise Institute Press, La Vergne, TN (1996); 147 pp;
29.95; ISBN 0-8447-3980-4, hardcover.
The Demise of Environmentalism in American Law discusses the collapse of environmental values in American law, specifically focusing on
constitutional and administrative case law. Greve begins Chapter One
by stating that "environmentalism" is not simply a desire for clean air
and water, but rather an ideology or worldview. Greve calls this an
"ecological paradigm" which views the world as being completely interconnected. This interconnectedness, therefore, leads to what Greve
feels is a coherent, yet perverse, view of the legal world. Greve discusses the impact that environmentalism has on politics and public
policy in the United States. A trend in American case law currently
demonstrates the reversal of environmental era doctrines, such as the
National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act, that were
once championed by American courts. Greve feels that the courts are
now deliberately rejecting the ecological paradigm "as a matter of
principle."
Greve explores the political changes that may occur as a result of
the shift in the intellectual ground on which environmental politics
rest. He discusses the impact of the ecological paradigm on common
law property rights, statutory law, and judicial interpretation and review of that law. Greve refutes the proposition that the ecological
paradigm is simply a "bigger New Deal" based on the theory that the
ecological paradigm is unparalleled in both form and substance, and
has no analog in other regulatory arenas. He claims thatjudges, along
with policy experts, began to realize that there were systematic defects
in the environmental regulatory system and that this too has contributed to the demise of environmental values.
In Chapter Two, Greve takes an indepth look at the Fifth Amendment takings clause. He discusses one of the leading Supreme Court
cases in this area, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, and the implications that this case has on takings in the environmental arena.
Greve also discusses Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission and Dolan v.
Tigard. Greve discusses the opinions of the justices in these cases and
the idea that manipulable standards make it almost impossible to de-
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termine the outcome of a particular case in advance.
In Chapter Three, Greve describes how standing to sue issues have
evolved in environmental law. He begins with the idea that during the
1960s and throughout a better part of the 1970s the judiciary expanded the definition of standing by lessening the importance of the
requirement that a plaintiff must have suffered some tangible harm in
order to have standing. Congress supported the judicial expansion of
standing by authorizing citizen suit provisions in every major environmental statute. Greve argues that in the past several years, however,
federal courts have rejected the extension of standing to public interest plaintiffs. This shift evidences a rejection of the ecological paradigm. Greve discusses the landmark cases of Lujan v. National Wildlfe
Federation (1990) and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992). Greve provides an informative analysis of the significance of these decisions.
The chapter concludes by comparing the Lucas case with the Defenders
of Wildlife case, and the fact that the rationale underlying these decisions firmly rejects the political-legal perspective of the ecological
paradigm.
Chapter Four discusses different types of judicial review of environmental regulation. The author bases the first type on the values
embodied in environmental statutes. The ecological paradigm requires that these values be placed above political bargains and economic considerations. The author bases the second type on close judicial scrutiny of an agency's decision making process. This "hard
look" approach is appropriate when an agency's policies seem less aggressive than the agency's underlying statute appears to permit. Greve
states that substantive review focuses on ensuring regulatory results
that are reasonable, i.e., more beneficial than detrimental. Substantive
review of environmental regulations resembles a "hard look" due to
the fact that both place a premium on reasoned decision making.
Greve uses major cases to illustrate the results of these different types
ofjudicial review.
In Chapter Five, Greve argues that the ecological paradigm imitates, rather than reduces, the complexity of the outside world and
places private interests above public values. This chapter focuses on
the idea that ecological doctrines have produced excessive regulations
and irrational policy results. Greve feels that the return to common
law harm-based principles promises to restrain such excesses and irrationalities. Greve discusses the position held by environmentalists on
what is the appropriate standard of review for environmental legislation.
Finally, in Chapter Six, Greve deals with environmental ideology
and real-world politics. Greve summarizes the theme of his book and
discusses the changes that have occurred in the environmental realm,
specifically the return to common law doctrines concerning environmental aspirations. Greve argues that a return to common law principles will promote the protection of private orderings, the ability to exclude others, voluntary exchanges, and protection from aggression by
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outsiders. Additionally, Greve discusses the power that ideology, such
as the environmental paradigm, can have over law and politics. He
also discusses the interplay between the judiciary and Congress as it relates to environmental legislation.
The Demise of Environmentalism in American Law provides an interesting, thoughtful and informative discussion of the catalysts of change in
environmental policy and legislation, illustrated by a discussion of
relevant case law.
MaureenD. McInerney

Colin Ward, Reflected in Water: A Crisis of Social Responsibility,
Cassell, London and Washington (1997); 147 pp; $25.95; ISBN 0304-33568-1, paperback.
In a practical, non-technical style, Reflected in Water examines social
issues raised both locally and globally due to our need for water and
the crises associated with water that face the world. The book emphasizes the need for local community control of access to water.
The first chapter explores the history of water in Britain, where access to water was recognized as a universal human right. Now, however, water has become yet another publicly owned utility being offered for sale to a public that already owns it collectively. This
privatization of water especially effects the poor in Britain. Thousands
of households have had their water supply cut off due to inability to
pay their water bills.
The next chapter discusses the tragedy of the commons and how
to avoid it. The tragedy is analogized to a group of herdsmen who live
together in harmony until the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality and the inherent logic of the commons generates tragedy. The theory is that a herdsman will pursue his interest by increasing the size of his herd while failing to consider the actions of others.
The consequence is that the land held commonly becomes overgrazed.
The author offers the proposition that local, popular control is the
surest way to avoid the tragedy of the commons and discusses the
plight of Spain as an illustration of this proposition.
Chapter Three illustrates the current preoccupation with largescale water engineering projects throughout the world and how the
control of water is inevitably control of life and livelihood. The author
remarks on the devastation of lives and livelihoods that these grand
projects cause, wondering why today's engineers, advocating central
control and incorporating a vast bureaucracy, dream of such projects
when a thousand smaller projects would be more beneficial.
Chapter Four sets forth a brief history of the dam and how a regime that is ruthless and unopposable equates to more extensive water
engineering projects. For example, in the Soviet Union, a series of irrigation projects were implemented in the rivers that feed into the
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Aral Sea. Instead of increasing the production of cotton and rice, the
intended purpose, the result has been a shrinking of the Sea, which
once provided 25,000 tons of fish and now yields zero since salinity has
trebled. The chapter also discusses the World Bank's history of favoring lending for spectacular projects, with minimal regard for the local
human and ecological consequences.
Chapter Five discusses the fact that water causes major conflicts.
Although sharing water resources by mutual agreement between
communities may be a fact of history, large-scale water disputes still exist and may have contributed to wars, particularly in the Middle East.
The chapter concludes by stating that trust could alleviate the incentive to fight over water.
Chapter Six discusses small and local approaches to water management.
Non-governmental organizations and other charitable
groups attempt to help poor communities make small improvements
to their water supply, and these groups often have the ability to become catalysts in the local communities.
Chapter Seven characterizes how women, as household managers,
are expected to produce the required amount of water for the needs
of the family. Ironically, the tradition in many societies has been that
water supply technology is too complex for women. Yet, there are aid
agencies that have learned through experience that they need to win
the support of the local people, often the women. Women become
their allies because women carry the daily burden of household management, and even horticulture management in some communities.
Chapter Eight chronicles water marketing and how the concept
that human beings are entitled to have access to water despite the ability to pay, has been replaced with the privatization of water. The
authors discuss and compare the British droughts of 1976 and 1995, as
water was not privatized in 1976. In England and Wales, about half of
the private water companies have introduced prepayment meters requiring customers to pay in advance with "smart cards." Customers
who fail to pay, presumably the poor, automatically have their water
supply cut off and weekly charges must be satisfactorily paid before the
supply comes on again.
Chapter Nine discusses the plight of the urban poor. In 1985, the
World Health Organization estimated that 25% of the population of
Third World cities and towns still did not have access to safe water, 100
million more people without safe water than in 1975. Tourism or cash
crops for export, versus using water on subsistence crops to feed communities affects rural areas. Thus, the casualties of the global market
economy are local people, deprived of a water supply for the benefit of
strangers.
Chapter Ten, discusses how the British took their water supply and
drainage systems for granted and how this has changed in more recent
years. Despite the problems with dirty water in England, Britain alone
pumps over 300 million gallons of sewage into their coastal seas
around each day. There is an obvious unwillingness to undertake the
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required "repair technologies."
Chapter Eleven outlines various problems that contribute to water
crises throughout the world. Examples include global warming and
irrigation issues. The author offers the proposition. that the global
problem of water is less a matter of misuse of a natural and renewable
resource than it is a reflection of our unwillingness to share our wisdom with those who need it.
The message of this book is that if local, human communities were
in control of their own water supply and the manipulation of water,
they would manage fairly and responsibly, allowing for the needs of all.
Yet, those in control of the world's water economy are not willing to
consider that option. Responsible water use does not come from pricing the poor out of the competitive market, but rather from the principle of fair shares for all.
The final chapter epitomizes the delights of water from bathing a
child to playing in the water of a fire hydrant in New York City in the
middle of the summer. The book ends with a reminder that we are
faced with a crisis of social responsibility and not a technical problem.
Beth A. Bulmer
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT
State of Missouri v. City of Glasgow, No. 97-2279, 1998 WL 459937 (8"h
Cir. Aug. 10, 1998) (holding that the City of Glasgow violated the federal Clean Water Act by discharging sludge from its waste water treatment plant without a municipal water treatment facility operating
permit, and that the district court record was insufficient to support a
finding that an increased permit fee violated the Missouri Constitution).
The City of Glasgow operated a water treatment facility that provided drinking water to Glasgow residents. The city's water came from
the Missouri River. The facility discharged sludge-precipitated solids
that resulted from the treatment process, into the river after treatment. Because it discharged sludge into the river, the facility was a
"point source" as defined by the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). As such,
the CWA required that the facility have a valid operating permit.
Glasgow's permit expired in 1995. Before Glasgow's permit expired,
the State of Missouri amended its permit statute to increase permit
fees from $75 to $1,500. Upon application for a new permit, Glasgow
refused to pay the increased fee. As a result, the state refused to issue
Glasgow a new permit.
The state sued Glasgow in federal district court alleging that Glasgow violated federal law by discharging sludge into the Missouri River
without a permit, and that Glasgow failed to pay permit fees as required by state law. In its counterclaim requesting that the court order
the state to issue a permit, Glasgow answered that it did not have to
pay the increased permit fee because the state statute requiring the fee
violated the Hancock Amendment to the Missouri Constitution. The
district court held, based on a recent Missouri Supreme Court decision, that the permit fee amendment violated the Hancock Amendment. The court also ordered the state to grant Glasgow's permit.
The state appealed, alleging that the Hancock Amendment did not
prevent the state from requiring Glasgow to pay the increased permit
fee.
The 1980 Hancock Amendment states that "the state is prohibited
from reducing the state financed proportion of the costs of any existing activity or service required of ... political subdivisions." Before
passage of the Hancock Amendment, and until the 1990 fee amendment, point source dischargers had to pay a $75 fee every five years.
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As of the 1990 amendment, all Missouri point source dischargers had
to pay a $1,500 annual fee to obtain a permit.
The circuit court found that the state required the permit fee, and
that because the fee is a requirement of Missouri State law, it must
conform to the Missouri Constitution. Thus, the question before the
court was whether the state had decreased its proportion of funding
for administration of its discharge permit program, resulting in a permit fee that violated the state constitution.
The court found that the state never funded all water pollution
regulation costs, but that the filing fees paid by municipalities subsidized some of those costs. Applying a previous Missouri Supreme
Court ruling, the court held that the state could lawfully increase fees
if the state continued to fund the costs of administering state water
pollution laws in the same proportion it did at the time of the Hancock Amendment's passage. Because the trial record did not provide
enough evidence for the court to decide whether the amendment unlawfully decreased the state proportion, the court reversed the district
court's ruling, and remanded for such a determination. The court
also reversed the district court's ruling ordering the state to issue Glasgow a permit, and remanded for issuance of an order declaring Glasgow in violation of federal law and enjoining the city from discharging
sludge into the river.
Debbie Eiland

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
OREGON
Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Or. 1997) (holding groundwater not subject to a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit under the Clean Water Act).
Plaintiff, Umatilla Waterquality Protective Association ("UWQPA"),
is a nonprofit corporation composed of approximately twelve individuals whose goal is to protect the quality of water in several Oregon
counties. Members of UWQPA owned property or lived near the
Smith Frozen Foods operation on Pine Creek in Weston, Oregon.
Plaintiff alleged that the wastewater pipelines sometimes discharged
pollutants into the creek, which interfered with aesthetic enjoyment
and water recreation in the area. Plaintiff also alleged that chemicals
from Smith's old brine lagoon were leaching into the groundwater and
then traveling to the creek, constituting an unpermitted continuous
discharge of pollutants into the creek.
Both parties stipulated to three issues. First, whether the federal
Clean Water Act ("CWA") applied to pollutants discharged into
groundwater that is hydrologically connected to navigable waters.
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Second, whether under the CWA, the unlined brine pond constituted
a point source. Finally, whether this type of pollutant discharge was
within the scope of federal Clean Water Act citizen suitjurisdiction.
The court concluded that all groundwater, including groundwater
hydrologically connected to surface water, was not subject to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permitting
program. The legislative history indicated that Congress did not intend to regulate groundwater when it enacted the CWA. The CWA
states explicitly when it applies to groundwater, and clearly differentiates "navigable waters" from "ground waters." Furthermore, the EPA
has not formally interpreted the CWA to include groundwater.
In addition, the court recognized a practical consequence to subjecting groundwater to the NPDES permit system. Oregon law requires a specific permit for discharges into groundwater that is different than an NDPES permit. Thus, the court was concerned that
people would be subject to increased liability if they misjudged the
type of permit they needed.
Although the other two issues were rendered moot after determination of the preliminary issue, the court offered resolution of these
issues so that the ninth circuit would have a full opinion to review. In
resolving the second issue, the court deemed the brine pond a point
source because it was easily identifiable as a single source discharging
pollutants.
Finally, the court determined that jurisdiction was proper in this
case. The CWA only allows citizen suit jurisdiction for current violations, not those that are in the past and from which there is no risk of
further violation. In the instant case, pollutants were no longer added
to the brine pond, yet they continued to escape from it. Thus, the
court held that because pollutants continued to reach navigable waters
there was an ongoing violation of the CWA, and therefore, jurisdiction
was proper.
Shana Smilovits

ALASKA
State of Alaska v. Marie Arnariak v. Adam Arnariak, 941 P.2d 154
(Alaska 1997) (determining that the Marine Mammals Protection Act
did not preempt state law regulating the taking of marine mammals
within the Walrus Islands State Game Sanctuary).
The Alaska Supreme Court found the federal Marine Mammals
Protection Act ("MMPA") did not preempt state regulations controlling the taking of marine mammals within a state game sanctuary. The
court found that such preemption would violate the Fifth Amendment's takings clause.
The purpose of the MMPA is to protect marine mammals to the
greatest possible extent. It seeks to prohibit the harassment, catching,
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and hunting of marine mammals and to protect their populations
from endangerment by humans. It protects essential habitats, rookeries, and similar mating grounds from the adverse effects of human
contact and activities.
Under Alaskan regulation, no one may enter the Round Island
sanctuary (part of the Walrus Islands State Game Sanctuary) without a
permit, and permitted visitors are prohibited from discharging firearms within the park. Visitation to Round Island is very limited-only
thirty persons per day are allowed during the peak season. Mrs. Arnariak was charged in this case with violating the first regulation, by
failing to obtain a permit to enter the park. The state charged Mr. Arnariak with violating the second regulation for discharging a firearm
while hunting walrus on the island.
The Arnariaks moved for dismissal, arguing that the regulations
they had allegedly violated were preempted by the MMPA. Specifically, the Act prohibits the taking of marine mammals, and prohibits
the enforcement of any state law regarding such takings. Crucial to
the Arnariaks' defense was an exemption in the Act for the harvesting
of mammals by Alaskan Natives for certain defined purposes. Among
the enumerated purposes are takings for subsistence, and takings for
creating and selling authentic native handicrafts and clothing. The
Arnariaks argued that because they are Native Alaskans, this exemption applied and that federal law preempted the state regulations.
After finding the MMPA preempted the state regulations and that
the respondents were protected under the Act's exemptions for Native
Alaskans, the trial court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss.
The appellate court affirmed the holding. The Alaska Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for a new trial on their findings.
The Alaska Supreme Court decided that the State of Alaska, the
Petitioner, had the right to exclude entry to its property and to prohibit the discharge of firearms therein. It found that prohibiting the
state's freedom to control the behavior of visitors to the Walrus Islands
State Game Sanctuary would constitute a taking, requiring compensation from the federal government. Interpreting the Fifth Amendment,
the court found it protects the states from federal government takings
as it does United States citizens. Typically, federal statutes are construed in a manner to avoid the risk of unconstitutionality if reasonable. If the MMPA was construed to preempt state law it would have
created an uncompensated taking of state property-the walruses.
Since the MMPA could reasonably be construed not to preempt state
law, avoiding the taking, the court interpreted it accordingly.
Noting the devastating effects to walrus habitat and population in
the absence of such state regulations, the Alaska Supreme Court found
it unlikely that Congress intended the Act to interfere with a state's efforts to maintain a walrus sanctuary. The court, after finding the state
regulations garnered similar results to those intended by the MMPA,
decided preemption was improvident. Supporting this conclusion is
the presumption of statutory construction against finding federal pre-
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emption in areas traditionally regulated by the states. Regulation of a
state's lands typically falls within the traditional functions of the state.
As state regulation is not preempted by the MMPA, the state is capable of restricting visitation and prohibiting hunting by Native Alaskans. Withoutjust compensation, the court concluded that a proscription of these state freedoms would be unconstitutional, violating the
Fifth Amendment, and thus construed the MMPA not to preempt state
law.
Chip Cuter

Kelso v. Rybachek, 912 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1996) (holding that the State
is not required to support its decision not to downgrade water uses
and was reasonable in its adoption of regulations governing reclassification of water).
On January 31, 1983, the Livengood/Tolovana Mining District
("Miners") applied to the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (the "Department") to reclassify streams for industrial uses,
thus lowering the classification standards for the streams. The Department denied the petition. The Environmental Protection Agency,
however, had revised its regulations requiring a State to perform a use
attainability analysis ("UAA") before reclassifying waters to eliminate
assigned uses.
The Miners appealed the denial of reclassification to the superior
court. The court held that pursuant to the new federal guidelines,
"prior to any reclassification the State must conduct a [UAA] and must
have appropriate regulations for the conducting of such analysis." The
court ordered the Department to promulgate appropriate regulations
and conduct a UAA on the waters that the Miners had petitioned.
The Department complied with the court order and enacted regulations that required at least one hearing and compliance with federal
reclassification regulations before any reclassification of state waters.
The Department then proceeded to conduct a UAA on the waters the
Miners had petitioned for reclassification. The Department conducted field surveys, water quality analyses, habitat observation, and
biological surveys. On three streams, the Department found that attainability was inconclusive because of lack of information. Where
they found suitable fish habitat but did not actually observe fish during
the study, fish use was deemed attainable. The Department then determined that the streams had, "'existing' and 'attainable' uses requiring more stringent controls than the industrial classification." Furthermore, the Department conducted public hearings on the
reclassification of the water. Based upon the UAA and the hearings,
the Department made a final decision on the reclassification of the waters and submitted it to the Department of Law. The Department of
Law made further revisions and subsequently submitted it to the Lieutenant Governor's office. On January 9, 1990, the final decision was
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transmitted.
Stanley and Rosalie Rybachek had resided on the patented mining
property for more than 30 years. They appealed the Department's
1990 decision partially denying the petition for reclassification and
challenged the validity of the regulations promulgated by the Department.
The superior court held that the department adopted regulations
in compliance with the previous order and in compliance with proper
procedure. The superior court questioned, however, the procedures
for maintaining designated uses in the UAA where the study results
were inconclusive, and remanded to the Department for further clarification and data. The superior court was concerned with the fact that
the Department could fail to collect certain data and then deny reclassification based upon that lack of data. The court said this was a "restrictive inference."
The State appealed the order of remand and the Rybacheks crossappealed claiming error in the findings by the superior court: "(1) that
the Department had promulgated a proper reclassification regulation;
and (2) that certain waters were appropriately not reclassified."
The Alaska Supreme Court applied the "reasonable and not arbitrary" standard to agency rule making. The supreme court stated that,
"[t]he Department has discretion to determine the extent and scope
of any UAA that it decides to perform, as long as it complies with 40
C.F.R. [Section] 131 and other applicable state and federal statutes
and regulations." The supreme court held that neither state nor federal regulations required the State to provide information in support
of a decision to maintain a designated use and therefore, "[t]he Department is not obligated by state or federal law to support its decision
not to downgrade water uses so long as the decision is reasonable and
not arbitrary."
The supreme court then addressed the validity of the regulations
promulgated by the Department. The court stated that the State had
wide discretion in enacting water quality regulations and the Department was vested with the power to establish water quality standards
and various classes of water. The court held that, "[g]iven the EPA
oversight, the Department reasonably adopted as Alaska's standard the
EPA regulation governing reclassification ... [t]hus we conclude that
the regulation is reasonable and not arbitrary."
The court reversed the trial court's order for remand to the Department and affirmed the remaining issues.
Christine Wise-Ludban

CALIFORNIA
Galante Vineyards v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management District,
60 Cal. App. 4th 1109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that adequacy ob-
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jections to an environmental impact report raised prior to certification
preserved plaintiffs right to bring action, that a final environmental
impact report must contain everything required to be considered, and
that an inadequate report cannot be cured by an addendum).
The Monterey Peninsula Water Management District ("District"),
when looking at a variety of long term water supply alternatives for the
Monterey Peninsula area, prepared an environmental impact report
("EIR") for a 29,000 acre-foot dam and reservoir on the Carmel
River-the New Los Padres Dam and Reservoir. The EIR certification
process must comply with the California Environmental Quality Act
("CEQA") and the federal Clean Water Act. CEQA requires notice
and public review of the EIR, with public hearings and comment periods.
Plaintiffs submitted comments to the District which criticized the
EIR's description of the Cachagua Valley as sparsely populated, and
raised concerns about air pollution from dust and its negative economic impact on the wine industry. Plaintiffs appeared at a public
hearing on the EIR and wrote to the District detailing concerns about
the impact to local agriculture. The court concluded that any party
may bring an action pursuant to CEQA section 21167 if it has raised an
objection to the adequacy of an EIR prior to certification. The court
found plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies by raising
concerns about the inadequacy of the final EIR prior to certification.
The District argued that the phrase "prior to the close of the public hearing on the project before the issuance of the notice of determination," as used in CEQA section 21177, must be interpreted as referring to a public hearing during the public comment period of the
draft EIR. Such construction would have disallowed plaintiffs' comments since they were made after that period. The court rejected the
District's construction of the statute and relied on the plain meaning
of the statute. The court interpreted CEQA section 21177 as stating
that any alleged grounds for noncompliance with CEQA provisions
may be raised by any person prior to the close of the public hearing on
the project before the issuance of the notice of determination.
CEQA requires that an EIR identify and focus on the significant
environmental effects of the proposed project. It should include relevant specifics of the area, the resources involved, physical changes, alterations to ecological systems, and changes induced in the human use
of the land, including commercial and residential development.
Through written and oral comments by the plaintiffs, the District
was made aware of the importance of viticulture in the Cachagua Valley. However, in the final EIR, the District's only reference to this area
is in the Climate and Air Quality chapter, where it described the area
as sparsely populated, with no industry other than several vineyards in
the Cachagua Valley.
Plaintiffs argued that the EIR failed to take into account the highly
susceptible nature of the local agriculture. Plaintiffs said that while
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data readily existed on the local microclimate, the EIR used an outdated study from 1967. The plaintiffs claimed the EIR also failed to
address three adverse impacts to agriculture directly related to the reservoir construction: the potential increase of humidity, frost generation, and increased potential habitat for the leafhopper.
The court concluded that an addendum to an inadequate EIR
does not cure the EIR. It found a proper analysis of the project's impacts was impossible because the EIR inadequately described the environmental setting for the project. The court found that everything to
be considered must be in the final EIR and, therefore, material presented after certification may not be considered. The court stated that
under CEQA section 21166, an addendum to a certified EIR is proper
only where there are changed circumstances, or where new information, which was not known and could not have been known, arises.
Through its comments and attendance public hearings, the plaintiffs
made the District aware of the viticulture in the area.
Elaine Soltis
County of San Joaquin v. State Water Resources Control Board, 63
Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming the trial court's
holding that the United States Bureau of Reclamation is an indispensable party, and upholding dismissal of the action because the Bureau
refused to waive its sovereign immunity).
The United States Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") operates the
Central Valley Project under water rights permits from the California
State Water Resources Control Board. The Central Valley Project includes the New Melones Dam. On June 8, 1995, the State Water Resources Control Board adopted Water Rights Order No. 95-6 ("WR 956") which approved changes in the water rights permits for both the
State Water Project and the Central Valley Project. One month later,
the County of San Joaquin (Plaintiffs/Appellants), filed a writ of mandate contending that use of water from the New Melones Dam for fish
and wildlife restoration and water quality improvement violated California water laws and denied the water users their priority rights. The
plaintiffs also asserted that WR 95-6 violated the California Environmental Quality Act and the California Water Code.
Appellants named as respondents the State Water Resources Control Board and the five individual members. Appellants named as real
parties in interest the United States through the Bureau, the State of
California through the Resources Agency, and the Department of Water Resources. The State Water Resources Control Board moved for
judgment on the pleadings arguing that the Bureau was an indispensable party that had not been joined and accordingly, dismissal of the
action was required. The trial court found that the Bureau was an indispensable party and accordingly, dismissed the action without prejudice. The sole issue presented to the California Court of Appeals was
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whether the trial court erred in finding that the Bureau was in fact an
indispensable party.
The appellate court found that the trial court had appropriately
reviewed the propriety of the United States' participation in this action
pursuant to the factors and considerations set forth in subdivision (b),
section 389 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Subdivision (b)
states that if there is a party who cannot be joined in the action, and in
whose absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those who
are already parties to the action, the court shall determine whether, in
equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the
parties who have been joined and are in front of the court, or whether
the action should be dismissed without prejudice-the absent party
having been thus determined indispensable. The appellate court
characterized plaintiffs/appellants attempt to obtain a de novo review
of the trial court's decision as an attempt to completely retry their case.
The law is settled that it is within the trial court's discretion, as governed by the factors in subdivision (b) of Cal. C.C.P. section 389,
whether to proceed in an action in the absence of a particular party. It
would be illogical to grant a trial court this discretionary power to balance equities and then reject the court's evaluation and balance the
equities anew. The rule provides for evaluations of situations on a fact
specific basis. The appellate court reasoned that the trial judge is in a
better position than an appellate panel to weigh the pragmatic considerations of a particular situation. Excluding the rare instances in
which an abuse of discretion occurs, it would be counter-productive to
second guess the trial court's management of a case.
Appellants argued that the factors considered by the trial court
could have been weighed in a manner that would have favored their
position. The appellate court held that this mere possibility did not
amount to an abuse of discretion by the trial court. The language of
the rule specifically granted the trial judge substantial discretion in
considering which factors to weigh and how heavily to emphasize certain considerations. Accordingly, it was the trial court's decision to determine whether the action should go forward in the absence of a
party needed for a complete adjudication of the dispute.
Reevaluating the trial court's consideration of the applicable factors
would contravene the plain language of the rule.
Finding that the trial court had adequately considered the factors
in subdivision (b), and that there was no abuse of discretion, the appellate court held that the action was properly dismissed.
Maureen D. Mclnerney
COLORADO
Chatfield East Well Co., Ltd. v. Chatfield East Property Owners Ass'n,
956 P.2d 1260 (Colo. 1998) (affirming the water court's order dismissing well company's application for decree allowing it to extract and use
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not nontributary water from Arapahoe aquifer, one of the Denver Basin aquifers, underlying subdivision where well company held only
possible inchoate right in nontributary groundwater).
This case arose from a dispute between a water company ("Chatfield Well") and residents of a subdivision located in northern Douglas
County near the Chatfield Reservoir. The Development Company for
the subdivision previously sold lots to various individual buyers between 1978 and 1981, and conveyed the common areas to the Chatfield East Property Owners Association ("POA"), which consisted solely
of the homeowners. The deeds to the homeowners included the following language: "Reserving unto the Grantor all underground nontributary water and Grantees hereby consent to the use of said water
upon any land or area, regardless of where located."
Denver Basin aquifer water is regulated as nontributary or not
nontributary, depending on the aquifer characteristics and the applicable legal standards as provided in provisions of the Groundwater
Management Act. If the withdrawal of Denver Basin aquifer water will
not, within one hundred years, deplete the flow of a natural stream at
an annual rate greater than one-tenth of one percent of the annual
rate of withdrawal, then the water is nontributary under C.R.S. section
37-90-103(10.5). Conversely, under C.R.S. section 37-90-103(10.7),
Denver Basin aquifer water is not nontributary if its withdrawal will
cause a depletion in excess of that amount. The Development Company, in 1992, quitclaimed any interest it believed it held in the
ground water to Chatfield Well. The main issues before the court were
whether the Development Company had an ownership interest in water beneath the subdivision, and whether homeowner deeds in the
subdivision reserved any rights to the Development Company in not
nontributary water so that the Development Company could assign any
such rights to Chatfield Well.
Chatfield Well initially filed an application for a decree, which
would allow for extracting and using water from the Denver Basin aquifer underlying the subdivision. The District Court, Water Division
No. 1, dismissed the application. Subsequently, Chatfield Well appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.
The court held that Denver Basin aquifer water is a public resource, the ownership of which cannot be reserved in a deed conveying the surface estate to another person. Thus, no vested right. Furthermore, in the absence of a vested right to use the water, a title issue
does not exist. Additionally, this case involved a water matter, the adjudication of the right to use water, which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the water court, an issue Chatfield Well had presented for
review. Finally, the Development Company reserved at most the inchoate right to extract and use "underground nontributary water" under the subdivision. The court reiterated that a right to use nontributary groundwater outside of a designated basin is governed by statute
and that landowners only have an inchoate right to extract and use the
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nontributary water pursuant to the Groundwater Management Act.
Landowners have no absolute right to ownership of water underneath
their land.
According to the court, the state engineer and the water court
acted within their authority in determining that the aquifer water under the subdivision was not nontributary. Additionally, the deeds did
not "withhold from the homeowners their inchoate right to use the
not nontributary water under their lots." Further, whether nontributary or not nontributary, an applicant for recognition of a right to use
groundwater in the Denver Basin aquifers cannot receive a permit or
decree unless he or she is the overlying landowner or has the landowner's consent. The Development Company and Chatfield Well
owned no land in the subdivision when Chatfield Well filed its application for a decree with the water court, nor had either completed a well
into the Arapahoe aquifer, nor had they obtained the consent of the
homeowners to the application. Chatfield Well relied solely on the effect of its quitclaim deed from Development Company when asserting
its entitlement to the groundwater.
Another issue brought on appeal by Chatfield Well dealt with the
adoption of Senate Bill 96-74 prior to the trial of this case. The Bill
amended the definition of nontributary ground water by stating that
"not nontributary groundwater... in the Denver Basin shall not become nontributary groundwater as a result of the aquifer's hydrostatic
pressure level dropping below the alluvium of an adjacent stream due
to Denver Basin well pumping activity." The provisions addressed a
previous issue that arose in prior augmentation cases involving not
nontributary Denver Basin water in the context of considering an alleged break in the aquifer's connection with the natural stream system.
Here, the court concluded that the intent of the legislature was that
Senate Bill 96-74 should apply to pending decree and permit applications. Chatfield Well argued that if the Bill was applied retroactively, it
would violate the Colorado Constitution. The prohibition of retroactivity set forth in the Colorado Constitution applied solely to statutes
that impair or take away a vested right. Chatfield Well did not have
any vested rights at the time this statute was enacted; thus the water
court applied Senate Bill 96-74 to this case as the legislature had intended. The court determined that this is not unconstitutional as applied.
The deeds at question here did not withhold from the homeowners their inchoate right to use the not nontributary water under their
lots. Subsequently, since the homeowners did not consent to Chatfield
Well's application, the water court correctly dismissed the application.
Beth A. Bulmer

City of Grand Junction v. City and County of Denver, 960 P.2d 675
(Colo. 1998) (holding Denver's application for a refill right with re-
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spect to Dillon Reservoir did not implicate the federal court's exclusive
jurisdiction to implement the Blue River Decree and the Blue River
Decree did not preclude reservoir refill rights).
This case came to the Colorado Supreme Court on appeal of the
District Court, Water Division 5 holding that the Blue River Decree did
not limit Dillon Reservoir to one fill per year. Grand Junction contended that, pursuant to the Blue River Decree, the federal court retained exclusive jurisdiction over Denver's application for a refill right.
Grand Junction also argued Denver's claimed refill right conflicted
with the terms of the Blue River Decree because the Blue River Decree
restricts Dillon Reservoir to only one fill each year.
The Blue River Decree is the result of a dispute dating to 1937. In
that year, Congress authorized a reclamation project known as the
Colorado-Big Thompson Project ("CBT"). One purpose of the CBT
was to store replacement water at Green Mountain Reservoir for use by
western slope interests to compensate for other Colorado River water
diverted to the eastern slope as part of the CBT. On October 12, 1955,
the federal court entered a final decree and judgment (the "Blue River
Decree") which recognized the United States' right to fill and utilize
Green Mountain Reservoir and described Denver's rights to the use of
Blue River water and its tributaries. As part of the Blue River Decree,
the federal court expressly retained continuing jurisdiction for the
purposes of effectuating the objectives of the Decree. It is within this
context that Grand Junction asserted that the water court lacked subject matterjurisdiction over Denver's application for a Dillon Reservoir
refill right.
The Colorado Supreme Court responded by stating that subject
matterjurisdiction relates to a court's authority to deal with the class of
cases in which it renders judgment. An application for the determination of a water right or a conditional water right involves a "water matter" over which a water court has special statutory jurisdiction. Subject
matter jurisdiction vests in the water court upon the timely filing of the
application and publication of the resume notice. Because Grand
Junction did not contend that Denver failed to comply with any statutory procedures relating to application for adjudication of a water
right, the water court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over Denver's application, absent special circumstances divesting the court of
jurisdiction.
Grand Junction asserted the water court lacked jurisdiction because the long-standing principles of water law prohibit a court from
interpreting or enforcing decrees entered by another court. The
Colorado Supreme Court rejected this argument as a rule per se. In so
doing, the court held that the water court possessed the authority to
review the Blue River Decree in order to ascertain whether Denver's
application would interfere with the terms or objects of the decree.
The court also held that a court of coordinate jurisdiction does not
possess the authority to enter a decree that modifies or interferes with
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the objectives or terms of another court's decree. As the water court
explained, the federal court in the Blue River Decree addressed only
those relative priorities at issue at the time of adjudication.
Grand Junction also contended that the water court's decree directly conflicted with the Blue River Decree. Grand Junction argued
the Blue River Decree expressly prohibits the parties to the decree
from asserting or claiming, as against each other, any different priorities than those specified in the final Blue River Decree. The Colorado
Supreme Court rejected this argument as well. The court stated that
Denver's application for a refill right with a 1987 priority date does not
concern or interfere with any provision of the Blue River Decree, including rights junior to Denver's original fill right. The refill right is
junior to all the appropriations adjudicated in 1955, and, according to
the terms of the water court's judgment, cannot be exercised to the
detriment of any priority awarded in the Blue River Decree. Consequently, Denver's application for a refill right did not directly conflict
with the Blue River Decree nor did it implicate the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction to implement the Blue River Decree.
Matt Diliman

O'Neill v. Simpson, 958 P.2d 1121 (Colo. 1998) (holding that the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred claim that water court lacked jurisdiction).
In March 1912, six water rights in the Cache Creek, Arlington, and
Clear Creek Ditches were decreed to Twin Lakes Placers, Limited. In
June 1912, an injunction was entered against Twin Lakes because its
hydraulic mining process polluted the Arkansas river. As a result,
Twin Lakes abandoned the six water rights.
This appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court represented Dennis
O'Neill's fourth attempt to revive these abandoned water rights. In the
subject appeal, O'Neill argued that the water court lacked jurisdiction
in the first trial ("O'Neill I") to determine whether the water rights had
been abandoned. In O'Neill I, the water court rejected O'Neill's initial
attempt to revive the six water rights and held that these rights had
been abandoned.
In the present case, O'Neill contended that the water court lacked
jurisdiction in O'Neill I due to a defective service of process and because the water court's judgment represented a collateral attack on a
series of possessory and use rights determined in various prior quiet
title decrees. The water court dismissed O'Neill's subsequent complaint and awarded attorney's fees to the Defendant State Engineer.
After sternly warning O'Neill that further non-meritorious attempts to
relitigate these matters would result in severe sanctions, the court affirmed the water court's determination.
The court held that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the trial court's jurisdiction unless the
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trial court manifestly abused its authority. The court reasoned that
O'Neill had a full and fair opportunity to oppose the water court's jurisdiction in O'Neill I, and on appeal of that case, but failed to do so.
The court further ruled that the subject claim was substantially vexatious, and therefore, the State Engineer was entitled to attorney's fees
for defending the appeal.
David A. Laird

CONNECTICUT
Hartt v. Schwartz, No. CV 920331912S, 1997 WL 625467, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 1997) (holding that a conveyance of property,
which housed a dry cleaning operation from 1967 to 1978, was subject
to Connecticut's Hazardous Waste Transfer Act).
In 1986, the Hartts purchased property from Schwartz. The property housed a dry cleaning operation from 1967 to 1978. The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") then notified the Hartts that contamination from the old dry cleaning
operation had migrated off-site. The Hartts were ordered to clean up
the waste.
The Hartts sued Schwartz. They claimed Schwartz was responsible
for disclosing the condition of the property, according to the Connecticut Hazardous Waste Transfer Act. Schwartz moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the property transfer was only subject to the
1985 version and not the 1987 amendment to the Act. The summary
judgment motion was examined and ruled on by the superior court.
The court held that "the 1987 amendment should be applied retroactively and that summary judgment should therefore not be
granted." Additionally, it was noted that the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act ("CEPA") "appears to contemplate the possibility of a suit by a private citizen against an entity other than the state for
the consequences of past pollution." Therefore, the Hartts could
bring suit against Schwartz for past pollution.
The court perused the language of the amendment, as well as legislative intent and history in reaching its decision. It observed that the
amendment clearly directed transferors of property to include all operations since 1967 which may have generated waste, and that dry
cleaning operations were plainly included in the amendment. Likewise, the legislative intent, as asserted in the state's code, indicated that
there was a "public interest to provide all persons with an adequate
remedy to protect the air, water and other natural resources from unreasonable pollution.... ." The court pointed out that the Director of
the DEP Hazardous Waste Unit testified at legislative hearings that the
amendment was meant to clarify a loophole, ensuring that dry cleaning operations were included within the Act's scope. The testimony
also indicated that the inclusion of the May 1967 date was designed to
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clarify existing law, not to change a substantive change law.
Based on these investigations, the court found that public policy
required that the amendment operate retroactively. Thus, Schwartz'
conveyance was subject to the Transfer Act and summary judgment
was denied.
In addition, the court noted that the language of CEPA only precluded an action against the state for pollution that occurred prior to a
conveyance of property. Thus, it followed that an action against an individual or other entity based on prior contamination was not prohibited.
StephaniePickens

GEORGIA
Givens v. Ichauway, Inc., 493 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. 1997) (holding that the
appellant failed to present admissible evidence demonstrating navigability and, therefore, prosecution for trespassing was appropriate).
Ichauway, Inc. sued to enjoin Givens from floating down Ichauwaynochaway Creek through its property. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Ichauway. On appeal, Givens asserted
he had presented sufficient evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact as to the stream's navigability. The Supreme Court of Georgia
held that Givens failed to establish the creek's navigability and that
Ichauway, therefore, had the fight to exclude the public-a right creating legally tenable grounds to charge Givens with criminal trespass.
In Georgia, the statutory definition of navigable creek is one that is
"capable of transporting boats loaded with freight in the regular
course of trade ...." The mere rafting of timber or the transporting

of wood in small boats shall not make a stream navigable." Although
Givens attempted to demonstrate the creek's navigability in a number
of different ways (among others, Givens built a raft of styrofoam and
wood, loaded it with a goat, a bale of cotton, and two passengers, and
floated it through Ichauway's leasehold), the court rejected his arguments stating that he failed to present evidence showing the creek's
navigability under the state's statutory definition.
Alternatively, Givens argued that an 1894 Georgia case, Young v.
Harrison,defined three different types of rivers in the state: (1) those
which are wholly private property; (2) those which are "private property subject to the servitude of the public interest, by a passage upon
them"; and (3) those subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. Givens
contended that the Young court's language supported a common law
right of passage as an alternative to the state's statutory definition. The
court stated that the legislature had codified the Young decision in the
statutory definition of a navigable creek and that a court could not interpret the language of Young to extend a right of passage to streams
not found to be navigable under the statute.
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The dissent attacked the majority on grounds ranging from procedure to substantive law. The dissent stated that summary judgment
was usually inapplicable in equity matters. The dissent also stated that
the legislative history of Georgia's statutory definition of navigability
did not support the court's narrow construction of the term "navigability." Furthermore, the dissent stressed that statutes should be interpreted as codification of the common law unless otherwise explicitly
contrary, as the statute was in this case, and that navigability is a federal
question whereby the court was compelled to consider navigability under both state and federal law.
Amy W Beatie

ILLINOIS
Independent Trust Corp. v. Chicago Dep't of Water, 693 N.E.2d 459
(M11. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that a hydrant lead is not "firefighting
equipment or facilities" within the meaning of the Tort Immunity
Act).
The basement of 205 West Randolph Street in Chicago flooded on
February 20, 1994. The water department discovered the basement
and subbasement filled with over ten feet of water. Water department
employees removed the water and investigated the cause of the leak.
They observed multiple hairline cracks in the hydrant lead, a six-inchdiameter pipe connecting an adjacent fire hydrant to an underground
water main. This pipe caused the flooding to occur.
Plaintiffs, Independent Trust Corp. and First Management Realty
Corp. owned the building. Pago Pago II, Inc. and Corporation Supply
Company, Inc. each operated a business in the building. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company was a subrogee of Corporation Supply. All three plaintiffs filed separate suits against the city and the
court consolidated their cases. Each alleged the city negligently maintained, inspected, or repaired the pipe. The circuit court granted the
city's motion to dismiss because the hydrant lead was "firefighting
equipment or facilities" within the meaning of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the "Act").
Plaintiffs then appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois.
The appellate court held that the hydrant lead was not "firefighting equipment or facilities" within the meaning of section 5-103(a) of
the Act and, therefore, the lower court erred in granting the Defendant's motion to dismiss. The court declared the city not immune
from liability in this case.
The court first analyzed the Act. The Act does not grant general
immunity to municipal water providers. Unless their specific conduct
falls within another section of the Act, the water provider may be held
liable. Defendants argued immunity under section 5-103(a) which
states: "Neither a local public entity, nor a public employee acting in
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the scope of his employment, is liable for an injury resulting from the
condition of fire protection or firefighting equipment or facilities."
The record showed, however, that no problem ever existed with the
hydrant itself, but only with the pipe.
The court then looked to the legislative intent of the Act. In analyzing the plain language of the statute, the court found immunization
of the city for injuries resulting from the condition of the "firefighting
equipment or facilities." The court stated it must give these words
their ordinary and popularly understood meaning because the statute
did not provide a definition. "Facility" referred to a structure and
clearly did not apply in this instance. The court stated that the hydrant itself could be considered "equipment" but, the pipe, as part of
the underground water system, could not. If immunity went further
than this the court would be going against the clear congressional intent of the Tort Immunity Act.
Melinda Barton

Gernand v. Ilinois Commerce Comm'n and Consumers M. Water Co.,
286 M11. App. 3d 934 (LI. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that the Illinois Public Utilities Act authorized the Consumers Illinois Water Company to
obtain a temporary easement over landowners' land for testing purposes).
In response to nitrate problems discovered by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency required Consumers Illinois Water Company ("CIWC") to
execute a letter of commitment saying it would lower the nitrate levels
in the water it supplied to its customers to comply with federal primary
drinking water standards. In order to comply the CIWC chose a
groundwater blending option. CIWC filed a petition with the Illinois
Commerce Commission (the "Commission") requesting a certificate of
convenience and necessity under section 8-406 of the Illinois Public
Utilities Act (the "Act") and orders under sections 8-503 and 8-509
which would authorize CIWC to obtain, by eminent domain, temporary easements for test-boring surveys, constructing test wells, extracting groundwater, and measuring the effect of groundwater removal on
the water supply in a rural area of Vermilion County, Illinois.
The affected landowners were granted leave to intervene. The
Commission entered an order allowing the petition, and denied landowners' application for a re-hearing. Landowners filed a timely petition forjudicial review.
The landowners argued that they did not cite statutory authority
before the Commission for a utility to drill for water because the trial
court did not rely upon provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code. The
necessary provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code permit a water
company such as CIWC to relocate its source of supply to a point less
than 20 miles beyond the corporate limits of the municipality served,
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and authorizes the taking or damage to private property. The court
concluded that regardless of whether the trial court relied upon the
Illinois Municipal Code, it was applicable to this administrative review.
The court would only overturn the Commission's decision if proven it
was not supported by substantial evidence.
The landowners also argued that sections 8-406, 8-503, and 8-509
of the Act seem to refer only to takings of property for permanent facilities, and not to temporary easements for testing purposes. The
court agreed that there was no express authority under the Act for the
Commission to give a utility authority to condemn for temporary
easements in order to perform tests. However, in interpreting the legislation, it gave deference to the Commission.
The court also relied on Wilcox v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (also
concerning the use of eminent domain) where the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the Commission's order issued under the "Gas Act."
The supreme court permitted condemnation for underground gas
storage even though the project was experimental.
Therefore, considering the deference given to the Commission,
the construction the supreme court gave to the Gas Act, and the common sense of permitting condemnation to test the quality of a water
source before making permanent facilities, the court held that the
temporary testing wells, and the installation of the piezometers and
other testing devices were within the meaning of sections 8-503 and 8509 of the Act. The Commission properly denied landowners' motion
to dismiss CIWC's petition for failure to set forth grounds for relief.
Melody Divine

Ryan v. Stonehedge, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 497 (IMI. App. Ct. 1997) (holding
that a court is not required to find that a site is contaminated before it
can conclude that the site contaminated groundwater in violation of
the Environmental Protection Act).
The People of the State of Illinois filed a three-count complaint
against the Defendant, Stonehedge, Inc., alleging that deicing salt
stored on Stonehedge's property leaked into the area's groundwater
supply, contaminating it. The trial court granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all three counts. The Plaintiff appealed.
In fall 1988, Stonehedge began storing deicing salt on its property
and continued to store salt until approximately Fall 1992. Stonehedge
stored the deicing salt on the ground, without a concrete pad or cover.
In 1992, tests by the McHenry County Department of Health revealed
high chloride levels in groundwater wells adjacent to the site where
Stonehedge, Inc. stored the deicing salt.
Count I of the Plaintiffs complaint alleged that Stonehedge's discharge of salt into the groundwater violated sections 12(a) and 12(d)
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of the Environmental Protection Act ("Act"). The Plaintiff alleged that
Stonehedge only contaminated private wells. Although the Act does
apply to groundwater, it only applies to the State's groundwater.
Therefore, because the Plaintiffs complaint did not allege that Stonehedge polluted the State's groundwater, the court held that section 12
of the Act did not apply in this case.
Stonehedge argued that because the Plaintiff did not bring forth
evidence that the site was contaminated, the court could not conclude
that Stonehedge had contaminated the groundwater. However, the
trial court did not grant summary judgment on this basis. The Plaintiffs complaint did not allege that the Stonehedge storage site was
contaminated. The complaint alleged that the deicing salt leaked into
the groundwater, contaminating it. The court held that the Plaintiff
did not need to produce evidence that the Stonehedge site was contaminated to prove the merits of the action.
Lastly, Stonehedge argued that the Plaintiff failed to follow testing
procedures used to demonstrate noncompliance with the groundwater
standard. The court found that the Illinois Water Well Construction
Code ('Well Code") applied in this instance. Under this section, a water well can be monitored for groundwater quality if a construction report has been filed with the Department of Health, or if the well meets
the Illinois Water Well Construction Code. According to the Well
Code, "[wlells constructed prior to the adoption of this Part may not
meet the criteria established. When a well is to undergo modification,
reconstruction, or repair, the work shall include those changes necessary to make the well conform to this Part." The court rejected Plaintiffs argument that its wells were "grandfathered" into compliance
with the Well Code. Instead, the court found that the purpose of the
statute was to acknowledge that the wells in existence at the time the
Well Code was enacted did not have to meet the Well Code requirements unless or until they were modified. The wells at issue were
never modified. Accordingly, the wells did not meet the Well Code's
requirements for testing contaminated groundwater. Therefore, the
Plaintiffs groundwater samples could not be used to determine
whether the groundwater in those wells was contaminated. Consequently, the court held that the trial court's grant of summary judgment was proper concerning count I.
Count II alleged that by allowing the salt to leak through the
ground, Stonehedge altered the physical, chemical, and biological
qualities of the water so as to render it unfit for use as potable water
under the public water supply regulations. The Plaintiffs complaint in
this count also depended on the groundwater samples taken from the
wells that the court deemed not in compliance with the Well Code.
Therefore, the court held that summary judgment was properly
granted regarding count II.
Count III alleged that Stonehedge was in violation of the Act by
depositing at least 50,000 pounds of deicing salt within 200 feet of two
existing potable water supply wells, which qualified it as a new poten-
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tial secondary source. A potential secondary source is a unit, facility,
or site that stores or accumulates at any time more than 50,000 pounds
of any deicing agent. The Plaintiff maintained that Stonehedge failed
to bring forth evidence that it had never stored more than 50,000
pounds on its site. The court agreed that the record lacked any such
evidence. Therefore, the court found that the Plaintiffs allegations as
to count III remained a question of fact that precluded summary
judgment. The court held that the trial court's grant regarding count
III was erroneous and reversed. The court affirmed the trial court's
judgment in part, reversed in part, and the cause was remanded.
Lori Asher

MARYLAND
Gwynn v. Oursler, 712 A.2d 1072 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (holding
that where a right-of-way to navigable water is created, and the party's
intent is ambiguous, the easement alone does not constitute a riparian
right to construct a dock).
This appeal arose from a property dispute originating in 1957.
The Oursler and Gwynn properties bordered one another. In 1957,
both families created a deed for a perpetual right-of-way. The easement, a 20 foot-wide strip, ran along the property line separating the
two lots and led to both the road on one side and the river on the
other. When the deed was executed, a pier was located at the end of
the right-of-way leading into the Patuxent River. Due to natural disasters, the pier was destroyed and rebuilt, but not in the same location as
when the original deed was issued. After a potential injunction, the
Ourslers removed and rebuilt the pier, far removed from the right-ofway.
The Gwynns applied for a permit to construct a new pier at the
end of the right-of-way. The county Board of Commissioners would
not issue a permit until a decision from the circuit court was granted.
The Gwynns filed suit claiming riparian right-of-way across the Oursler
land. The trial court ruled that the creators of the right-of-way lacked
the intent to convey riparian rights (and therefore gave no authority to
construct a pier). In general, a right-of-way leading to the shore of a
navigable river did not create a riparian right. The trial court determined that the right-of-way was intended "only to provide access to the
various owners of the dominant estates to the road," not to the river.
The circuit court reversed. The Ourslers appealed.
Two issues were presented on appeal. First, "does an easement for
ingress and egress only to the shore of a navigable river entitle the
owner of the dominant estate to construct a pier at the end of the
easement?" Second, "[w]as the trial court's evidentiary finding that
the deed did not intend that the right-of-way include a pier clearly er-
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roneous?"

The court first gave a definition of "riparian owner" and what that
owner can do with such a status. As a riparian owner can erect structures "that are connected to the waterfront and build out into the water," the court analyzed whether the Gwynns were riparian owners under Maryland law. In other words, whether an easement to a navigable
river carries with it riparian rights. If not, the owner of the dominant
estate is not entitled to construct a pier to connect to the river.
Precedent from other states provided the court with guidance. In
Minnesota, a court ruled that a grant of an easement alone does not
convey riparian rights to the grantee. However, both Oklahoma and
Maine ruled that where the language of a deed is ambiguous, parol or
extrinsic evidence is admitted to determine whether the parties intended to convey riparian rights.
The court began its opinion by ruling that "the right-of-way to a
body of water, alone, does not entitle the grantee the right to construct a dock or a pier." The court determined that a two-part test was
necessary to evaluate the particular issue in this case.
First, the court must examine the deed alone to determine
whether, on its face, it grants or denies the riparian rights. "If the
deed itself contains an express grant or denial of that intent, the language of the deed controls .... ." If, however, the deed is ambiguous as
to the intent of the grantor, the court must undertake the second part
of the analysis and may consider parol or other extrinsic evidence to
discover the grantor's intent.
The deed in this case was silent as to piers or docks and failed to
mention riparian rights at all. While the deed was explicit about the
ingress and egress right-of-way, it did not discern whether the ingress
or egress was to access the water, the road, or both. The court pointed
to numerous cases that held when a deed grants an access such as this,
the language is deemed ambiguous as to the parties' intent. This question will depend upon the "extent and reasonableness of the use of a
private right-of-way in the exercise of an easement."
The trial court allowed both parties to introduce evidence as to the
intent of the parties who created the deed. Based on this evidence,
the trial court ruled that the right-of-way did not convey a riparian
right so as to construct a pier from the dominant estate. Even though
the intent of the parties was clear, the judge ruled that because there
was nothing in the deed indicating that the pier was to be part of
something else, he would not grant the right.
The Court of Special Appeals for Maryland noted that they would
not overturn a lower court's finding unless it was clearly erroneous.
Based on the evidence submitted, the court determined that the trial
court's decision was proper.
KarinaSerkin
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MICHIGAN
Bolt v. City of Lansing, 561 N.W.2d 423 (Mich. 1997) (holding that
city's charge to landowners for cost of separating storm water from
sewage system and treating storm water runoff was a "user fee" and not
a tax requiring voter approval under local law).
In an effort to comply with requirements of the Clean Water Act,
the Lansing City Council adopted an ordinance that provided for the
creation of a storm water enterprise fund. The project separated the
storm water and sewage water, and provided for treatment of the
storm water to remove pollutants before discharging the water into
navigable waterways. The city financed the system's cost through an
annual storm water service charge. The city imposed this charge on
each parcel of real property in accordance with a formula that calculated each parcel's estimated storm water runoff. The ordinance also
provided a system of administrative appeals by property owners who
disputed the assessment of their parcel. Under this process, the property owner could reduce the storm water fee by showing that his parcel
produced little or no storm water runoff, or that its actual runoff was
less than the city's estimate. The city began billing property owners in
December of 1995.
The Plaintiff ("Bolt") challenged the ordinance on grounds that it
violated the Headlee Amendment to the Michigan State Constitution,
which required voter approval of any increase in local taxes. The sole
issue was whether the court considered the charge to landowners for
the cost of separating the storm water a "tax" which required voter approval, or whether it was considered a "user fee" which did not require
voter approval.
The court found that the Headlee Amendment to the State's constitution failed to define a tax or a fee. However, in examining old
cases and comparing this service to other city services, the court concluded that the storm water charge was a "user fee" and not a tax.
Thus, the ordinance did not violate the Headlee Amendment.
The court reasoned by analogy that if, as found in earlier cases,
sewage disposal charges to landowners constituted "user fees," then the
storm water charges were also "user fees." In addition, the charges did
not lose their character as fees simply because the ordinance separated
them from the original sewer disposal charge.
The dissenting opinion found that the policy of the Headlee
Amendment is to prevent the legislature from increasing its spending
and taxing without the approval of the voters, and this ordinance did
just that. The dissent also contended that the majority misclassified
the storm water charge as a fee although it had more characteristics of
a tax within the meaning of the Headlee Amendment.
Joseph A. Dawson
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MONTANA
Axtell v. M.S. Consulting, 955 P.2d 1362 (Mont. 1998) (holding that
genuine issues of material fact exist regarding abandonment of specific water rights and that summary judgment was improper).
M.S. Consulting owned a 110 acre parcel of land in Madison
County, Montana. The Axtells owned a two acre parcel within the
larger parcel. Eclipse Creek ran through both parcels. Several springs
were located on the large parcel, but outside the perimeter of the
small parcel. Over the years the Axtells and their predecessors in interest used one of the springs for their domestic water needs. M.S.
Consulting attempted to prevent the Axtells from using this spring.
The Axtells filed a complaint and obtained a temporary injunction
enjoining M.S. Consulting from interfering with the spring water supply. The Axtells then moved for summary judgment in the district
court. The court found no disputed issues of material fact and
granted summary judgment in favor of the Axtells.
The district court found that Ms. Florence Baker, the previous
owner of the entire parcel, had obtained water from the spring for use
on what is now the small parcel. The court also found that when Ms.
Baker divided the land she conveyed the large parcel away and reserved the small parcel. In so doing she necessarily reserved with the
small parcel the appurtenant water right, even though not expressly
reserved in the deed. The court determined that this water right
transferred with each new conveyance and ultimately to the Axtells. In
making these determinations, the district court held that summary
judgment was appropriate, entitling the Axtells to use all the waters of
the spring. M.S. Consulting appealed to the Montana Supreme Court
to review the summary judgment ruling. The supreme court reversed
and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings.
In reviewing the lower court's grant of summary judgment, the supreme court first examined early Montana water law doctrine. Prior to
1973, water right adjudication followed the prior appropriations doctrine. Under that system a person could acquire an exclusive right to
use a specific amount of water by applying it to the land for a beneficial use. In 1973, the legislature enacted the Water Use Act which
abolished the prior appropriation system and implemented a new adjudication system. This system required new filings for existing claims,
and provided a statutory method of filing to establish all new claims.
The water right at issue in this case originated prior to the 1973 Water
Use Act, and therefore was determined under prior appropriation law.
Under the prior appropriation system, exclusive rights to use a
specific amount of water can be acquired by applying it to the land for
a beneficial use. Once a water right is acquired, the right is generally
appurtenant to the land where it is used, and passes with the conveyance of the land. A water right is severable from the land by conveying
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the land and expressly reserving the water right, or by conveying the
land and water right separately. The new owner may not enlarge a
transferred water right beyond the original owner's use.
Once a water right is acquired, the holder must continue to use
the water right for a beneficial purpose or risk losing it through abandonment. Abandonment arises when there is nonuse and intent to
abandon. Evidence of a long period of continuous nonuse raises a rebuttable presumption of intent to abandon the water right.
In this instance, the spring water went unused on the small parcel
for a period of eleven years. M.S. Consulting argues that such nonuse
resulted in a loss of the water right. The Axtells argue that their
predecessors in interest did not abandon the water right because the
record shows that a water conveyance system existed during that time.
In reviewing the record, the court held that several issues of material fact existed with respect to the abandonment of the water right.
These disputes were material to the outcome of this case. If the water
right appurtenant to the small parcel was not abandoned, then the Axtells would have acquired the right. If abandoned, the water right was
not available to pass with the conveyance of the small parcel. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings.
Tracy Rogers

NORTH CAROLINA
King v. State of North Carolina, 481 S.E.2d 330 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding that a refusal to grant a 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341 Clean Water Act
certification, which resulted in Plaintiff being unable to subdivide
property as she desired, did not constitute a denial of all economically
viable use of the property and therefore, no taking had occurred).
Plaintiff desired to build a road and construct a 50 lot subdivision
on her property-a peninsula. The originally proposed project called
for placing between 10,000 and 20,000 cubic yards of fill material on
the property. According to Clean Water Act section 404, Plaintiff must
obtain a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers "COE" prior to
placing fill material onto wetlands. In addition, Plaintiff must provide
the COE with a certification that discharge of fill material is consistent
with state water quality standards. The Division of Environmental
Management ("DEM"), the department responsible for reviewing section 401 certification requests, refused to issue a certification, finding
that the proposed wetland fill would degrade surrounding shellfish waters, and that there were less environmentally damaging alternatives
for construction of the road.
Plaintiff appealed the decision, and later filed a claim asserting
that the decision to refuse section 401 certification and the section 404
permit had denied Plaintiff all reasonable use of her property and,
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therefore, constituted a taking.
The court found that because the DEM had determined that less
environmentally damaging alternatives for construction of the road existed, the state had not denied Plaintiff all economically viable use of
her property. The State had no obligation to allow Plaintiff the most
profitable use of her property; it must only allow some economically
viable use of the property.
Under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that to support a takings claim, Plaintiff must show either a
physical invasion or that the State's action has denied her all economically beneficial or productive use of her land. The test in North Carolina for determining whether a taking has occurred, set out in Finch v.
City of Durham, is whether the property has a practical use and a reasonable value. The State contends that because the decision not to
grant the permit only affects one quarter of Plaintiffs entire parcel,
and because other alternatives for road construction and development
of the property are available, the property still has a practical use and
reasonable value. Therefore, an essential element of Plaintiffs takings
claim-deprivation of all practical use and reasonable value, is eliminated. By establishing that alternatives existed to Plaintiff's proposed
plan, the court determined that the State had met its burden of proving that Plaintiff had not been deprived of all practical use and reasonable value of her property.
Heidi A. Anderson

Pine Knoll Ass'n v. Cardon, 484 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that where the configuration of the shoreline is irregular, the
proper allocation of water space between abutting riparian owners is
governed by a "rule of reasonableness," and is a question for the jury).
Pine Knoll Shores Association ("Pine") and Cardon owned adjacent waterfront property along the Davis Landing Canal (the "Canal").
Pine, a homeowner association, owned a tract of land that ran along
the Canal's end. Cardon, a member of the association, owned a lot
situated immediately west of Pine's property with a small protrusion of
its boundary located on the western bank of the Canal. A seawall ran
east-west along Pine's property and north-south along Cardon's land.
Pine had earlier adopted a restrictive covenant prohibiting the placement of obstructions in the extensions of the property lines abutting
the Canal. Cardon maintained a dock along his property and moored
two boats, approximately thirty feet in length, perpendicular to the
dock and parallel to Pine's seawall.
Pine claimed that the boats intruded upon, and interfered with, its
right of access to the Canal, and sued for violation of the restrictive
covenants, trespass and violation of its riparian rights. At trial, Pine
withdrew its complaint for violation of the covenants, and the court
granted summary judgment for the Defendant on the two remaining
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issues. The appellate court quickly dispensed with the trespass claim,
noting that as a member of the association, Cardon had authorization
to access the property in question.
The remaining issue was the allocation of the riparian rights to the
canal. The court defined riparian rights as vested property rights that
arise out of ownership of land bounded or traversed by navigable water. The court explained that a riparian owner has a qualified property right in the water frontage belonging, by nature, to his land. The
chief advantage growing out of the appurtenant estate in the submerged land was the right of access over an extension of waterfronts to
navigable water, and the right to construct wharfs, piers or landings.
The court first examined the validity of each party's property
rights. Both parties produced valid deeds which conveyed the respective properties with all riparian rights attached. Furthermore, both
deeds originated from a common source of title. The court then
turned to the general rules of apportionment of disputed riparian
rights. Normally, such apportionment involved drawing a line along
the channel in front of the properties, then drawing a line perpendicular to the line of the channel so that it intersects with the shore at
the point the upland property line meets the water's edge. However,
this rule applied to situations in which the shoreline was substantially
straight, whereas the shoreline in question was essentially a right angle.
The court noted an absence of controlling precedent, and evaluated the rules from nearby jurisdictions. The court recognized two
such methods of allocation, the "angle bisection formula" and the
"reasonable use" test. The court concluded that where the shoreline
was at a right angle, such as the Canal's shoreline, the "reasonable use"
test was the most equitable method of determining the owners' rights.
According to the test, the owners' rights depend on a rule of reasonableness, and must be restricted so as not to interfere with the correlative rights of other owners. As a reasonableness inquiry, the question
was one of fact for the jury, rendering summary judgment inappropriate.
Stephen Lawler

NORTH DAKOTA
Mougey Farms v. Kaspari, 579 N.W.2d 583 (N.D. 1998) (holding the
parties' written easement and lease expressed an intent contrary to the
creation of an easement implied from a preexisting use or an easement by necessity, and that partitioning the underground irrigation
system was not in error because the parties' written easement identified the ownership rights).
In 1982, the State Engineer of North Dakota issued the Kasparis a
conditional water permit requiring beneficial use of the water before
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August of 1985. Mougey agreed to help the Kasparis develop the water
right, and by 1984 Mougey operated an above ground irrigation system
on the Kasparis' land. Subsequently, the parties agreed to install an
underground irrigation system to service both the Kasparis' and
Mougey's land with Mougey paying additional rent for the irrigation
equipment financed by the Kasparis. It was also agreed that Mougey
would receive water rights for its land. The State Engineer approved a
transfer of 13 acres of water permit from the Kasparis' land to
Mougey's land.
In 1985 the parties entered into a ten year lease in which Mougey
agreed to pay a certain amount for the cost of pipe and wire for the irrigation system, and to pay additional rent for the purpose of buying
the irrigation system from the Kasparis. The parties also exercised a
written easement allowing Mougey to run water through the irrigation
system on the Kasparis' land to its land. The easement also apportioned ownership of the irrigation system, and specified that it would
terminate if Mougey no longer leased the Kasparis' land. In 1987, the
parties entered into a new ten year lease where Mougey would make
payments directly to the Kasparis' bank for the irrigation equipment.
In 1996, the Kasparis informed Mougey the lease would not be renewed, and that Mougey could not continue to pump water through
the irrigation system to its land.
Mougey sued, claiming that it could continue to pump water across
the Kasparis' land under an implied easement, an easement by necessity, or an easement of condemnation. It also sought reformation of
the 1987 lease and partition of the irrigation system. Mougey appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing its
easement claim, and the Kasparis cross-appealed the court's decision
reforming the lease and partitioning the irrigation system.
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in addressing Mougey's easement claim, recognized two types of implied easements, an easement
implied from a preexisting use and an easement by necessity. Mougey
asserted that an implied easement existed because water rights were
appurtenant to the real estate, and the Kasparis granted an implied
easement to pump water across their land. After defining the categories of implied easements, the court stated "the express grant of an
easement negates an implied easement." Here, the parties had a written, express easement. Therefore, a contract analysis was appropriate
to determine that the parties' express written intent sought termination of the easement if Mougey no longer leased the Kasparis' land.
The supreme court also found summary judgment of Mougey's
eminent domain claim for an easement to pump water across the Kasparis' land in error. The court concluded that a private person was allowed to exercise such a claim, under North Dakota law, so long as
that person is acquiring for "a public use any property or rights existing when found necessary for the application of water to beneficial
uses." The court stated that according to Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361,
each state's local conditions play an important role in deciding if a
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proposed taking to facilitate use of water is for public use. Consistent
with North Dakota law, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded
that irrigation of farmland satisfied the pubic use requirement so long
as it is under a perfected water permit issued by the State Engineer.
The supreme court also found that the easement identified the
parties' ownership rights with respect to the irrigation equipment.
Thus, the trial court was correct in partitioning the irrigation system
pursuant to the parties' intent.
As for Mougey's reformation claim, the supreme court found that
Mougey's payments to the Kasparis' bank were for the actual cost of
the irrigation system. The actual cost of the irrigation system was less
than the actual loan taken out by the Kasparis to buy the equipment.
The court upheld the use of extrinsic evidence to establish the reformation claim and held that the claim was not barred by the statute of
limitations because Mougey had no reason to know he was being overcharged until 1993. Therefore, Mougey's eminent domain claim was
remanded and the remainder of the trial court's judgment was affirmed.
Anna Litaker

OHIO
Rivers Unlimited, Inc. v. Schregardus, 685 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio Misc.
1997) (holding that Ohio's antidegradation statute did not violate the
Ohio Constitution's one-subject rule, but did violate the U.S. Constitution's supremacy and commerce clauses).
Plaintiff and Defendant both filed cross-motions for summary
judgment in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff, Rivers Unlimited, Inc., sought judgment declaring that Ohio's antidegradation
statute violated the Ohio Constitution's "one-subject rule" and the
Federal Constitution's commerce and supremacy clauses. Defendant,
Schregardus, sought to uphold Ohio's antidegradation statute. The
court granted the Defendant's motion holding that the state antidegradation statute did not violate the "one-subject rule." Conversely,
the court granted the Plaintiffs motion holding that the antidegradation statute conflicted with the Clean Water Act ("CWA"); thus, the
statute violated the Federal Constitution's supremacy and commerce
clauses.
The Ohio Constitution's one-subject rule precludes political minorities from combining their provisions into a single bill to obtain a
majority vote required for the bill's passage, and precludes a person
from attaching a provision to a bill anticipated to pass so that the provision will also pass. In order to attach a provision, the bill and the
provision must share a common purpose or relationship. However, if
the court finds that semantic and contextual analysis of the documents
constituted a manifestly gross and fraudulent violation of the rule, the
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legislative enactment will be invalidated. In this case, the antidegradation provision was attached to an appropriations bill for the operation
of the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency. Hence, the court held
that, as a matter of law, the two provisions, the appropriations and the
substantive portion, were not so unrelated as to constitute a "manifestly gross and fraudulent violation" of the Ohio Constitution's onesubject rule.
Conversely, Congress drafted a comprehensive and far-reaching
federal statute, the CWA, that the court held preempted state legislation. If a state law frustrates the CWA's purpose then the courts will
find the state law invalid. The Clean Water Act's purpose is to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters. The United States Environmental Protection Agency
("USEPA") requires states to further this purpose by establishing an
antidegradation policy that maintains high water quality.
Ohio created an antidegradation statute pursuant to the USEPA
requirement. However, Ohio's statute allowed the state environmental
protection director to degrade high quality waters when the director
found that the water body lacked exceptional recreational or ecological value. The statute enabled the director to allocate eighty percent
of the water's pollutant assimilative capacity to existing sources without
a required CWA degradation review. Under the CWA's degradation
review, a state may only degrade waters after the director has complied
with the public notice and intergovernmental coordination requirements, conducted a public hearing to consider the social and economic impacts, and chosen to lower the stream's water quality based
on the result of the public hearing.
Based on the conflict between these two statutes, the court held
that Ohio's antidegradation statute failed to comport with the federal
requirements. Because the statute allowed the director to lower a
stream's water quality by assigning the stream's pollutant assimilative
capacity without a degradation review, Ohio's antidegradation statute
frustrated the CWA's purpose. By frustrating the purpose, the state
statute conflicted with the federal statute. Therefore, the court found
the state antidegradation statute violated the U.S. Constitution's supremacy and commerce clauses.
Madoline Wallace

OREGON
Russell-Smith v. Water Resources Department, 952 P.2d 104 (Or. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that there is no statutory forfeiture for nonuse of
water, even though the water user obtained water from an unauthorized point of diversion and did not follow the statutory requirements
to apply for a change in point of diversion, provided that the water
user obtained the water from a source designated from the water right
certificate for the designated use in the designated amount).
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The petitioner Joann Russell-Smith ("Russell-Smith") and her husband acquired a certificate for water rights for domestic use on two adjoining properties called lots 4 and 5. Russell-Smith lived on lot 4 and
rented lot 5 to others. The certificate authorized diversion of water
from an "unnamed spring" and identified a particular point of diversion ("POD") where the certificate authorized the owner to take water
from that source. From 1977 to the present, the various owners of the
two properties captured water at the authorized POD in a collection
box. Overflow from the collection box, as well as water flowing from
the unnamed spring near the collection box, flowed into an intermittent stream that ran near lot 5. Renters, and later owners, of lot 5 used
the water from the intermittent stream. In early April 1996, the present owners of lot 4 filed documents with the Water Resources Department claiming statutory nonuse of the water from the intermittent
stream. The owners asked for a cancellation of that portion of the old
water right appurtenant to lot 5. The present owners claimed that because use of the water was from a place other than the described POD
in the certificate, it met the statutory definition of nonuse.
The main issue was whether a holder of a water right, who takes
water from the authorized source but does so from an unauthorized
POD has failed to use all or part of the water appropriated, thus, triggering forfeiture of the water right. The court concluded that if, as
here, a certificate holder makes an unauthorized change of POD, but
continues to use water from a designated source in a designated
amount and for the designated use, there is no "failure to use" within
the meaning of the statute.
The court reasoned that although there are special rules that a water user must follow when the user changes the POD, the key issue in
forfeiture for non-use is use, and not whether the user failed to comply
with statutory procedures for changing the POD. Oregon's water law
treats "use," "beneficial use," and "point of diversion" as distinct concepts. The statute in question focuses on "use" and "beneficial use,"
and makes no reference to "point of diversion." Although other statutes do speak to unauthorized changes in point of diversion, none refer to forfeiture as a consequence or remedy.
Moreover, nothing suggests that the legislature, in enacting the
forfeiture statute, intended an unauthorized change in POD to give
rise to forfeiture.
Joseph A. Dawson

VIRGINIA
Treacy v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 500 S.E.2d 503 (Va. 1998) (holding
that food company failed to demonstrate ajusticiable controversy with
respect to modification of a state pollution discharge permit).
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Smithfield Foods owned subsidiary corporations that operated two
pork processing plants in Isle of Wight County. In 1986, the State Water Control Board (the "Board"), through the Commonwealth of Virginia, issued a permit that regulated the wastewater Smithfield discharged into the Pagan River. The Board later modified the permit,
adding a compliance schedule for the construction of facilities that
would meet a monthly average effluent limitation of phosphorous and
limited nitrogen. Smithfield appealed the modification, challenging
the phosphorous standards that were set forth by the Board.
In 1991, a special order was issued in which Smithfield agreed to
dismiss its appeal and to decide within a specified time if it would
comply with the permit. Smithfield agreed one month later to connect its wastewater plants to the Hampton Roads Sanitation District
wastewater plant. In 1992, a new permit was issued with the same
phosphorous levels.
In 1996, the Board filed a complaint alleging that Smithfield
committed numerous permit violations and violated the special order.
The EPA then filed suit against Smithfield in the U.S. District Court
seeking penalties under the Clean Water Act for violations of certain
effluent standards, including phosphorous and TRN standards in the
1992 permit. Smithfield filed a cross-bill seeking declaratory judgment
that the special order revised, superseded, and replaced the earlier
permit.
The Chancellor issued the declaratory judgment that the phosphorous standards were inconsistent with the special order. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that there was no controversy at issue
because they had agreed that the special order precedes the permits.
Smithfield however, argued that there was a controversy because the
special order was a contract with the Commonwealth which the Commonwealth breached by issuing the 1992 permit.
The Virginia Supreme Court held that Smithfield was not entitled
to a declaratory judgment because it failed to demonstrate ajusticiable
controversy. The court found that to be justiciable a controversy must
involve specific adverse claims that are based on present, not future or
speculative, facts that are ripe for justiciable assessment. Thus, the
trial court did not have authority to issue an advisory opinion or answer speculative inquiries. No controversy existed with the Commonwealth because they agreed on the importance of the special order.
Rather, the controversy was with the EPA in the federal case against
Smithfield and it should have been pursued it that forum.
Elise S. Wald

WASHINGTON
Tiegs v. Watts, 954 P.2d 877 (Wash. 1998) (affirming a lower court
decision which held Defendants liable for breach of a farm lease and
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creating a nuisance by contaminating well water used for commercial
farming on adjacent property, even though the defendants were operating under a pollution discharge permit).
Commercial potato farmers in Washington brought suit as tenants
under farm leases against their former landlord and landlord's successor for breach of a lease and for creating a nuisance by contaminating
well water used for commercial farming. In Walla Walla County, the
Boise Cascade Corporation was disposing of its pulp-mill wastewater
under a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
Permit. However, the discharge contaminated the well water that the
farmers used to irrigate their crops.
The farmers sued based on several theories, including nuisance
per se and lost future profits for breach of a farm lease option. The
trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for $2.5 million for the
tenant farmers. The court of appeals affirmed the decision.
The main issue presented to the Washington Supreme Court was
whether the jury was properly instructed as to whether the discharge of
pollutants in Washington's waters constituted a nuisance per se in violation of the Washington Water Pollution Control Act ("WPCA"),
without a determination by the Department of Ecology that a violation
has been committed. A nuisance per se is an act or use of property
that is a nuisance in itself and, therefore, is not allowed under any circumstances. A lawful business is not a nuisance per se, but may become a nuisance based on the surrounding facts. If a person conducts
his business lawfully by discharging pollutants in compliance with an
NPDES permit, but unreasonably interferes with another person's use
and enjoyment of his or her property, then a nuisance may have been
committed.
The common law right of action to recover damages for wrongful
water pollution is well established in Washington. The court found
that the WPCA does not expressly or impliedly abolish this right of action.
The court determined that whether a business created a nuisance
that resulted in damages to adjacent property is a question for the jury.
Here, the jury determined that Boise Cascade was responsible and
awarded damages for lost future profits in the amount of $2.5 million.
Lost profits are the proper measure of damages when they are within
the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered,
they are the proximate result of the defendant's breach, and they are
proven with reasonable certainty. The court found that the testimony
and exhibits of the farmers provided a reasonably certain basis for the
jury to use as a measure of damages. Therefore, the decisions of the
trial court and court of appeals were affirmed.
Eric V Snyder
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Washington Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 957 P.2d 1241 (Wash.
1998) (holding that quantification method utilized in issuing final water right certificate must be based upon actual application of water to
beneficial use).
In 1973, George Theodoratus applied for a water right to serve a
residential development planned near the Skagit River in Skagit
County. The approved application purported to create a vested water
right once the water supply system was capable of delivering water.
The quantification method used to determine the extent of the water
right was based on system capacity. The Department had commonly
used this "pumps and pipes method" for at least the past 40 years.
Several extensions were granted to the permit which originally called
for completion of the system by 1980. In 1992, Mr. Theodoratus requested another extension. The Department granted the extension,
subject to a condition that the vested water right would be determined
based upon actual application of water to beneficial use, not on system
capacity.
An appeal was filed with the Pollution Control Hearing Board
which struck the conditions placed on the extension. The Department
appealed to the superior court which reversed, holding that the Department had the discretion to condition subsequent extensions by
providing that the final water certificate would be issued in the
amount of water actually put to beneficial use. The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's finding to determine whether
a final certificate of water right might be issued based upon the capacity of a developer's water delivery system, or whether a vested water
right may be obtained only in the amount of water actually put to
beneficial use.
The court held that state statutory and common law does not allow
for a final certificate of water right to be issued based upon system capacity. "Relevant statutes, case law, and recent legislative history leave
no doubt that quantification of Appellant's water right for purposes of
issuing a final certificate of water right must be based upon actual application of water to beneficial use, not upon system capacity." The
original permit required the Department to issue a vested right based
on an unlawful method of quantification. Therefore, the Department
has the authority to condition any extension, so that the final certificate will comply with all relevant statutes.
An interpretation of the relevant groundwater and surface water
statutes, taken together, are consistent with a fundamental principle of
Western water law which requires the actual application of water to a
beneficial use. In Washington State, public groundwater appropriations are also subject to the state's surface water provisions. The court
determined that the terms contained within the groundwater provision (granting a final certificate upon construction of a water system in
compliance with the terms of the permit and perfection of the appropriative right) were inconsistent with the requirements of the surface
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water code, specifically made applicable to the appropriation of
groundwater, and therefore inapplicable.
Legislative intent based on statutory interpretation requires that
the final certificate of water right be consistent with the beneficial use
requirements. A determination of beneficial use is based upon diversion and actual use. "Perfection" and "beneficial use" have the same
meaning under the applicable statutes, thereby limiting the appropriation to the actual use. This requirement effectuates legislative concerns about the availability of water resources given the ever increasing
demand an d eliminates speculation and uncertainty in the management of limited water resources.
John B. Ridgley

Hillis v. State Dept. of Ecology, 932 P.2d 139 (Wash. 1997) (holding
the use of watershed assessments and the prioritization of applications
for groundwater appropriations as within the department's statutory
authority).
Developers in Kittias County, Washington, Larry and Veralene Hillis, filed nine applications for groundwater appropriations with the
Department of Ecology ("Ecology") in 1992. After two years and no
response from Ecology, the developers sought a writ of mandamus in
superior court to compel Ecology to process their applications. The
trial court granted the writ, and Ecology appealed. On appeal, Ecology challenged the writ of mandamus, which demanded the immediate processing of the applications, the cessation of watershed assessments until Ecology had investigated and decided upon all
applications, and the court's holding that Ecology's decision to prioritize applications did not follow the APA procedures for rule making.
The Washington Supreme Court considered a few key circumstances when making its decision. Primarily, in 1993 the legislature severely cut Ecology's budget, causing them to implement some new priorities and decisions regarding the groundwater application backlog in
its office. In addition, the area for which the developers sought
groundwater rights already had nearly 1,000 applicants, some with seniority, and the area's drought created a water shortage for all involved.
In deciding whether to compel Ecology to immediately process the
Hillis' application and cease the watershed assessments, the court
looked at Ecology's statutory authority and whether it acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in making its decisions.
Ecology argued that the watershed assessments allowed them to
process applications more quickly than taking the applications one by
one and making decisions individually as it received them. Instead,
the department could group the applications by area, conduct a watershed assessment to determine the availability of water in the area, and
then decide on each application accordingly. Ecology also prioritized
applications by those for public health emergency use, public project
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short-term use, and changes to existing rights. The developers in this
case did not meet any of Ecology's priorities and many applications
were senior in priority to theirs. The Hillises argued that Ecology had
a statutory duty to process their application in a timely manner.
The court found no time limit in Ecology's governing statute, observed that agencies may not exceed legislative funding to perform its
duties, and stated that "[n]either Ecology's decisions to prioritize
emergency applications nor.., to batch applications by watershed are
arbitrary or capricious or beyond its statutory authority."
Ecology responded to the budget cuts appropriately, according to
the court. In developing the watershed assessment program, Ecology
petitioned and won an additional $500,000 in emergency funds from
Washington State. Once the decision to prioritize the applications by
emergency, short term and existing use evolved, the department notified applicants and the public through a series of publications.
In its holding, the court also noted that the public policy effect of
an immediate investigation of the developer's applications and a cessation of watershed assessments must be considered as well. If the court
compelled Ecology to act in accordance with the trial court's writ,
thousands of other applicants could petition for immediate investigation as well, exacerbating the department's backlog problem. In the
meantime, by forcing Ecology to cease the assessments, a backlog
would build as Ecology investigated each application as received.
"[Enforcing the writ] would put Ecology in the untenable position of
either violating a court order or violating the state constitution...
which forbid[s] agencies to expend any money in excess of the
amount appropriated .... " The court commented that the separation
of powers doctrine kept it from compelling the state legislature to give
Ecology the funds to process applications in a more timely manner.
Finally, the court also refused to violate other applicants' rights in order to process the Hillis' application first. "As Ecology correctly points
out, it cannot determine if there is water available for Hillis until it has
processed the senior applicants who seek water from the same source."
The supreme court did uphold the trial court's invalidation of
Ecology decisions for not following rule-making procedures in accordance with the APA. Hillis asserted, and the trial court found, that
Ecology's assessments and prioritization of applications were new
"qualifications and requirements" which "are invalid unless adopted in
compliance with the APA." Ecology argued that the changes did not
affect whether an application met water rights criteria. The supreme
court countered that while the criteria for granting water rights went
unchanged, prerequisites to those decisions must follow APA rule
making procedures that give applicants and the public a right to notice and comment. The court held the changes invalid for the above
reasons, and it noted that Ecology could continue with the watershed
assessments, but could not make any decisions based on the assessments until it followed APA procedures for rule making. In the meantime, Ecology could adopt "temporary emergency rules" to keep the
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application process streamlined "while regular rule making proceeds."
JenniferLee

State of Washington, Dep't of Ecology v. Acquavella, 935 P.2d 595
(Wash. 1997) (holding that confirmation of a water right must be
made upon a finding of beneficial use; an appropriate measure of an
irrigation district's water right is the acres of irrigable land to which
the water right is appurtenant; and, that classification of a water right
as either standby or reserve cannot serve to protect it from future challenges of non-use).
This direct appeal arose from a general adjudication of water
rights in the Yakima River Basin and the trial court's water award to
one of many claimants, the Yakima-Tieton Irrigation District ('YrID").
Formed in 1918, the YTID received its water from reservoirs constructed and maintained by the United States pursuant to the Reclamation Act. Under a 1945 Consent Decree, the YTID's primary water
right was listed as 96,000 acre-feet for annual use during the irrigation
season. Pursuant to amendments to YTID's contract with the Bureau
of Reclamation, YTID was granted another 18,000 acre-feet in low water years. This grant was based upon the condition that the additional
entitlement did not exceed the safe carrying capacity of YTID's canals.
Due to this condition, however, YTID has never been able to accept
the additional 18,000 acre-feet. The trial court classified YTID as a major claimant with state-based water rights and determined that YTID
could carry 110,700 acre feet safely in its canals and awarded that
amount to YTID for the irrigation season. The trial court entered a
finding of fact and order with this water entitlement describing YTID's
water right as being appurtenant to 27,900 irrigable acres. The trial
court stated that YTID's "current irrigable acreage is subject to change
based on future reclassification of the Bureau of Reclamation." Two
assignments of error as to the classification of acreage were raised as
issues for review.
First, YTID argued that 18,000 acre-feet of the amount awarded
should have been classified specifically as standby/reserve water. Second, YTID challenged the appropriateness of the statement concerning the Bureau of Reclamation's reclassification of irrigable acres
within YTID. Additionally, the Department of Ecology ("DOE"), crossappellant, challenged the trial court with two issues of appeal. First,
DOE challenged the trial court's reliance on the 1945 Consent Decree
as evidence of YTID's water right. DOE asserted that any water right
must be based on actual, past beneficial use of the water. Second,
DOE asserted that the trial court erred in using the irrigable acres
category instead of the actual irrigated acres category. DOE alleged
that YTID's water right should be limited by the number of actual acres
previously irrigated.

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding
with only one exception. To reach its decision, the court examined
the principle of "beneficial use." The court stated, "[t]he principle
that water must be used for a beneficial purpose is a fundamental
tenet of the philosophy of water law in the West. Under both state and
federal law, beneficial use is the basis, the measure and the limit of the
right to the use of water." The court agreed with DOE's argument that
the trial court's confirmation of 110,700 acre-feet to YTID without
making a finding of fact as the whether that quantity has ever been
beneficially used was inconsistent with beneficial use requirements.
The court reversed the trial court's decision concerning the quantification of YTID's water right and remanded the case for an accurate calculation based upon diversion and actual use.
However, the court did not find any merit in DOE's argument that
the trial court erred when it specified that YTID's entitlement was appurtenant to 27,900 irrigable acres. The premise that YTID cannot irrigate any land which, historically, has not been irrigated, was implicit
in DOE's argument. The court ruled that this argument was misplaced
and the trial court's reliance on the irrigable, as opposed to irrigated,
category was correct. Indeed, the court reasoned that the actual irrigated category is less useful than the irrigable category in denoting the
extent of YTID's water right. Although a water right certificate must
specify the land to which the right attaches, "the right can be shifted to
any land in the district on which the water can be beneficially usedi.e., the fight can be applied to any irrigable acreage." For this reason,
it was most useful for Y'TID's certificate to denote the number of acres
to which the water can be applied beneficially, not the number of
acres which has been actually irrigated.
The supreme court did not find merit in either of YTID's arguments on appeal. Y'TID first argued that the trial court should have
classified a portion of its entitlement as standby or reserve water. YTID
implied that any quantity of water described as such would protect
YTID's entitlement from future claims of relinquishment. The court
held that this argument was not supported by law, nor was it ripe for
review. Whether water is used as standby or reserve is a question of
fact that is relevant only at the time one asserts relinquishment. Second, YfID objected to the inclusion of the "reclassification" language
in the trial court's order. However, the court reasoned that YTID mistakenly read the trial court's language regarding classification as
somehow allowing the Bureau of Reclamation to unilaterally reclassify
YTID's acreage without regard to the statutory requirements for undergoing such a reclassification. Holding that nothing in the trial
court's language purports, or is able, to interfere with statutory requirements necessary for reclassification to occur, the court affirmed
the trial court's holding on this issue.
CarolinePayne
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Hubbard v. State, 936 P.2d 27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
"significant hydraulic continuity" between aquifer and stream,
not significant effect on stream, requires conditions on groundwater permits
to protect instream flows).
In 1976, the State of Washington established minimum instream
flows for the Okanogan River. Between 1979 and 1988, the Hubbard
brothers dug two wells 4,000 and 5,700 feet from the Okanogan River
for the purpose of irrigation and frost protection of orchards. The
wells drew from the Wagonroad Coulee aquifer, which supplied the
Okanogan aquifer, tributary to the Okanogan River. The State Department of Ecology found water available for appropriation, and issued permits conditioned upon the maintenance of minimum instream flow levels.
State statute required that Ecology impose
conditions where a "significant hydraulic continuity" exists between an
aquifer and surface water. Hubbard's hydrologist calculated the effect
of the wells on the river during low flow as a .004% reduction of the
surface flow.
The Hubbards appealed the Pollution Control Hearings Board's
approval of Ecology's permit conditions based on the contention that
their wells held rights senior to the instream flow appropriation and
that their wells would not significantly affect the flow of the river. The
court held that statutorily created minimum flow appropriations hold
"priority dates as of the effective dates of their establishment."
The
State, thus, held the instream flow rights senior to Hubbards' rights.
The court further held that "significant" as used in the applicable
state statute applied to the degree of physical connection between the
aquifer and the river, not whether the pumping would exert a significant impact on the river's flow. Since the Wagonroad Coulee aquifer
drained entirely into the Okanogan River or its aquifer, the court held
Ecology's finding of "significant hydraulic continuity" not manifestly
unreasonable.
DarrellBrown

CONFERENCE REPORT
THE FOURTH WESTERN REGIONAL INSTREAM
FLOW CONFERENCE
WATER FOR FISH VS. WATER FOR PEOPLE: A REAL CONFLICT?
In 1973, the Colorado Legislature created an instream flow program with the mission of "correlating the activities of mankind with
some reasonable preservation of the environment."' Recognizing the
continuing impact of this legislation and similar programs throughout
the West, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Forest Service
sponsored an instream flow conference, at Copper Mountain Resort,
Colorado on October 8-9, 1998. The conference attracted participants
from over 50 different environmental organizations, state and federal
governmental agencies, water districts, and other water professionals.
These participants came from 18 different states and 1 foreign nation,
and included some of the most influential legal minds and policy
makers in the Western United States. The conference, organized by
Trout Unlimited, focused on six aspects of instream flow regulation:
(1) water for fish; (2) water for people; (3) the value and costs of instream flows; (4) instream flows and endangered species recovery; (5)
state and tribal strategies, and (6) federal roles.
J. William (Bill) McDonald, Special Assistant to the Commissioner
of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, delivered the keynote address. Mr.
McDonald reviewed the history and development of instream flows
("ISFs"). He specifically highlighted the difficult political and legal
obstacles including: instream fishery requirements in the face of economic activity diversions; competing needs of different fish species
(e.g., native, introduced, warm water and cold water species); competition between anglers and other recreational users; conflicts between
flushing flows, minimum flows, and optimum flows; and state regulation versus federal regulation.
Other speakers from the first morning session focused on flow
management, and the water quantity and quality needed to serve the
purposes of dedicated ISFs. Leroy Poff, a professor at Colorado State
University, spoke about natural flow regimes. Harold Tyus, a professor
at the University of Colorado, discussed whether ISFs are effective in
preserving native species.
Providing the unique perspective of an angler who has fished some
of the 8,000 miles of streams and rivers protected by ISF rights in
Colorado, Dave Taylor, a Trout Unlimited member, criticized Western
1. Act of April 23, 1973, ch. 442, 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 97.
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water law as too narrow in its definitions, sometimes painfully illogical,
and guilty of encouraging and rewarding waste. He also pointed out
that many of the ISF rights in Colorado are junior rights. These junior
rights are often inadequate to benefit the aquatic environment. He
called for expanding the definition of beneficial use for private interests choosing to utilize ISFs.
The focus of the conference shifted from fish to people beginning
with a luncheon speech by John "Woody" Wodraska, the outgoing
General Manager of the Southern California Metropolitan Water District. As manager of one of the largest water users in the West, Mr.
Wodraska called for pragmatism in resolving water disputes among
competing users.
The afternoon series of speakers focusing on water for people began with Pamela Case a social scientist at the USDA Forest Service, who
profiled the West's changing demographics. She noted the change
from primarily agrarian uses to a growing urban service based economy, and the growing conflicts caused by increasing demands by municipal and urban users and their impact upon irrigators who appropriate approximately eighty percent of all water. Chips Barry, Manager
of Denver Water, spoke about the need for compromise among local
interests. The remainder of the afternoon session was devoted to the
economics of ISFs.
The second day began with a presentation by Dan Luecke of the
Environmental Defense Fund on state law and the Endangered Species
Act. Mr. Luecke discussed the problems of maintaining ISFs, and
some proposed solutions for the fifteen mile section of the Colorado
River above the confluence with the Gunnison River. Two examples of
Mr. Luecke's solutions included entering into forbearance agreements
with senior appropriators to release water for fish, and allowing release
of excess water in Green Mountain and Rudi Reservoirs for ISFs. Following Mr. Luecke, Ray Tani of the Colorado Water Conservation District further discussed how the fifteen mile section illustrates conflict
among users. Mr. Tani spoke about the ineffectiveness of junior ISF
rights on that stretch of water. He proposed contractual operation
agreements as an alternative. He noted the disagreement among users
as to ISFs versus minimum and maximum flows that allow fishermen
access to the Fryingpan River below Rudi Reservoir. He also pointed
out that cooperative agreements in the Upper Colorado Basin have
worked thus far due to relatively favorable hydrologic conditions, but
warned about conflict in times of shortage due to drought.
John Volkman, counsel for the Northwest Power Planning Council,
discussed ISFs within the Columbia River Basin and the effects of hydroelectric projects on Columbia River salmon fisheries. Mr. Volkman
elaborated on focusing ISF efforts on core areas of reproduction for
spawning salmon. He also questioned whether the $100 million spent
by power companies to mitigate the effects of dams has been well
spent. He criticized such efforts as the creation of non-natural reproductive systems, exemplified by such practices as barging fish to spawn-
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ing grounds. He also noted that while native fish populations have
continued to decline, hatchery raised fish populations have stabilized.
The proliferation of hatchery raised fish has succeeded in creating a
second rate substitute fish population with lower reproductive rates
and higher susceptibility to disease.
The next series of speakers focused on state and Native American
tribal strategies. Reed Benson of Oregon's WaterWatch spoke about
environmental groups using state water laws to restore and protect
stream flows. Mr. Benson's organization applies for ISF rights, opposes
applications for new uses, and opposes rubber stamp extensions of
temporary water rights. He pointed out that strong laws mean nothing
without strong implementation and enforcement, and that his organization lobbies for better management and enforcement of existing water uses.
Walter Echo-hawk of the Native American Rights Fund presented a
Native American's perspective. Mr. Echo-hawk argued that ISF policy
makers must take into account and include Indian reserved rights. He
pointed out the unique Native American perspective of close observation of the natural world, and argued that the cultural and historical
perspective of Native Americans can be a powerful tool for policy makers. He also noted that other factors mandate Native American participation in any ISF discussion, including the sheer number of treaty
rights to hunt, gather, and fish which are recognized property rights;
and the relatively senior tribal water rights that stem from those treaties under the Winters Doctrine. He presented a case study of the
Oregon Klamath Tribes to illustrate his arguments.
David Gillilan, co-author of Instream Flow Protection, discussed the
states' role in protecting ISFs, noting both their innovation and caution. Gillilan spoke of three different state mechanisms used to meet
ISF objectives. According to Gillilan, the first and strongest are ISF
property rights. He also noted the use of the Public Trust Doctrine
and administrative set asides.
Colorado Supreme CourtJustice Greg Hobbs delivered a luncheon
speech about the struggle to integrate ISF rights into Western water
law. Justice Hobbs discussed the prior appropriation system and the
stability and flexibility offered by the definition of beneficial use. He
referred to "borders drawn and borders crossed," an analogy of the
vested rights of the prior appropriation system and the conflicts that
are presented by the relatively new adoption of ISF rights.
Bruce Bernard of the U.S. Department of Justice discussed the
roles of ISFs under reserved water rights after United States v. New Mexico. Mr. Bernard provided an overview of some of the Forest Service
arguments concerning the Idaho Snake River Basin Adjudication. The
Forest Service claims arise under the Wilderness Act, the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act, the Forest Service Organic Act, the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act, and various national recreation area Acts. He also
provided insight into what he deemed a cumbersome and inefficient
process. By way of example, he discussed an almost two year litigation
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process to recognize that water is essential to the preservation of fish.
Barry Nelson of Save the San Francisco Bay Association spoke
about the Central Valley Project on the Sacramento and San Joaquin
Rivers, and the challenge of changing water policies developed over a
half century ago. He discussed the impacts of the project on the ecosystem's salmon fishery and the 24 year decline from 191, 000 fish in
1967 to a 1991 level below 200. He outlined the three recent attempts
to turn around the Central Valley Project's Environmental Damage
and the latest state and federal cooperative effort known as CALFED.
The Program Manager of the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission, Curt Brown, delivered a synopsis of the Commission's latest report. Bennett Raley of Trout and Raley, P.C. and Chair
of the Federal Water Rights Task Force spoke about the Task Force
report on Forest Service attempts to require water users to relinquish a
part of their water supplies in order to provide water for the secondary
purposes of the National Forest as part of the Forest Service's permitting authority. The overall conclusion of the report was:
Congress has not delegated to the necessary authority to allow the
Forest Service to require water users to relinquish a part of their water
rights to the United States as a condition of the grant or renewal of
federal permits;
Decrees entered in McCarren Amendment water rights adjudications are intended to result in a binding allocation of the rights to water use for federal and non-federal purposes, including the use of water to attain primary and secondary purposes of the National Forests.
Accordingly, the Forest Service may not use its permitting authority to
reallocate or otherwise obtain water for National Forest purposes from
non-federal water rights which have been or will be recognized in
McCarren proceedings; and
The Forest Service must attain the secondary purposes of the National Forests by obtaining and exercising water rights in accordance
with state and federal law, and by working with owners of non-federal
water rights to achieve National Forest purposes without interfering
with the diversion, storage, and use of water for non-federal purposes.
The use of these approaches will curtail the Forest Service's impulse to
act in a manner exceeding its legal authority.
Ed Marston, Editor of the High Country News, concluded the conference. He noted both the flexibility and the rigidity of systems in
which ISF rights are achieved. He commented that the landscape of
the West is a reflection of the morality of those who live within that
landscape, and the need for a social and economic vision to accompany the moral vision of those interested in the future of ISF rights
and indeed the future of the West.
James Fosnaught

